

The CRIMSON HISTORICAL REVIEW

An Undergraduate Journal of History at the University of Alabama



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FROM THE EDITOR

Dear Readers,

I want to begin with a refrain that, however trite, feels essential: I hope you and yours are—and continue to be—well. This year has brought with it numerous tragedies and challenges; and we at the *Crimson Historical Review*, like many of those at other student organizations and scholarly journals, have been forced to adapt to the exigencies of pandemic life. Nevertheless, *CHR* staff—not a group to be slowed—have demonstrated their typical energy and endeavor, producing one of our strongest publications yet.

To this end, the *CHR* owes much to the authors who chose to submit their work. This cycle, the journal received nearly fifty papers from institutions spanning the United States and parts of the globe. Each piece—meritorious in its own way—was diligently evaluated, with peer-reviewers writing in total over two-hundred pages of comments and suggestions.

Selected from this particularly competitive batch, the articles in the present edition represent an intriguing mix of geographic and thematic foci—histories of labor, propaganda, and governance, to name a few—, as well as methodological interventions—including colonial, information, and intersectional studies. They are meticulously-sourced and precisely-written; in all, exemplary, and further improved by our intelligent review board and watchful copy editors.

To sum, I am amazed that, despite remote meetings and fears of a suspended semester, the *CHR*'s end product has proven so characteristically ambitious: almost one-hundred pages of robust scholarship, plural in its inquiry, comprehensive in its breadth, richly-formatted, and ready-to-print. I am amazed, too, by the professionalism, positive attitude, and persistent effort of our entire staff.

Here, I would like to thank especially Dr. Margaret Peacock, *CHR* faculty advisor. Put simply, there is no journal without her steady guidance and unflinching commitment. I am likewise grateful for Logan Goulart, Review Board Executive, and Lily Mears, Chief Copy Editor; both led their divisions with remarkable *sangfroid*. Lastly, I extend my most sincere appreciation to John Pace, Production Editor. He is as witty as he is indefatigable, and a true servant to this project.

Yours,

Jackson C Foster

Jackson C. Foster

Editor-in-Chief, the *Crimson Historical Review*



Crimson Historical Review

SLAVES OF THE WEST: Exploitation, Struggle and Resistance Among Early 20th Century California Farmworkers

Andrew Bilodeau

Historical work on California farmworkers has often focused on the rise of the United Farmworkers Union and the battles their members fought, but this timeline overlooks previous generations of important organizers and conflicts across the state's agricultural lands. This paper, focused both on repression and resistance, engages with a variety of secondary sources as well as newspaper archives and contemporary farm records. It argues that at the turn of the 20th century, a diverse group of farmworkers endured economic, social, and political repression that, together, made for a situation ripe for forced labor. In the face of these circumstances, farmworkers united, sometimes across racial and ethnic lines, to organize against exploitation.

Introduction

Every March 31st, Californians celebrate Cesar Chavez, the labor giant who exposed exploitative farm working conditions to the wider public. The influence of Chavez and his collaborator, Dolores Huerta, on California labor history is immense; their battles and victories, including famous boycotts and strikes, merit celebration. However, many incorrectly believe that the United Farm Workers Movement was the first mobilization the California farmworker. The fight for a more humane farming economy has long shaped California's history. In another world, California might observe a J.M. Lizarras Day, in honor of another California labor leader of a different, forgotten generation that also grabbed the attention of millions of Californians through their activism.

Another misconception places larger-than-life figures and organizations at the forefront of California's farm labor activist history rather than individual farmworkers. Popular representations of 1930s California are often guilty of this, a landscape of recollection depicted by John Steinbeck and Dorothea Lange, who were among California's wealthiest residents speaking about the exploitation in the fields.¹

Perhaps foremost among these intellectuals was Upton Sinclair who, even today, finds himself hailed as a trailblazer of the 1930s California labor movement. At the turn of the 20th century, Sinclair personified muckraker journalism, publishing *The Jungle* (1904), *King Coal* (1917), and *Oil!* (1927), exposés of the meatpacking, coal mining, and oil industries respectively. After he established himself as a prominent leftist thinker, he ran for political office several times in California as a member of the Socialist Party. In 1933, Sinclair pushed his political presence into the mainstream and ran for Governor of California as a Democrat.² The announcement sent shockwaves through the state's political elite, who had discounted Sinclair's political ambitions as the pursuits of a hopeless radical. The most radical elements of

¹ Anne Loftis. *Witnesses to the Struggle: Imaging the 1930s California Labor Movement*. (Reno, NV: University of Nevada Press, 2014).

² "Sinclair to seek California Office," *The Christian Science Monitor*, September 16, 1933.

his movement concerned human rights abuses on California farms: Sinclair's proposition was that the State of California buy up agricultural lands and train unemployed Californians to work in them.³ Sinclair won the California Democratic Party's nomination for Governor, shocking observers around the country. However, a well-executed opposition research campaign and the lack of enthusiastic support from the Party (and perhaps his overconfidence) doomed Sinclair in the general election.

Sinclair's gubernatorial run influenced millions of Californians, but a focus on his campaign would obscure decades of organizing that had been done by farmworkers themselves in the state. Upton Sinclair's rise as an intellectual in mainstream California politics reflected what would become a common theme in California farmworker activism: wealthy intellectual backers masking the constant effort by the laborers themselves.

In 1935, Carey McWilliams published the legendary California farm labor exposé *Factories in the Field*. His book shocked many across the country and shifted conceptions of the labor movement beyond industrial work. He opens his book by saying it sheds light on "a hidden California."⁴ But the story was never hidden for California's farmworkers. They had been organizing and working to expose their enslavement for decades when McWilliams's book was published.

The following piece takes the reader back to a different, forgotten time in California's labor history—without famous supporters or enough media coverage to build a movement. This is the story of slavery in the California farmlands at the turn of the 20th century and the bravery of the farm laborers that experienced it and worked to end it. It is a story of massive potential and heartbreaking failure. In many ways, it is an analysis of what could have been—and how California's farmworkers refused to be silenced.

Most historical analyses of California farmworkers' movements have focused on the United Farm Workers (UFW), led by Cesar Chavez and Dolores Huerta in the mid-20th century. Other scholars, however, have also attempted to shift this historical narrative. For example, Dionicio Nodín Valdés's *Organized Agriculture and the Labor Movement Before the UFW* consciously aims to rewrite the timeline of farmworker organizing. Valdés's work aims to connect the struggles of farmworkers in Hawaii, California, and Puerto Rico as a broader fight against imperialism and settler colonialism. While "Slaves of the West" takes on a less ambitious project, it aims to add yet another voice to the historiography that has called for a reimagining of farmworker struggles beyond the UFW. In addition, "Slaves of the West" also seeks to transform the timeline of farmworker organizing that has been taken for granted for a generation. In Anne Loftis's *Witnesses to the Struggle*, she recounts the organizing of a later generation of farmworkers, whose work in the 1930s substantially impacted the progressive leaders of the day, such as Carey McWilliams. However, "Slaves of the West" takes a different approach, centering the labor organizers and workers in their own struggle, asserting its significance in their own lives, not just the lives of the elites.

In addition to highlighting the untold stories of California's farmworkers at the turn of the 20th century, this paper also makes two central arguments. First, it argues that the California agricultural capitalist economy—the land owners, labor contractors, and state—stripped farmworkers of their autonomy and treated them as slaves to their employers. Though a provocative claim, it spells it out with three characteristics of contemporary farm labor: (1) the living and working conditions on

³ S. Korman "Speakers Pay Labor Tribute at World's Fair," *Chicago Daily*, September 3, 1943.

⁴ Carey McWilliams and Douglas C. Sackman *Factories in the Field: The Story of Migratory Farm Labor in California*. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000).

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farms ignored workers' rights; (2) state actors, especially law enforcement, criminalized farmworkers when they were not on the farms providing cheap labor; and (3) contractors colluded with farmers to trap laborers in cycles of debt and criminally low wages. Second, this narrative expands the common periodization of California farmworker resistance to include the grassroots rebellions of the early 20th century. Moreover, it argues that this resistance, whether violent or nonviolent, organized or spontaneous, required solidarity across and along racial and occupational lines.

Beyond ideological concurrences and arguments, this piece also utilizes other histories of farmworkers for important contextualization. Foremost among these is Richard Steven Street's *Beasts of the Field: A Narrative History of California's Farmworkers, 1769-1913*, which covers many of the events outlined in this article. Readers will notice, however, that this article utilizes many narrative pieces from Street's work in an effort to analyze these events in the framework of forced labor, a framework Street does not engage with nearly as centrally. "Slaves of the West" also draws from Carey McWilliams's *Factories in the Field*, which, due to its journalistic nature, is used much like a primary source in this work to enhance descriptions of the lives of farmworkers at the turn of the 20th century.

In addition to engaging with the secondary sources listed above, this piece also makes use of multiple bases of primary source documents. Primarily, this comes in the form of California newspaper archives (mostly the *Los Angeles Times*), which illustrate not only a recounting of events but also ideological responses to those events from members of the community. It also utilizes the records of George F. Johnston, housed at the Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library at Yale University. This collection includes payroll records and day-to-day work-logs and provides valuable context that illustrate the racial and class dynamics of life on a turn-of-the-century farm in California.

Writer's Note

In this piece, I chose to use the word "slavery." Modern discourse has often opted toward other phrases, such as human trafficking or labor trafficking. For many, this stems from a desire to avoid comparisons to the profound, systemic injustice that was chattel slavery in the American South. Avoidance of the word is often seen as a way to pay respect to the severe nature of that iteration of enslavement.

I do not take my choice lightly. Thus, it is appropriate to explain the choice. The United Nations defines slavery as something "identified by an element of ownership or control over another's life, coercion and the restriction of movement and by the fact that someone is not free to leave or to change an employer."⁵

The history in this piece reflects that many of California's farmworkers were never free from their labor and were often paid wages that essentially amounted to nothing. Moreover, refusing to work could have devastating and even deadly consequences. Farmworkers, many of whom were recent immigrants, endured all sorts of abuses to survive. In addition to abuses from labor bosses, growers, and landowners, these men also fell victim to widespread bigotry and an early version of California's prison-industrial complex. They were not only slaves of individuals but of a socioeconomic system. Thus, it is essential for this paper to attach a word with the weight of slavery to early 20th century Californian agricultural workers.

I find it also pertinent to assert that this is in no way a comparative piece. I do not wish to assert that this Western version of slavery was on par with the chattel slavery seen throughout the Southeast. In fact, there existed such chattel slavery in

⁵ "Slavery," as defined by the United Nations, accessed on April 15, 2019.

parts of the West as well. Rather, I intend to propose the dynamics of California's agricultural business as a *different* and *less violent* but still inhumane version of slavery that fits our modern definitions. I believe this is an important endeavor because expanding the framework of how historians imagine forced labor can lay bare the violence of racial capitalism in new forms, opening the scholarly conversation to new arenas of thought.

Part One: Slaves of the West

Fourteen-year-old Claude F. Hankins killed his foreman, George Mosse on a farm in Marysville, California in July 1904.^{6*} Hankins's sister sent him to work as punishment for befriending a rowdy crowd of young men. The practice of sending juvenile delinquents to work on California's farms had become commonplace by this time—until newspapers in San Francisco began to cover the arrest and prosecution of Claude Hankins. The trial shocked crowds of reporters, not because of the murder, but because of the horrific stories about the physical abuse, sexual assault, and psychological manipulation he endured at the hands of his foreman. Others corroborated the adolescent's claims. Charles N. Dray, a former coworker of Hankins, shocked the court when he said, "we were slaves on that ranch."⁷ Dray shared others' anecdotes of struggling to flee the farm and of his own experience earning one dollar for a year's work. Nonetheless, Hankins was found guilty of second-degree murder. Despite pleas for leniency from the jury, the judge sentenced the young child to 16 years in prison.

In the early 20th century, much like today, California farmers exploited the labor of migratory farmworkers, many of whom were newcomers to the region. For the first decades of the century, most of these laborers were poor Japanese, Filipino, Mexican, or White. Many were immigrants, documented and undocumented, and spoke only broken English.⁸ Farmworkers, already disempowered by their circumstances and poverty, were further denied agency when they suffered violent abuses like Hankins and when they were forced to endure dangerous and inhumane working conditions.

Poor quality housing made even basic human functions difficult for farmworkers. In the orange groves of Southern California, farmworkers were provided housing in the form of "plenty of clean hay to sleep on."⁹ Restroom and shower facilities were usually minimal or nonexistent. One laborer recalled a grower offering him "the side of a rail fence and a five-gallon coal-oil can to cook... meals on."¹⁰ One landowner, George Johnston, housed his workers in tents on his property. Although these tents were better for workers than forcing them to sleep without cover, they still required the men to pack in uncomfortably close quarters, with as many as ten men in a tent designed for four people.¹¹ Moreover, given the wages Johnston paid his

⁶ Richard Steven Street. *Beasts of the Field: A Narrative History of California Farmworkers, 1769-1913*. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), 473.

* The reader will notice throughout the piece that I draw heavily upon Steven Richard Street's work, *Beasts of the Field*. Street's book on California farm labor is incredibly important for the study of this time period, as it recounts essential anecdotes discussed in few other places. I trust that the reader understands that while I respect the work of Street greatly, I believe my historical analysis adds layers of dynamics left unaddressed by Street in his massive project. For example, I choose analyze California farm work as forced labor in much more substantial and deliberate ways compared to Street.

⁷ Street, 474.

⁸ McWilliams and Sackman. *Factories in the Field*.

⁹ Street. *Beasts of the Field*, 504.

¹⁰ Street, 504.

¹¹ George F. Johnston Company Records. Yale Collection of Western Americana, Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library.

laborers, it would have taken over 100 hours of work for the workers to purchase the tents in the first place.

Conditions of the job disrupted attention to human necessities, like sleep. Some apple farmers required workers to spend mornings sitting outside in freezing temperatures without pay while they waited for the frost to melt off the trees.¹² On some farms, growers made the pickers responsible for keeping the fruit from freezing overnight. Laborers did so by burning fires by the produce overnight, skipping sleep along the way. The next morning, they'd still be required to get to work on time to pick more produce all day.¹³ This environment led to frequent farm accidents, especially when ladders and other equipment could weigh upwards of seventy-five pounds. Farmworkers had little say in their labor—they either endured enslavement for survival or did not survive at all.

Japanese farmworkers in the early 20th century faced further layers of exploitation that compounded their hardships on the farm. Japanese laborers often had to work under *keiyaku-nin*, who were roughly equivalent to labor contractors, to get consistent work.¹⁴ The *keiyaku-nin* benefited the laborers as often as they exploited them. Usually English-speaking Japanese immigrants, the *keiyaku-nin* frequently negotiated labor contracts with local growers without consulting the workers they were bargaining away, sometimes agreeing to make them work longer hours for lower pay.¹⁵ After the work finished, they charged several expenses for translation, medical care, and office filing fees, even when such services never occurred. In all, *keiyaku-nin* could take between 20-40% of a worker's earnings. They also often took advantage of workers who had taken to gambling, operating makeshift casinos in Japanese settlements and profiting off of the workers' habits.

But the workers fared even worse when *keiyaku-nin* were not involved. In 1916, after *keiyaku-nin* influence had fallen considerably, grower George F. Johnston paid a white labor contractor for Japanese workers at a rate of around one-third of what he paid their white counterparts.¹⁶ The *keiyaku-nin* labor system forced Japanese farmworkers to accede to the demands of their wealthier co-ethnics or be forced out of labor altogether.

Even before they encountered the *keiyaku-nin*, Japanese farmworkers endured exploitative practices. Immigration companies gave working-class Japanese men empty promises in exchange for the purchase of a ticket to California. For example, the Meiji Emigration Company pledged upward mobility and \$2.50 per day working in the fields of California, but records show that no worker earned more than eighty cents per day. Those with enough money to return to Japan did so almost immediately—those without it had nowhere else to turn. Trapped in California with little English skills, Japanese laborers had little option but to accept any deal offered by predatory employers.

In the ensuing decade, Japanese labor was gradually replaced with a group that came to be known as bindlemen, or hobos. Bindlemen, mostly poor European white and Latino men, were migrant workers who rode atop train cars searching California for work.¹⁷ A transient lifestyle was foreign to many onlookers; the fascination with the isolating existence of bindlemen led to several tropes trying to explain their behavior. These tropes ranged from calling the men simple laborers to

¹² Street, *Beasts of the Field*, 504.

¹³ Street, 504.

¹⁴ Street, 436.

¹⁵ Street, 422.

¹⁶ George F. Johnston Company Records. Yale Collection of Western Americana, Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library.

¹⁷ Street, *Beasts of the Field*, 529.

honoring them as folkloric workmen to warning against them as dangerous criminals.

While in some towns bindlemen were only curious characters, in others they were condemned and punished for non-normative behaviors. Law enforcement most commonly arrested and punished bindlemen under the guise of vagrancy charges.¹⁸ California’s penal code defined a vagrant as “every person (except a California Indian) without visible means of living, who has the physical capacity to work and who does not seek employment nor labor.”¹⁹ Someone could also be identified as a vagrant if they meandered without legitimate business, or if they rested or slept on a property without the owner’s permission.

The migratory habits of bindlemen and loose definitions of vagrancy enabled local law enforcement to criminalize the bindlemen’s existence. Law enforcement conducted frequent sweeps, leading to the frequent incarceration of bindlemen on vagrancy charges—sometimes up to one trip to jail per month. The *Sacramento Bee* once remarked that in places like Pomona, where vagrancy was the most common crime, “if Christ were to come to the Golden State, He could be and probably would be jailed as a tramp under our vagrancy laws.”²⁰ During their trials, bindlemen were often denied a jury and could face sentences of up to six months in prison.

While bindlemen worked on farms between March and September, they were much less likely to encounter legal trouble. After the harvest had ended, however, many towns strengthened the enforcement of the law, arresting bindlemen with increasing frequency. During the week of November 24th, 1907 in Los Angeles, nearly five hundred bindlemen were arrested for vagrancy—only “five or six” had been wanted by the police for previous crimes.²¹

Once in state captivity, bindlemen could be forced to perform menial labor for the local community. At one point in Los Angeles, over 100 bindlemen were locked in a chain gang and forced to do hard labor.²² Bindlemen could be forced to break rocks, repair roads, and perform other infrastructure-related tasks. Some accounts suggest that towns might have leased incarcerated bindlemen to local farms during labor shortages, making them tend to the fields without pay.²³ Bindlemen were thus victims of state-sanctioned slavery in an early version of the Californian prison-industrial complex. In San Marino, a suburb of Los Angeles, City Marshall Porter did not make incarcerated bindlemen work—rather, he tied them to trees down Huntington Drive for days on end, vowing to keep them there “until they decide that San Marino is an unhealthful place for their ilk.”²⁴

The criminalization of bindlemen points to a broader systemic issue of forced labor—a system not completely explained by isolated incidents of poor working conditions or low wages. Rather, bindlemen were only deemed tolerable by law enforcement and employers only as docile faraway laborers. Incarceration, state-sanctioned forced labor, and cruel and unusual punishments withheld the agency of bindlemen even outside of farm labor contexts; they were locked in a system of slavery. In fact, the Thirteenth Amendment, through its exemption for criminal punishment, had enshrined slavery in law, locking millions across the country in a similar state of involuntary servitude.

¹⁸ Street, 541.

¹⁹ Street, 541.

²⁰ Street, 541.

²¹ “To Drive Out All Crooks.” *Los Angeles Times*, November 24, 1907.

²² “Those Hobos,” *Los Angeles Times*, September 13, 1903.

²³ Street, *Beasts of the Field*, 556.

²⁴ “Hobos Tied to Saplings,” *Los Angeles Times*, December 13, 1915.

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Bindlemen were easy targets for this exploitation due a to variety of non-normative practices and behaviors. For one, their unique vernacular often confused those unfamiliar with them. In bindleman speak, “blinky” was a man missing an eye, “cans” were police stations, “punk” was bread, and “gay cats” were young bindlemen new to the trade.²⁵ They were also known as heavy drinkers when off duty and engaged in raucous, drunken assemblies in saloons that often broke out into fights. In December 1902, fourteen bindlemen were arrested in San Bernardino’s Chinatown after a massive brawl broke out. Once the men arrived at the city jail, they “knocked out the lights and started another fight.”²⁶ A few bindlemen abused opioids—however, local newspapers frequently exaggerated violence in their reporting of these events.²⁷

Most concerning to town officials, however, was their engagement in same-sex relationships. While certainly not all—or even most—bindlemen engaged in these relationships, enough did to be noticed by reporters and townspeople. Some of these relationships took the form of long-term companionship. For example, bindleman William Edge described in a memoir a romantic partnership with a man named Slim. For more than a year, they traveled together “sharing beds, jobs and saloons,” rejecting other partners in favor of one another.²⁸ Other relationships were more casual—for instance, men often told anecdotes to sociologists about “railroad bulls catching men making out in the bushes and throwing them into the slammer.”²⁹ This anecdote, in particular, draws a direct connection between the non-normative habits of bindlemen and their subsequent criminalization.

Historian Kelly Lytle Hernandez connects the criminalization of bindlemen to the creation and enforcement of a white settler colonial fantasy among Los Angeles boosters and officials.³⁰ Anti-immigrant politics, anglo-centric origin narratives, and the rise of human caging all enforced this settler colonial order—which consistently excluded bindlemen. The result of this framework, for Hernandez, was not only the oppression of nonwhite people but also the criminalization and demonization of non-normative white people within a framework of settler colonial norms and values. Bindlemen, through their untraditional language, raucous lifestyle, and male-male sexual relations, operated outside the boundaries of acceptable whiteness.

When bindlemen were not exploited by the state or on farms, they were exploited by urban labor contractors. In the off-season, bindlemen often made their way to so-called “skid rows”—downtown districts usually filled with inexpensive hotels, restaurants, and bars. When bindlemen arrived, they also became sources of inexpensive—or even free—labor. During times when it became difficult to find legitimate labor, bindlemen made their way to slave markets in town squares.³¹ In these slave markets, labor contractors charged bindlemen fees in exchange for finding them jobs. Because the bindlemen did not have access to funds before they worked for them, they were often forced to take out a loan from the contractor. Then, labor contractors would collude with growers to get bindlemen fired as soon as they had paid off their loans to the, forcing them into debt again to find more work.³² Thus, bindlemen would often find themselves in cycles of debt slavery, gaining no

²⁵ Street, *Beasts of the Field*, 556.

²⁶ “San Bernardino,” *Los Angeles Times*, December 17, 1902.

²⁷ Street, *Beasts of the Field*, 558.

²⁸ Street, 557.

²⁹ Street, 557.

³⁰ Kelly Lytle Hernandez, *City of Inmates Conquest, Rebellion, and the Rise of Human Caging in Los Angeles, 1771-1965*. (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2017).

³¹ Street, *Beasts of the Field*, 570.

³² Street, 571.

advancement from their own labor—and deprived of the agency to exit cycles of poverty entirely.

The bindleman-contractor relationship resembled the Japanese farmworker-*keiyaku-nin* relationship in many ways. There were differences, though. Because *keiyaku-nin* were often immigrants themselves, they were more likely to find solidarity with the workers—a historical trend that will be explored in more detail in Part Two of this piece. Thus, the *keiyaku-nin* operated not simply as a part of the established employer hierarchy, but rather as mediators between workers and farmers. The urban labor contractors, on the other hand, pledged their allegiance only to farm owners, with interests not in worker well-being but firmly in labor exploitation and profit maximization. Despite these key differences, however, both *keiyaku-nin* and urban labor contractors helped produce a system of enslavement on California farms for the benefit of themselves and farm owners—at the expense of workers from all backgrounds.

Whether through horrific conditions on the farm, abuse from growers, fraud from contractors, or criminalization from local law enforcement, California farm laborers were trapped in a system of poverty and slavery. For many immigrant laborers, these struggles were compounded by—indeed, intertwined with—hardships brought on by racism, xenophobia and other forms of bigotry. It would be inaccurate, however, to say California’s farmworkers passively accepted this treatment.

Part Two: Warriors of the Cause

If you walked through a farm in the California Central Valley at the turn of the 20th century, you might hear the workers belt into a song like this:

*There’s a race of men that don’t fit in,
A race that can’t stay still,
So they break the hearts of kith and kin,
And they roam the world at will.
They range the field and they rove the flood,
And they climb the mountain’s crest,
Theirs is the curse of the gypsy blood,
And they don’t know how to rest.³³*

Bindlemen sang dozens of traditional songs during work, in saloons, or in chain gangs. In this song, the singers acknowledge feeling shunned for their lifestyle. They even separate themselves from others in ways beyond life choices, referring to themselves as a separate “race of men” cursed by “the g*psy blood.” This distance from normative behavior is acknowledged, but not bemoaned. Rather than focus on the burdens this separation places upon them, they focus on their own agency as “they roam the world at will.” Moreover, they shun common tropes about their “race.” While the rest of the world calls them lazy vagrants that must be handled by a local sheriff, they insist they still “don’t know how to rest.” Many songs were celebratory like this one. Others voiced deep frustration. All of them, though, represented small acts of rebellion against their bosses who abused them, the labor contractors who defrauded them, the sheriffs who arrested them, and the townspeople who shunned them.

Bindlemen rebelled in far more than songs, though. Many bindlemen, when forced to work under a particularly abusive foreman, pretended to be sick.³⁴ Once the foreman was transferred or fired entirely, the performed plague went away. Bindlemen would slow their pace of work, too, costing harsh growers enormous

³³ Street, 580.

³⁴ Street, 585.

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profits. They damaged equipment to provide fellow workers a respite from the abuses of a long day of labor.³⁵ In some cases, like Claude Hankins's, referenced earlier, bindlemen could only achieve justice through violence against authority.

The death of Francisco Torres, a bindleman in the late 19th century, exemplifies the dangers of resisting enslavement. In July 1892, foreman William McKelvey cut \$2.50 from Torres's paycheck, citing a "poll tax" charged by the county.³⁶ There was no such tax in existence. Torres protested his boss's lie and asked for his pay in full. When he was refused, Torres quit his job immediately. The following week, Torres returned to the ranch and asked for the money once more. After being denied again, the conflict escalated, until Torres allegedly dealt McKelvey a deadly blow and subsequently fled the scene (accounts vary on the weapon, location and circumstance of the crime).³⁷

After Torres was captured, he told investigators that he struck McKelvey in self-defense, a claim few newspaper reports mentioned without irony. For example, a headline in the *Los Angeles Times* after Torres's capture read, "Torres, the Murderer, and His Plea of Self-defense."³⁸ On August 10th, Torres was brought to jail to await his court date.

Torres never made it to trial. On August 20th, a mob of white townspeople stormed the jail in Santa Ana. The lone guard on duty called for the mob to halt but acquiesced when they began to use sledgehammers to break through Torres's cell door.³⁹ The crowd beat then dragged him out into the street toward a noose that hung from a telephone pole. After giving Torres time to pray his last rites, the mob executed him.⁴⁰ They hung a sign above Torres that read "Change of Venue."⁴¹

The lynch mob sent shockwaves throughout the local Mexican community. In an act of solidarity, the community came out in droves to pay respects to the tragedy. Over 3,000 people visited Torres's body on the day of his funeral.⁴² Many of his closest friends could not recognize his face because it had been beaten so severely.

While the Mexican community mourned, the rest of the town saw the incident as justice coming early. Several "prominent members" of the community were involved in the lynching, which effectively precluded calls for a thorough and fair investigation. After Torres was murdered, the *Los Angeles Times* aptly summarized the prospects for retribution best: "There have been no arrests made and there are not likely to be."⁴³

Some farmworkers resisted by reclaiming institutional space. As the years went on, many Japanese farmworkers transitioned from field hands to farm owners themselves. Street noted, "Japanese farmers climbed out of the fields by employing one of three methods: contracting, sharecropping or leasing."⁴⁴

Contractors negotiated deals for farms and workers to procure necessary supplies for farming, then received a fixed rate per acre they worked. This usually paid more money than traditional labor arrangements.⁴⁵ After contracting for a few years, many moved on to sharecropping, where farmworkers worked for the same

³⁵ Street, 585.

³⁶ "Lynch Law at Santa Ana," *Los Angeles Times*, August 21, 1892.

³⁷ "Hanged in the Street," *San Francisco Chronicle*, August 21, 1892.

³⁸ "Orange County," *Los Angeles Times*, August 20, 1892.

³⁹ "Hanged in the Street," *Chronicle*.

⁴⁰ "Hanged in the Street."

⁴¹ "Change of Venue," *Courier-Journal*, August 21, 1892.

⁴² "Lynch Law at Santa Ana," *Times*.

⁴³ "Lynch Law at Santa Ana.."

⁴⁴ Street, *Beasts of the Field*, 515.

⁴⁵ Street., 515.

rates but then kept a certain percentage of their harvest to sell and make additional profits. Unlike the exploitative sharecropping system in the Jim Crow South, sharecropping in California was viewed as an arrangement with great flexibility and autonomy—especially when compared to regular field work.⁴⁶

Leasing was a more complicated process. Japanese farmworkers banded with the *keiyaku-nin* to form independent farming companies and take control of production. They controlled prices, labor arrangements, and crop production.⁴⁷ Once Japanese labor companies gained monopolies across the state, they began to have a more significant say in how farms ran.

This aroused anger and fear from white onlookers. One newspaper warned the masses of “little brown men crowding out white laborers and getting ahold of ranches.”⁴⁸ Because of these sentiments, many white workers refused to work for Japanese bosses, which required immigrant farmers to get labor exclusively from co-ethnics. According to one contemporary report, a full 96% of laborers on Japanese farms were Japanese.⁴⁹

The state government eventually pushed back against growing Japanese autonomy. In 1913, the State Legislature enacted the Alien Land Law, which prohibited residents ineligible for citizenship from owning land.⁵⁰ Though it was ostensibly a ban of “alien” land ownership, many contemporary commentators used “alien” and “Japanese” interchangeably in discussions regarding the law.⁵¹ In practice, the Alien Land Law of 1913 targeted the growth of a Japanese landowning middle class built by the *keiyaku-nin* and their workers.

The leadership of the *keiyaku-nin* did more than help Japanese workers own their own farms. Despite their exploitative behaviors, the *keiyaku-nin* could be fierce negotiators on behalf of their workers when they chose. During the last days before harvest, they worked with laborers to organize slowdowns, work stoppages, or mass walkouts.⁵² These tactics frustrated farmers and forced them to acquiesce to their workers’ demands during severe labor shortages. These tactics also afforded Japanese farmworkers better working conditions, better wages, and better lives. In one noteworthy instance, the *keiyaku-nin* forced one California farmer to raise wages repeatedly, eventually getting their workers an over 300% wage increase from eighty cents to four dollars per day.⁵³

Sometimes, though, *keiyaku-nin* pushed too hard, and farmers turned to other sources of labor. One example of this illustrates the ethnic conflicts that complicated the lives of farm laborers in California. In the early 20th century, a notable number of Sikh men from the Punjab area of northern India moved to California.⁵⁴ These men typically settled in British Columbia in Canada, but intense persecution forced many to move to places such as San Francisco.⁵⁵ From there, they often found employment on California farms. Many worked for less than other workers, which attracted the hostility of others in the farm labor economy—including the *keiyaku-nin*.⁵⁶

⁴⁶ Street, 515.

⁴⁷ Street, 515.

⁴⁸ Street, 515.

⁴⁹ Street, 828.

⁵⁰ “Alien Land Law,” *Los Angeles Times*, August 9, 1913.

⁵¹ “Say California Demands Anti-Alien Legislation,” *Los Angeles Times*, April 6, 1913.

⁵² Street, *Beasts of the Field*, 485.

⁵³ Street, 437.

⁵⁴ Street, *Beasts of the Field*, 481.

⁵⁵ “Hindoos Turn to San Francisco,” *San Francisco Chronicle*, September 22, 1907.

⁵⁶ Street, *Beasts of the Field*, 483.

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Sikh men filled positions when Japanese workers went on strike. In August 1908, a farmer named George Pierce decided to rid himself of frequent conflicts with the *keiyaku-nin* and fired all of his Japanese workers in favor of Sikh men who were willing to work for less in worse conditions.⁵⁷ Events like this caused Japanese farmworkers to view the Sikh men as a nuisance, shifting their workers' job sites to most effectively impede Sikh laborers' success.⁵⁸

Others took further action against the Sikh workers. A group of white field hands near Marysville resolved to exclude the Sikh men through violence. In January of 1908, they raided a camp of Sikh workers, severely beating and robbing them of thousands of dollars before they burned the camp to the ground.⁵⁹ Not long after, the Sikh men fled the town, forced to look for work elsewhere. The *San Francisco Chronicle* called it the "Hindoo Riot" even though its perpetrators were white, and instead of emphasizing the violence against the Sikhs, it justified the actions as retaliations against alleged incidents of "indecent exposure" by Sikh men.⁶⁰ Though some Sikh men sought legal justice, the white jury absolved the perpetrators of the riot for any wrongdoing. No punishment came for the crime.⁶¹

Anti-Sikh violence is but one example of how narrow conceptions of identity fractured solidarity and stunted the building of a larger movement in the early 20th century. However, these moments of disunity are not the entire story. One episode of solidarity, the Oxnard Sugar Beet Workers Strike in 1903, suggests how workers united.

By 1902, the American Sugar Beet Company's leaders had struggled frequently with *keiyaku-nin* bargaining tactics. Together with other farmers, they formed the Western Agricultural Contracting Company (WACC), a contracting organization that brought labor negotiation under the complete control of farmers.⁶² WACC recruited workers around Oxnard from all backgrounds with the intent to artificially depress wages and oust the *keiyaku-nin* from the region. For a while, their strategy worked; they took over ninety percent of Oxnard's sugar beet labor that year.⁶³

Japanese workers had few options but to strike. Without the *keiyaku-nin*, they had no one to advocate for them in disputes with the growers. When WACC forced them to settle for lower wages, to pay arbitrary fees, and to purchase supplies from a company store, it became clear that action needed to be taken.⁶⁴ After much organizing, Japanese workers led a walkout of Oxnard's sugar beet fields on March 1, 1903.⁶⁵

Other farmworkers soon joined them. Local Mexican farmworkers organized alongside them to form the Japanese-Mexican Labor Association (JMLA) just weeks after the initial walkout.⁶⁶ The *Los Angeles Times* referred to the protest as peaceful, describing a scene in which "the greater portion of the [JMLA members] are spending the day playing handball on the vacant lots near Chinatown, and the nights parading with drum and flags." At this juncture, no violence had ensued "and none was

⁵⁷ Street, 487.

⁵⁸ Street, 487.

⁵⁹ Street, 483.

⁶⁰ "Prison Quarries Eclipse Siberia," *San Francisco Chronicle*, February 2, 1908.

⁶¹ Street, *Beasts of the Field*, 483.

⁶² Street, 447.

⁶³ Street, 447.

⁶⁴ Street, 448.

⁶⁵ Street, 448.

⁶⁶ Street, 449.

threatened.”⁶⁷ Fifteen hundred workers strong, the JMLA was an organization already built in unity and resistance, but its members soon had to prove their dedication to the fight for their collective human rights when the stakes were even higher.

Shortly after the strike began, WACC began attempts to break the strike, hiring crews of non-union affiliates to harvest produce. In retaliation, groups of JMLA members assembled to sabotage their camps. They cut down tents and vandalized supplies, forcing the crew to return to town without working the next day.⁶⁸ These instances became more frequent as the strike drew on, with WACC officials growing more impatient by the day. When the two sides met on March 21st, 1903, the threat of violence loomed over negotiations. WACC leaders insisted on their right to field a crew of nonunion workers and emphasized their intent to do so at all costs the following Monday. In response, JMLA members vowed to do everything necessary to prevent the crew from reaching the field. The stage was set for a standoff in Oxnard.⁶⁹

That Monday, the JMLA obstructed the street on which WACC’s crew wagons inched forward. As the tension built, one WACC member burst out of a company store with a shotgun to prevent JMLA ransacking. This precautionary measure only ignited a massive scuffle. Gunshots filled the air and confusion reigned while JMLA and WACC members became unsure of which side was shooting. After the fight, several JMLA members were severely wounded. One, Luis Vasquez, died from gunshot wounds.⁷⁰

According to various newspaper accounts of that week, Oxnard went quiet. Rain poured on the landscape and prevented further conflict while JMLA members tended to their wounded. On March 27th, the Japanese and Mexican communities of Oxnard gathered to mourn Luis Vasquez. Thousands assembled in what became part-funeral-procession and part-demonstration, waving flags behind a solemn drum line. The parade ended at a local Catholic parish, where Japanese workers sat beside their Mexican comrades to observe the mass and bury Luis Vasquez.⁷¹

Vasquez’s death added another layer of systemic resistance to the JMLA cause because activists believed the bullet that killed him was fired by the deputy sheriff. Suspicions heightened when the law enforcement began to investigate the shootings of JMLA protestors but neglected to include JMLA eyewitness testimony. In the end, law enforcement issued no indictments as the court determined that it could never know who shot who in the scuffle.⁷² To the activists, this represented the makings of a cover-up by the WACC and law enforcement officials.

JMLA, suspecting ulterior motives, organized further protests and even an assassination attempt on a WACC ally.⁷³ Support poured in from sympathizers around the state, putting pressure on the growers to accept the union’s demands. With tensions rising, an upcoming visit from President Roosevelt, and farmers starving for cash, the WACC finally settled its dispute with JMLA. The conflict ended with a resounding victory for the Mexican and Japanese workers. The WACC monopoly had been broken.⁷⁴

After the strike, JMLA assembled once more to petition for membership in the American Federation of Labor (AFL). After changing their name to the Sugar Beet

⁶⁷ “Oxnard,” *Los Angeles Times*, March 20, 1903.

⁶⁸ Street, *Beasts of the Field*, 455.

⁶⁹ Street, 457.

⁷⁰ Street, *Beasts of the Field*, 458.

⁷¹ “Oxnard,” *Times*.

⁷² Street, *Beasts of the Field* 461.

⁷³ Street, 461.

⁷⁴ Street, 463.

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Farm Laborer's Union (SBFLU), they met with AFL leaders to negotiate affiliation. The response of the AFL, which was a segregated organization at the time, tested their unity: the Mexican workers were free to join, but the Japanese men were not.⁷⁵ In his response, SBFLU leader J.M. Lizarras wrote:

We beg to say in reply that our Japanese brothers here were the first to recognize the importance of cooperating and uniting in demanding a fair wage scale. They were not only just with us, but they were generous when one of our men was murdered by hired assassins of the oppressor of labor, they gave expression to their sympathy in a very substantial form. In the past we have counseled, fought, and lived on very short rations with our Japanese brothers, and toiled with us in the fields, and they have been uniformly kind and considerate. We would be false to them and to ourselves and to the cause of unionism if we accepted privileges for ourselves which are not accorded to them... We will refuse any other kind of a charter except one which will wipe out race prejudices and recognize our fellow workers as being as good as ourselves. I am ordered by the Mexican union to write this letter to you and they fully approve its words.⁷⁶

Lizarras acknowledged not only the humanity of his Japanese brothers but also their foresight and intelligence in fighting against exploitation. The fledgling SBFLU found the bravery to chastise the AFL for putting prejudice over the larger labor struggle. Instead of accepting the backing of the AFL—the largest labor organization in America at the time—the Mexican workers chose not to leave their Japanese coworkers behind. The opportunity to be recognized by a major labor organization would have been rare for California farmworkers and especially rarer for non-white ones. Yet, the field hands of Oxnard chose solidarity with all workers instead of progress for a few.

The Oxnard Sugar Beet Strike of 1903 garnered tremendous support from Californians across the state but failed to make systematic change. Predatory labor contractors were not eradicated after WACC was disbanded in Oxnard, and conditions on the farms still were inhumane. However, the strike demonstrated that California farmworkers could create power in an economic system that operated on the removal of their liberty. The JMLA showed that solidarity in the fields of California was possible—and a force to be reckoned with.

Epilogue

Eventually, California farmworkers found help from the International Workers of the World (IWW). The IWW, commonly referred to as “the wobblies,” organized around tenets of free speech and socialist thought and embraced workers from all backgrounds.⁷⁷ IWW leaders would travel to town squares and set up soapbox speeches that warranted the ire of local officials resistant to their message and method.⁷⁸ This tension resulted in high-profile standoffs in cities such as San Diego and Fresno in the mid-1910s.⁷⁹

The IWW's radical stance for the redefining of labor itself in the California fields turned away many farmworkers whose primary concerns were living wages and decent conditions.⁸⁰ However, even when working with nonaffiliated farmworkers, the union worked tirelessly to improve their lives. Once, when workers rioted against a farmer in Wheatland, California, the wobblies mobilized to set up a support network

⁷⁵ Street, 464.

⁷⁶ Street, 464.

⁷⁷ Street, *Beasts of the Field*, 592.

⁷⁸ McWilliams and Sackman. *Factories in the Field*, 152.

⁷⁹ McWilliams and Sackman, 152.

⁸⁰ Street, *Beasts of the Field*, 592.

for the men, spreading word of the issue so much that it made national news.⁸¹ This publicity inspired movements like Kelley’s Army, in which a labor activist known as General Kelley led thousands of migrant workers to the California State Capitol Building to express grievances with the Governor.⁸² The Wobblies not only helped to form Kelley’s Army but also helped plant the seeds that grew into a class consciousness seen among local intellectuals in the 1930s.

The condition of slavery that ruled the lives of California’s farmworkers at the turn of the 20th century inspired many cases of solidarity across racial lines. This fight provided a model for future generations of farmworkers and transcended the contemporary labor movement. The work of the SBFLU is just one achievement in an array of movements that spurred further imaginations of the farmworker’s rights, from the 1930s to the 1960s to modern times.

Organizing among farmworkers has never stopped. It has been done with varying degrees of success, meeting harsh resistance from industry leaders each time. After the 1930s, farmworkers rarely were able to take their cause to a national stage until the rise of Cesar Chavez and Dolores Huerta.⁸³

The coalition building, boycotting, and hunger strikes that created the UFW and made it the largest farmworker union in the country, and it continues to dominate Californian discourse on farm labor. The coalition’s work at Delano, in which they combined tactics of unionism and civil rights activism to win a contract for grape pickers, has proven to be a legendary example of organizing.^{84**}

Much work has been done to make life easier for today’s farmworkers, but it is not nearly enough. Despite progress among immigration issues regarding migratory farm labor, undocumented farmworkers still find themselves vulnerable to mistreatment from their employers, similar to the Japanese victims of fraudulent immigration schemes over a century ago.⁸⁵ Many growers still do not provide housing. Instead of sleeping in tents like their predecessors, today’s farmworkers might commute several hours home after work, getting little to no sleep before making the drive back the next day.⁸⁶

In 2016, the California State Legislature implemented a plan to guarantee overtime pay for farmworkers in the state.⁸⁷ This came after a hard-fought battle that is still ongoing, as California’s enforcement mechanisms for labor law violations are slow to act.⁸⁸ Prosecutors are beginning to pay attention again to California farm labor as a human rights issue. On that front, there is still much work to be done to improve the lives of laborers in the fields.

As the labor struggle pushes forward in California’s farmlands, it will not only owe its success to the UFW but also to the slaves of the West over a century ago, the warriors of their cause who fought tirelessly—even when no one was watching.

⁸¹ McWilliams and Sackman. *Factories in the Field*, 155.

⁸² McWilliams and Sackman, 165.

⁸³ “UFW History.” UFW. Accessed May 02, 2019.

⁸⁴ “UFW History.” UFW. Accessed May 02, 2019.

** It is important to note that despite the influence of the UFW in bringing the rights of farmworkers to the forefront of national discourse, the movement was not without troubling flaws. Politics of documentation and ethnicity, for example, reflect a UFW that was not as inclusive as it is often described. Readers interested in exploring these issues more can read Matt Garcia’s 2012 book *From the Jaws of Victory: The Triumph and Tragedy of the Farm Worker Movement*.

⁸⁵ “Edgar Aguilachoso.” Telephone interview by author. March 27, 2019.

⁸⁶ “Edgar Aguilachoso.”

⁸⁷ “Stephanie Richard.” In-person interview by author. March 27, 2019.

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INDUSTRIAL WARFARE AND LABOR IDENTITY

Jason Daniels

Victory in the Great War of the early twentieth century necessitated complete loyalty among workers, whose labor fueled the industrial power of the United States. Those individuals whom the federal government did not perceive as cooperative in the nation's wartime efforts faced various forms of cultural and physical suppression. These restrictive measures impacted the self-identity of the American working class, motivating workers in the post-war world to prioritize their identities as loyal members of the nation over their membership within their gender or class. This shift in identity appears clearly in illustrations by artists sympathetic to the labor movement. In this paper, I analyze the works of these artists as published within newspapers and magazines prior to, during, and following the Great War in order to analyze shifting notions of identity present within the post-war American working class.

The Great War demonstrated the destructive potential of modern nation states, both within and outside of their own borders. Memories of past quarrels between Western empires shattered as the industrial titans of the new century bludgeoned each other to death over the course of years. These states sacrificed lives and armaments on a hitherto incomprehensible scale in order to achieve victory, leading to an unprecedented level of industrial demand. The United States in particular became a vital source of war materials, exporting munitions across the Atlantic to the front lines. Achieving victory in total war necessitated the full coordination between the social, economic, and military organs of the American industrial juggernaut. This machine-state increased its influence over the working class in order to achieve internal unity through the suppression of anti-war activities and the circulation of nationalist propaganda. As a result of this increased state management of the labor ecosystem, the United States witnessed drastic changes in the self-identity of workers, reflected through a shift in the working class's visual narratives. Specifically, the post-war labor environment featured a softening of class and gender barriers as well as growing resentment towards political and economic influence by foreign powers as part of a new identity based upon one's duty to the nation.

In this paper I argue that these changing attitudes, expressed by artists sympathetic to American Labor, directly resulted from the national government's emphasis on one's loyalty to the state as the defining feature of citizenship. To accomplish this goal, I analyze the common motifs contained within pre-war labor illustrations, the circulation of propaganda and restriction of anti-war activities by the federal government, and the shift in self-perceptions of laborers evident in post-war labor illustrations. By American Labor, I refer to the collective American working class within this historical setting, regardless of other social distinctions such as race or gender. The term "labor identity" functions to characterize the self-perceptions of these workers, as often demonstrated through visual illustrations by labor-sympathetic artists. These artists, while often distinct from American Labor due to their occupations or socio-economic status, were influenced by activities within the labor

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movement and worked to reflect the interests and plights of the working class in their illustrations. Through wartime propaganda and restrictions on activities perceived as opposed to the war, the federal government popularized a new definition of citizenship based upon one's loyalty to the state. Examining papers and other journalistic publications from the American Midwest, Sara Egge notes that the Great War caused suffragists to adopt this notion of citizenship, casting off social divisions such as gender or class in favor of a distinctly merit-based American identity.¹ My work centers upon the emergence of this viewpoint within the illustrations of artists sympathetic to the labor movement following the end of the Great War.

Merit-based citizenship, by which I mean a notion of one's worth as a citizen defined by his or her contributions to the nation, appears in a number of features within post-war labor illustrations. These images often encourage cooperation between American Labor and Capital in order to achieve mutual benefits, while pre-war visual narratives almost entirely lack collaboration between these two groups. Labor cartoonists villainized corporations both prior to and following the Great War; however, the nationalist narratives furthered by the federal government in wartime encouraged individuals to think of themselves as primarily loyal to the state rather than their class. Gender distinctions similarly dissolved under nationalist pressure. Women began to appear as equal and even dominant members of labor households in illustrations following the war. While still placing women primarily within the domestic sphere, post-war labor illustrators possessed a growing notion of women as valuable members of society, validated by their efforts in wartime. Racial barriers would remain prominent across class barriers during the remainder of the twentieth century, particularly in the decades following the war's end. However, illustrations following the end of the Great War reveal an adoption of this same nationalist imagery by African American labor publications. Nativist fears of economic and political influence by foreign states also arose within illustrations created by labor-sympathetic artists. In each of these changes, the working class as a whole adopted viewpoints popularized through the federal government's issuing of propaganda and restriction of activities viewed as opposing the war effort. These perspectives reflect a shift in American Labor's identity from one defined by social distinctions, such as class and gender, to one centered around a group's contributions to the nation.

Pre-War Labor Illustrations

Visual media created before the war's inception reveals a labor ecosystem deeply divided along barriers of class, gender, and race. This particularly appears in the illustrations widely circulated throughout the United States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. A serial published in 1892 features an illustration of hell by the labor artist Art Young. This image depicts the devil in a fashion noticeably resembling a businessman in his private office.² "Mr. Satan" holds a cigar in one hand and a telephone in the other, with lines connecting to New York and St. Louis.³ This motif of government officials bowing to corporate interests routinely appears in labor publications in the years leading up to the Great War. In a cartoon from *Puck Magazine* in 1904, John Pughe depicts President Theodore Roosevelt stopping the cutting down of trusts in order to maintain federal funds.⁴ These illustrations reveal a belief among pre-war labor sympathizers of a symbiotic relationship existing between

¹ Sara Egge, *Woman Suffrage and Citizenship in the Midwest, 1870-1920* (Iowa City, Iowa: University of Iowa Press, 2018), 154.

² Art Young, "Mr. Satan's Private Office," illustration, *Hell Up To Date*, 1892.

³ Young, "Mr. Satan's Private Office"

⁴ John S. Pughe, "Woodman, spare that tree, touch not a single bough. Funds would be scarce if we should 'run amuck' just now," illustration, *Puck Magazine*, 1904.




Figure 1: “The Invisible Government of the United States.” *Appeal to Reason*. Ryan Walker. 1914.

the national government and large corporations. Other images depict American Business as dominating government officials. Figure 1 presents the United States Congress and President Woodrow Wilson as puppets controlled by the hand of John D. Rockefeller’s Standard Oil.⁵ Throughout the early decades of the American Progressive Era, artists used their illustrations to depict corporations as maintaining a dangerous hold over the United States government. These images reveal a deep understanding of class barriers in the pre-war labor

environment among labor illustrators, manifested in the villainization of corporate and governmental officials.

Illustrators furthered this understanding of class divisions through the depiction of conflict between corporations and labor unions. An illustration in *Industrial Pioneer* by the artist “A. Slave” shows a corrupt policeman and other figures of capitalist society as unable to stop a bell reading “I.W.W. The One Big Union” from ringing.⁶ The Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), a radical labor union founded in 1905, appeared prominently within early twentieth century visual media, portrayed both as a bastion of workers’ rights by some and a menace to societal order by others. In his work discussing the use of printed images by the IWW, Tom Juravich notes that this union often used images to motivate fellow workers to take actions for their own benefit at the expense of business interests.⁷ Certain cartoons, such as “Mr. Block”, were created to lampoon workers who attempted to reconcile their differences through words with their supervisors rather than disruptive action.⁸

The visual narratives of labor unions in illustrations created prior to the Great War largely center around an inevitable victory over capitalist interests through organization. Richard Battle’s cartoon for *The Masses* shows the history of capitalism ending with a laborer rising up to kick back the dogs of governmental and corporate oppression.⁹ These images reveal the use of visual media by labor illustrators to mobilize laborers against common enemies, similar to later practices by wartime government propagandists. However, while government propaganda focused on one’s duty to the nation, pre-war labor illustrators sought to inform workers of their duty to serve their class and oppose the interests of corporate oppressors. In these illustrations, the American labor force appears largely centered around its class identity and opposition to the interests of American Capital rather than an underlying loyalty to the nation.

When artists sympathetic to the working class depicted its female members,

⁵ Ryan Walker, “The Invisible Government of the United States,” illustration, *Appeal to Reason*, May 16, 1914.

⁶ A. Slave, “They Can’t Keep It from Ringing,” illustration, *Industrial Worker*, November 12, 1912.

⁷ Tom Juravich, “Representing Labor: Labor Posters and the American Labor Movement,” *Work and Occupations*.

⁸ Juravich, “Representing Labor,” 144.

⁹ Richard Battle, “Complete History of Capitalism in Five Chapters,” illustration, *The Masses*, January 1914.

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they largely rendered these women as guardians of the domestic sphere that were holding back the forces of capitalism. These types of depictions reveal gender barriers present within the pre-war labor force. One cartoon reveals this gender-based division by depicting children attempting to flee Lawrence, Massachusetts following a textile worker's strike. A large policeman attacks a procession of women and children attempting to flee towards the female embodiment of sympathy, who beckons them into the homes of other cities.¹⁰

Figure 2, appearing in *Industrial Worker* in 1913, displays a working class woman within her home, holding her child away from a personified "death" in the garb of a Roman soldier.¹¹ These images depict women as guardians of their homes and children, rather than co-laborers with their male counterparts.

Racial barriers remained similarly well entrenched within the working class throughout the pre-war years. Cedric de Leon describes the origin of this racial divide within labor unions during the Reconstruction and Gilded Age periods.¹² He characterizes the rise of this division through episodes such as the exclusion of Lewis H. Douglass, son of leading abolitionist Frederick Douglass, from the Columbia Printer's Union in 1869.¹³ Such sentiments continued into the early twentieth century. In an edition of the *International Socialist Review* from 1903, leading Socialist politician Eugene V. Debs states his belief that the Socialist Party has "nothing special to offer the negro" and "cannot make separate appeals to all the races."¹⁴ These words reveal the presence of colorblind ideology among prominent members of the working class during this time period, as labor leaders made little effort to assist in the plights uniquely faced by African American laborers in the years following Reconstruction.

Most prominent labor publications from the pre-war period lack depictions of cooperation between white and black labor. However, the absence of these depictions reveals as much about the presence of racial barriers as does the villainization of corporate and government officials or the domestic depictions of working-class women by labor artists. The pre-war working class largely viewed racial and class-related issues as separate problems. Prominent labor publications reflect this viewpoint by displaying cartoons that relate primarily to white laborers rather than their black counterparts. These illustrations demonstrate the pre-war American working class as divided along the social distinctions of gender and race rather than



Figure 2: "Let Death Call on the Parasite Class for its Cannon Food." *Industrial Worker*.

¹⁰ Art Young, "Law and Order in Lawrence," illustration, *Industrial Worker*, March 21, 1912.

¹¹ "Let Death Call on the Parasite Class for its Cannon Food," illustration, *Industrial Worker*, May 8, 1913.

¹² Cedric de Leon, "Black from White: How the Rights of White and Black Workers Became 'Labor' and 'Civil' Rights after the U.S. Civil War," *Labor Studies Journal* 42, no. 1 (2017): 24.

¹³ de Leon, "Black from White," 22.

¹⁴ Eugene V. Debs, "The Negro in the Class Struggle," *International Socialist Review* 4, no. 5 (1903): 260.

united in devotion to the nation as a whole.

Anti-Militarist Visual Narratives

Visual narratives opposed to warfare abounded among the working class at this time, with many labor illustrators arguing against the military buildup occurring in the years prior to the Great War. For many labor-sympathizers, the nation's role in producing munitions for other world powers presented war as a tool used by the upper class to increase profits at the expense of workers' lives and labor. However, the flood of government propaganda circulated in the minds of the public during the war largely drowned out these narratives. Additionally, any actions taken by laborers in response to heightened militarism would result in strict punishment by the wartime government. This restriction of the public's activities and the circulation of propaganda combined to subdue class and gender distinctions within the workforce, redefining citizenship as a measure of "civic responsibility" to the nation.¹⁵

The United States would not officially enter into the Great War until 1917. However, the industrial juggernaut served to supply many European powers with their means of destruction prior to the United States' direct involvement. In the early years of the conflict, the large American banking corporation J.P. Morgan & Co. began to finance and manage war material purchases for the British, French, and Russian Empires.¹⁶ This corporation distributed contracts to the top manufacturers in particular industries, such as the Winchester and Remington Companies for rifles and the DuPont Company for TNT and picric acid.¹⁷ Cooperation of American banking and armaments companies with European powers allowed the captains of industry at the helms of a relatively small number of powerful American businesses to profit heavily from the onset of the Great War, fueling anti-war sentiments among workers.

The federal government also increased its influence over the national economy in order to better manage the production of war materials. In his analysis of munitions production in the Great War, David Rogers notes that, as the war progressed, governments realized that they could not rely upon market forces to regulate munitions production.¹⁸

Victory in total war required the expansion of national governments into their economic spheres. Following this theory, the United States government increasingly managed munitions production and trade with foreign nations over the course of the war. The Anglo-American Purchasing Treaty, passed in August 1917, established a government committee responsible for overseeing all purchases of armaments by the British Crown.¹⁹ The American and British governments used this policy to place political officials over the purchasing of armaments, rather than relying upon businesses to single handedly manage the munitions trade. These changes to the



Figure 3: "God." *The Masses*. Boardman Robinson, 1913.

¹⁵ Egge, *Woman Suffrage*, 154.

¹⁶ Michael A. Martorelli, "Mobilizing US Industry for the Great War," *Financial History* 123 (Fall 2017): 17.

¹⁷ Martorelli, "Mobilizing US Industry," 17.

¹⁸ David Rogers, *Bullets, Bombs and Poison Gas: Supplying the Troops on the Western Front 1914-1918* (Solihull, England: Helion & Company, 2017), 45.

¹⁹ Rogers, *Bullets, Bombs and Poison Gas*, 44.

economic climate in the United States simultaneously ballooned the profits of a select number of munitions corporations while also increasing the federal government's hold over the production of war materials.

Anti-war visual narratives developed within the labor force largely as a backlash against this ever-expanding power of the United States government and the heightened profits of armaments corporations during wartime. Proponents of American military buildup cited the prevention of aggressive imperial expansion and tyrannical rule by European powers as justifying the growth of their own armed forces and the nation's involvement in the Great War.²⁰ However, anti-war thinkers believed militarism would lead to these same dangers appearing within American institutions.²¹ Fears of expanded government influence over society appear in the visual media created by working class thinkers prior to the outbreak of war. Robert Minor's illustration in a 1916 issue of *The Blast* displays a number of men in suits worshipping "The God of Dynamite."²² This image reflects working class opposition to the government's interest in expanding the nation's military might through the armaments industry. Figure 3, an image by Boardman Robinson appearing in *The Masses*, presents a grotesque combination of the various world powers of the time holding a sword above the caption "God."²³ Such illustrations relay a perceived idolatry of military might by the national government. As the war continued in Europe, supplied largely by American corporations, labor illustrators within the United States began to express a view of warfare as a capitalistic endeavor conducted by the wealthy at the expense of laborers' work and livelihood.

Propaganda, Government Suppression, and the Rise of a National Identity

The national government's extensive circulation of propaganda and restriction of activities perceived as opposed to the war effort effectively subdued these anti-militarist narratives. The onset of the Great War saw a dramatic increase in state-produced visual media, much of which opposed the goals of labor activists in favor of one's duty to the nation at large. Examining the use of nationalism by the combatant states of the Great War, L.L. Farrar notes that most combatant governments viewed propaganda as crucial to mobilizing their populations for total war.²⁴ The success of the state in wartime required a united force. Propaganda furthered this goal by, in the words of Johnathan Auerbach, "bringing the state to the doorsteps of ordinary Americans as never before."²⁵ Through bringing workers face to face with the nationalist visual narratives of the state, propaganda suppressed devotion to social categories such as class and gender in favor of a stronger duty to the nation.

The visual narratives created by the United States during the Great War sought to unite the workforce under a national identity by reflecting the vital role laborers played in achieving victory. Examining posters containing these narratives, Pier Paolo Pedrini argues that one of propaganda's most consistent goals was to portray the work of laborers as another form of military service.²⁶ Posters circulated by the American government specifically displayed munitions workers as equally vital

²⁰ Michael Cohen, "Imagining Militarism: Art Young and The Masses Take on the Enemy," *Radical History Review* 106 (2010): 93.

²¹ Cohen, "Imagining Militarism," 93.

²² Robert Minor, "Worshipping the God of Dynamite," illustration, *The Blast*, August 15, 1916.

²³ Boardman Robinson, "God," illustration, *The Masses*, August 1916.

²⁴ L.L. Farrar, "Nationalism in Wartime: Critiquing the Conventional Wisdom," in *Authority, Identity, and the Social History of the Great War*, ed. Frans Coetzee (Providence, RI: Berghahn Books, 1995), 137.

²⁵ Jonathan Auerbach, *Weapons of Democracy: Propaganda, Progressivism, and American Public Opinion* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2015), 71.

²⁶ Pier Paolo Pedrini, *Propaganda, Persuasion and the Great War* (London: Routledge, 2017), 83.



Figure 4: “Mobilizing US Industry for the Great War.” *Financial History*. Michael A. Martorelli. 2017.

to the war effort as soldiers on the front. One image created by Adolf Triedler explicitly conveys this notion of reciprocal roles, depicting an American soldier side by side with a munitions worker as “the combination that will win us the war.”²⁷ Other pieces of propaganda demonstrate the vital role that workers played in supplying the nation’s allies in an idealized fight for global democracy. Figure 4 displays a poster created by the National Industrial Conservation Movement in 1917. This image shows the cannon of “American Industry” firing supplies and munitions across the Atlantic Ocean to the Allies as part of the “War for Democracy” while also calling laborers to cooperate with the war effort, as their compliance will prove “more profitable” than strife.²⁸ Through these posters, the national government popularized a notion of workers’ identity as loyal citizens of the nation rather than

members of their particular class.

Propaganda similarly dissolved gender distinctions by emphasizing the role of women in achieving victory. Despite female laborers’ comprising a significant portion of the industrial workforce, American propaganda typically portrays women in the agricultural sphere or as nurses in the Red Cross. The relegation of women to jobs outside of the factory in these images reflects traditional notions of jobs suitable for women. However, propaganda’s abundant depiction of female labor in these roles still served to dissolve traditional gender distinctions within the working class, as seen in post-war labor cartoons. Through posters demonstrating the efforts of women for victory, the United States government popularized a merit-based notion of citizenship as being earned through service to the nation. As Deborah Thom notes, the Great War saw a shift from mere toleration of female labor to its celebration as “constructive for families, desirable for the nation, and healthy for women.”²⁹ This shift largely resulted from the global increase in demand for industrial labor to produce war materials. This increased need translated to a heightened demand for laborers, which American women swiftly moved to fulfill. Sara Egge notes that Woodrow Wilson cited the vital role which women played in the workforce in an address to the Senate in 1918 arguing for women’s suffrage.³⁰ Indeed, the Nineteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution in part resulted from the changing notion of citizenship that working women furthered during the war effort.

The propaganda circulated by the federal government during the Great War furthered the notion of citizenship as a “measure of civic responsibility” at a time in which American women filled a number of jobs vital to the success of the nation.³¹

²⁷ Adolf Triedler, “194 USA,” illustration, in *Posters of the First World War*, collected and reviewed by Maurice Rickards (London: Evelyn, Adams, & Mackay, 1968).

²⁸ Martorelli, “Mobilizing US Industry,” 18.

²⁹ Deborah Thom, “Gender and Work,” in *Gender and the Great War*, ed. Susan Grayzel and Tammy Proctor (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 49.

³⁰ Egge, *Woman Suffrage*, 152.

³¹ Egge, *Woman Suffrage*, 154.

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Government programs such as the War Garden Commission encouraged many working class women to grow their own food, allowing the nation's food production industry to focus on feeding the front lines. Maginel Enright, a prominent female illustrator working for the commission at the time, depicts one such woman shoveling vegetables from her war garden "over the top" of a trench in Figure 5.³² The phrasing used in this poster intentionally reflects the movements of soldiers over the edges of trenches into battle. Through this depiction, the War Garden Commission attempts to portray women's agricultural efforts as similarly vital to the success of the nation as soldiers' fighting on the front lines.

In addition to agricultural labor, American propaganda also depicted women working in the Red Cross. One poster by A.E. Foringer depicts "The Greatest Mother in the World" in a nurse's uniform cradling her injured son.³³ Images such as these echo traditional gender roles of women as the nurturing force within the home, serving their greatest purpose through motherhood. However, the circulation of images showing women in these traditional, yet vital roles demonstrates these loyal servants of the state as deserving of the same degree of participation in national activities afforded to men. Propaganda helped fuel the rise of merit-based citizenship in the working class that combined with the efforts of women in wartime to contribute largely to the success of the women's suffrage movement.

In addition to the circulation of propaganda, the United States government also furthered a merit-based notion of citizenship through suppressing the activities of certain groups perceived as opposed to the war. Anti-war efforts by labor unions such as the IWW and the federal government's restrictions on the ethnic activities of German Americans illustrate this trend. Many members of the IWW in the Western United States refused to register for the draft, with others choosing to flee the nation entirely.³⁴ The IWW also circulated stickers and leaflets urging others to refuse to support the war effort.³⁵ Through such activities, radical labor groups sought to take drastic actions against conscription. However, these movements ultimately served to fuel the government's control over American Labor. Tammy Proctor notes that the fear of anti-war activities by labor groups led to the creation of internment camps, such as Fort Douglas in Salt Lake City.³⁶ These camps demonstrate a growing view




Figure 5: "War Gardens Over the Top." National WWI Museum and Memorial. Maginel Enright, 1919.

³² Maginel Enright, "War Gardens Over the Top" illustration, issued in 1919 by National War Garden Commission.

³³ A.E. Foringer, "120 USA," in *Posters of the First World War*, collected and reviewed by Maurice Rickards. (London: Evelyn, Adams, & Mackay, 1968), illustration.

³⁴ James W. Byrkit, "The IWW In Wartime Arizona," *The Journal of Arizona History* 18, no. 2 (1977): 163.

³⁵ Byrkit, "The IWW," 162.

³⁶ Tammy M. Proctor, "The Great War and the Making of a Modern World," *Utah Historical Quarterly* 86, no. 3 (Summer 2018): 198.

of anti-war individuals as not fully citizens due to their active decision to not support the goals of the nation. Federal agencies also sought to censor many forms of visual media perceived as contrary to the war effort. Steven Ross describes efforts by the national government to monitor and restrict films depicting labor strikes and other workers' movements, noting that censorship appeared most severe in areas where "class conflict was most pronounced."³⁷ While notions of class conflict abounded in the pre-war visual narratives, such messages faced intense opposition from the state during the Great War, as they might incite workers to refuse to support the industrial war machine. Internment and censorship served to subdue the activities of individuals that may distract from or directly oppose the efforts of the state.

While the government suppressed many groups for openly opposing the war, others faced such persecution due to mere speculation about their disloyalty to the state. German Americans in particular grew to make up a significant portion of internment camp populations as a result of fears regarding their potential loyalty to the German Empire.³⁸ Families emigrating from the lands that would come to form the nation of Germany in the nineteenth century comprised a large fraction of the United States' population in certain regions by the early twentieth century. Many German Americans living in the American Midwest moved to this region half a century or more before the war. However, under fears of disloyalty to the nation in wartime, government policies imprisoned or culturally suppressed many of these families, ultimately forging a uniquely nationalist identity in the minds of many citizens. Egge notes that laws against "un-American" activities became common within the Midwest, such as a ban on the public speaking of foreign languages in Iowa or the confiscation of radios from German families.³⁹ Notably, suffragists passionately participated in "Americanization", which encouraged conformity in various behaviors such as the sewing of American clothing styles and eating American dishes rather than those customary eaten in families' nations of origin.⁴⁰ In this example, suffragists demonstrate a public uptake of the nationalist, merit-based citizenship popularized within the United States at this time. Through propaganda and the restriction of activities perceived as opposing the war effort, the federal government drowned out anti-militarist narratives and furthered a notion of citizenship as defined by one's support of the nation.

Post-war Visual Media

These practices resulted in the softening of class and gender barriers within working class visual narratives in favor of a stronger devotion to national identity. While many of the labor publications popularized in the pre-war era ceased operations over the course of the Great War, other artists continued to reflect the sentiments of the working class in their own publications. Laborers began to view themselves as a force whose worth derived from its loyalty to the state rather than its mere ability to oppose the aims of the wealthy, and artists sympathetic to labor reflect these ideas in their illustrations. Additionally, the workforce came to present its female half in an equal position to male labor largely as a result of women's contributions as part of the labor force during the Great War. African American labor publications would employ these same narratives, using their support of the state in wartime as a justification for why they should be recognized as equal citizens. Nationalist sentiments against foreign

³⁷ Stephen J. Ross, "Struggles for the Screen: Workers, Radicals, and the Political Uses of Silent Film," *American Historical Review* 96, no. 2 (1991): 360.

³⁸ Proctor, "The Great War and the Making of a Modern World," 198.


³⁹ Egge, *Woman Suffrage*, 156.

⁴⁰ Egge, *Woman Suffrage*, 163.

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influence within the United States, popularized by the federal government during the war, also emerged within working class visual narratives. These developments in labor illustrations represent the rise of “merit-based” citizenship within the minds of the postwar labor force.

The softening of class barriers in the post-war world did not result in an end to class distinctions. The American upper class certainly retained a large majority of the wealth circulated within the United States in the decade following the war’s end, helped in no small part by the war industry itself. Indeed, fears of heightened militarism, driven by captains of industry, continued to flourish within labor illustrations following the war’s end. These images demonstrate a fear of a government dominated by an interest in mechanized, large scale munitions production resulting from the heavy emphasis placed on the mass production of armaments by the state in the Great War. Figure 6, an illustration by Art Young from 1921, depicts munitions workers from Allied nations constructing battleships, munitions, poison gas, and other war materials.⁴¹ The workers of each nation are shown competing with one another for the benefit of their particular state, representing the division of the global working class along national borders. Through such images, one gains a view of the post-war American labor force as maintaining a primary loyalty to the state itself rather than class identity.



WHO SAID DISARMAMENT?

Figure 6: “Who Said Disarmament?” *Good Morning*. Art Young. 1921.

The visual narratives of labor illustrations also notably demonstrate a softening of both gender and class distinctions through depictions of cooperation between the working class and American businesses, as well as an increasingly powerful image of women in labor households. These images reflect a large shift in the role of women within the visual narratives of laborers resulting from the vital role of female workers in the nation’s war effort. Women within the workforce of many combatant nations were expected to return to the domestic sphere following the war’s end.⁴² As a result, pre-war gender barriers resurfaced in the post-war labor ecosystem

⁴¹ Art Young, “Who Said Disarmament?,” illustration, *Good Morning*, 1921.

⁴² Thom, “Gender and Work,” 58.

to some degree following their brief suspension in wartime. However, while many female laborers in the United States did return to the domestic sphere after the war, they also gained a large degree of societal importance due to their service in the wartime economy.

While post-war labor illustrations still largely relegated women to the domestic sphere, the softening of gender distinctions within the self-identity of workers appears in these images as well. Post-war depictions of women display them as much more powerful figures within the home than the women of pre-war publications. The archetype of the strong, working class woman features prominently in depictions of interactions between American Labor and Capital. An illustration by I. Swenson from the *Seattle Union Record* in 1919 depicts a worker side by side with his wife outside of a factory, challenging the factory boss to “see what you can do” without their support.⁴³ This image takes the working-class woman out of the home and shows her supporting her husband’s activism in the workplace.



Figure 7: “The Sky is Now Her Limit,” *The Sandusky Star-Journal*. A.E. Bushnell. August 23, 1920.

Figure 7, an illustration by E. A. Bushnell depicts a working class woman looking up a ladder leading from “Slavery” to “Presidency.”⁴⁴ This image appeared in nationally circulated publications, including the New York Times Company’s *Current History* journal.⁴⁵ While many of the larger pre-war labor publications ceased operations during the Great War, the circulation of such images in journals with a broad-reaching audience reflects a positive view of increased agency for working class women in the post-war labor ecosystem.

Other images directly compare American Labor to a woman in a troublesome marriage with American Capital. An illustration by “Ding” Darling from 1919 depicts this archetypal couple peering over a fence to see their neighbors of “Capital” and “Labor” having destroyed their house through lockouts and strikes, resulting in their child, “Prosperity”, becoming pinned underneath the debris.⁴⁶ One might argue that the association of U.S. Labor with women at the time would implicitly place this institution under the patriarchal rule of U.S. Capital. However, such a notion ignores depictions of American Labor such as Figure 8, in which a small and weak American Capital is easily struck by his “wife.”⁴⁷ These images of women within the labor household reflect a tumultuous, yet mutually beneficial, relationship between the working and upper classes of the United States. Post-war illustrations depict a softening of class and gender barriers resulting from propaganda’s emphasis specifically on the efforts of women and the working class in support of the war effort.

⁴³ I. Swenson, “Untitled,” illustration, *Seattle Union Record*, February 6, 1919.

⁴⁴ A. E. Bushnell, “The Sky is Now Her Limit.”

⁴⁵ A. E. Bushnell, “The Sky is Now Her Limit.”

⁴⁶ Jay N. Darling, “Why Can’t People Think of That Before Breaking Up All the Furniture,” illustration, *The Des Moines Register*, June 7, 1919.

⁴⁷ Jay N. Darling, “There Are Moments When Married Life Seems Quite Endurable Even to a Man Who Thinks He’s Henpecked,” illustration, *The Des Moines Register*, June 14, 1919.

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Nativism and fears of foreign influence expressed through the policies and practices of the state in wartime continued to appear in post-war labor illustrations. An image created by Carey Orr in 1921 echoes the previously mentioned archetype of a marriage between American Capital and Labor, this time depicting the couple arguing over the other's inviting labor and goods in from "cheap foreign" sources.⁴⁸

While the United States emerged from the Great War as an industrial superpower, fears of foreign nations' influence within domestic markets abounded across class boundaries. Businesses feared profit losses while American industrial workers feared the loss of already sparse employment opportunities to foreign labor. These tensions may largely be seen as an extension of nativist sentiments popularized within the wartime visual narratives through propaganda and the internment of minority groups believed to be acting in opposition to the state.

Additionally, the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 expounded nativist fears within the minds of American business leaders and moderate labor sympathizers. This Red Scare resulted in images designed to further encourage cooperation between businesses and the



Figure 8: "Married Life," *Des Moines Register*. 'Ding' Darling. June 14, 1919.

working class. "Ding" Darling's illustration within the *Des Moines Register* from June of 1919 depicts U.S. Labor as a strong woman kicking the "Reds" out of her house, declaring that she can handle her small husband, "Capital", on her own.⁴⁹ Cartoons from larger publications echo this nationalist narrative, such as F.T. Richards' illustration from *Life* magazine in 1920, shown in Figure 9.⁵⁰ This image portrays the personified American Federation of Labor striking at Bolshevism with a knife reading "Loyalty." Such images reflect a call for nationalist unity among prominent labor unions of the time as well as a perceived need for cooperation between American Labor and Capital in order to avoid



KILL IT NOW!

Figure 9: "Kill It NOW!" *Life*. F.T. Richards. May 6, 1920.

⁴⁸ Carey Orr, "The Tariff and Immigration Questions," illustration, *The Chicago Tribune*, March 1, 1921.

⁴⁹ Darling, "There Are Moments When Married Life Seems Quite Endurable Even to a Man Who Thinks He's Henpecked."

⁵⁰ F.T. Richards, "Kill it NOW!," illustration, *Life*, May 6, 1920.

influence by foreign powers in domestic markets and political revolutions. This notion largely echoes the nativist sentiments popularized within the United States in wartime through propaganda and restrictions on activities perceived as anti-war.

In contrast to gender and class, racial barriers remained well entrenched in the post-war identities of the working class. Illustrators for African American publications demonstrated their frustration at the lack of cooperation between white and black labor in the years following the Great War. An image by Leslie Rogers in *The Chicago Defender* from 1924 shows a man representing “Negro Labor” knocking on the door of The American Federation of Labor on two occasions twenty years apart, with Samuel Gompers, President of the AFL, only taking notice of him in the latter situation.⁵¹ Although the man represented grows in size in the years between these occasions and gains the attention of a powerful union leader, he remains outside the door in both images. This cartoon reflects the continuation of precedent set by prior white labor leaders to treat issues of race and class as entirely separate. Although racial barriers remained strong in the post-war labor ecosystem, advocates for African American labor adopted the same merit-based notion of citizenship demonstrated within other labor publications at the time. As Jeanette Keith notes, black political leaders attempted to demonstrate their loyalty to the nation and right to be treated as equal citizens through support for the war effort, similarly to the actions of American suffragists.⁵² While their efforts would not reach the same result, both African American and suffragist political leaders adopted a notion of citizenship as earned from one’s efforts in support of the nation in wartime.



Figure 10: *The Afro-American*. John Good. November 11, 1921.

This sentiment would continue in illustrations of black labor following the war’s end. Figure 10, an illustration from *The Afro-American* in 1921 depicts the struggle of an African American veteran looking for work in the post-war economy.⁵³ Illustrations such as this echo the same nationalist definition of citizenship popularized in state propaganda and practices in wartime. According to this view, black laborers ought to be granted the same degree of citizenship as white laborers earned through their loyalty to the state in the Great War. This merit-based notion of

⁵¹ Leslie Rogers, “Too Powerful to Keep Out,” illustration, *The Chicago Defender*, September 13, 1924.

⁵² Jeanette Keith, *Rich Man’s War, Poor Man’s Fight: Race, Class, and Power in the Rural South during the First World War* (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 121.

⁵³ Good, “Untitled.”

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citizenship also expresses itself in images demanding black labor's inclusion as a vital force in the working class's efforts against American Capital.

In a cartoon for *The Messenger*, W.B. Williams depicts two capitalists on the backs of black and white laborers, attempting to prevent their cooperation by citing racial divisions.⁵⁴ By placing these individuals on the backs of both white and black laborers, this illustration demonstrates African American labor as equal to other members of the working class as a result of their similar work in struggling to support the nation. Through these illustrations, African American publications adopted the same merit-based notion of citizenship developing within the rest of the working class at the time in order to secure the full privileges of citizenship that they believed their work for and loyalty to the nation demanded.

Conclusions

As a result of the issuing of nationalist propaganda and the suppression of actions perceived as anti-war by the federal government, labor identity in the United States shifted following the Great War to focus upon a devotion to the nation at large rather than social distinctions such as class and gender. This shift in identity most noticeably involves the rise of merit-based notions of citizenship within post-war working class visual narratives. The softening of class and gender distinctions in labor illustrations, growing nationalist opposition to foreign states by these same images, as well as the simultaneous rise of merit-based notions of citizenship in African American labor publications each testify to the rise of a nationally based identity in the post-war American workforce.

This example of a shift in the identity of particular individuals allows historians to study the nature of group identity under specific social and geopolitical circumstances. The industrial demand created by the Great War led to the need for internal cohesion within combatant states, resulting in the circulation of propaganda and suppression of activities perceived as a threat to the nation. Under these pressures by the United States government, certain aspects of laborers' self-identity softened, such as devotion to one's class or gender. The social distinction of race stands in contrast to these, remaining entrenched within the minds of many laborers even under pressures for national unity. However, as reflected in the images created by members and allies of the labor movement, merit-based citizenship to the nation became a core aspect of American Labor's identity as a result of nationalist government policies during the Great War. The rise and fall of aspects of labor identity allows historians to understand the nature of groups' self-perceptions under certain circumstances. The data presented here illustrates the rise of a strengthened nationalist identity within a particular group due to efforts by the federal government to create internal cohesion in the face of global industrial warfare. Further studies may illustrate the collapse of loyalty to the nation within a particular group under different circumstances. Observing these trends allows for greater understanding of how certain historical factors affect the adoption and rejection of various aspects comprising a group's self-identity.

⁵⁴ W.B. Williams, "When They Get Together They'll Dump Us Off," illustration, *The Messenger*, August 1919.

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ALIENATED ALLIES: Northern Irish Women During the “Friendly Invasion” of 1942-45

Greyson Hoye

In the Second World War, victory in Europe would not have been possible without the bond shared between the United States and Great Britain. In the case of Northern Ireland, the preservation of this vital alliance rested upon the willingness of that country's society to sacrifice women as moral scapegoats, holding them responsible for almost any questionable interaction with the American soldiers based there between 1942 and 1945. Local sources, including newspapers, demonstrate that the alliance was not only considered in the management of interactions between GIs and Northern Irish women, but more importantly, it was maintained at the expense of the latter. This paper seeks to fill a crucial gap in the historiography of gender relations during the Second World War by positing that these instances of social contact played a significant role in international diplomacy.

Introduction

According to social historian Juliet Gardiner, the nature of a military alliance must be understood on two overlapping yet distinct levels: “The policy [is] hammered out by the political and military leaders [... but] the reality [has] to be forged by the men.”¹ In World War II, victory in Europe would not have been possible without the bond shared between America and Britain. The strategies and agreements made the alliance official, but it was the daily, routine interaction between citizens of the Allied nations that made the alliance possible. Both sides understood, therefore, that whenever Americans and Britons met, nothing could be allowed to endanger the union of their two countries and, by extension, the defeat of the Axis Powers. The question remains as to what degree the alliance influenced, and was influenced by, these personal and often gendered relationships between soldiers and civilians, specifically in culturally and ethnically-homogenous regions such as Northern Ireland.

Local sources, and newspaper accounts in particular, demonstrate that the preservation of the vital alliance between Great Britain and the United States rested upon the willingness of Northern Irish society to sacrifice women as moral scapegoats, holding them responsible for almost any questionable interaction with the American GIs based there between 1942 and 1945. Not only was the alliance considered in the management of interactions between GIs and Northern Irish women, but more importantly, it was maintained at the expense of the latter. With that in mind, this paper seeks to fill a crucial gap in the historiography of gender relations in the Second World War by positing that these instances of social contact played a significant role in international diplomacy.

¹ Juliet Gardiner, *Overpaid, Oversexed, & Over Here: The American GI in World War II Britain* (New York: Abbeville Press, 1992), 6.

Entering the war in December 1941, the United States immediately faced a problem that it had also encountered in the last war: where to station American troops. Thousands of miles away from any combat zone, the American military needed to rely on other countries to host its servicemen and servicewomen abroad. The first American soldier to be officially welcomed onto European soil was Private First Class Milburn H. Henke of Minnesota, who walked down the gangplank of a troopship anchored in Belfast on January 26, 1942.² He and those who followed him in what locals called the “friendly invasion” would ultimately number some 120,000 by late 1943, which was equivalent to one tenth of the prewar population in Northern Ireland.³

A largely rural country historically fraught with sectarian strife, Northern Ireland (also known as Ulster) was relatively unprepared for war. Rather than assuming a unified stance against fascism, Northern Irish citizens were deeply split along political and religious lines, torn between factions of Protestant unionism (committed to remaining in the United Kingdom) and Catholic nationalism (supportive of a united and independent Irish state).⁴ In addition, the Northern Irish economy had been slow to mobilize during the interwar period, as the rate of unemployment among industrial workers reached almost thirty percent by 1938. With an ideologically divided populace and a stagnant economy that failed to join the prewar industrial expansion which had taken place throughout the rest of Britain, Northern Ireland was hardly in a position to offer a strong contribution to the Allied war effort.⁵

In the realm of defense, the nation was even less ready. When German bombs began to fall on Britain, it became frighteningly clear that “Belfast was the most unprotected city in the United Kingdom,” according to historian Jonathan Bardon.⁶ In anticipation that President Roosevelt would declare war on Germany, American workers arrived in mid-1941 to construct naval installations. After the attacks on Pearl Harbor, Ulster represented the “Atlantic bridgehead” of the American military in Europe, and it soon became home to airbases, shipyards, and the largest U.S. Navy radio station in the theater.⁷

Previous Scholarly Discussion

Across the British Commonwealth, from Belfast to Brisbane, American GIs acquired a substantial degree of influence over their host societies, particularly with respect to the local female population. With the exception of Norman Longmate’s 1975 book *The G.I.’s*, it was not until the 1990s that significant scholarship arose regarding the interactions between American soldiers and women in Britain and elsewhere, such as Australia, during the war. Over the past three decades, scholars have compensated for the dearth of research by exploring the ways in which the relationships between GIs

² Francis M. Carroll, *The American Presence in Ulster: A Diplomatic History, 1796-1996* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2005), 146.

³ Leanne McCormick, “‘One Yank and They’re Off’: Interaction between U.S. Troops and Northern Irish Women, 1942-1945,” *Journal of the History of Sexuality* 15, no. 2 (2006), 228; Gardiner, *Overpaid, Oversexed, & Over Here*, 53.

⁴ Simon Topping, “‘A hundred thousand welcomes’?: Unionism, nationalism, partition and the arrival of American forces in Northern Ireland,” *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 16, no. 1 (2018): 95.

⁵ Philip Ollerenshaw, “War, Industrial Mobilisation and Society in Northern Ireland, 1939-1945,” *Contemporary European History* 16, no. 2 (2007): 173, 174, 177.

⁶ Jonathan Bardon, *A History of Ulster* (Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 1992), quoted in Carroll, *American Presence in Ulster*, 138.

⁷ John W. Blake, *Northern Ireland in the Second World War* (Belfast: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1956), 318, quoted in Francis M. Carroll, “United States Armed Forces in Northern Ireland During World War II,” *New Hibernia Review* 12, no. 2 (2008): 15; Carroll, *American Presence in Ulster*, 141-142.

and women challenged local understandings of both race and gender, as well as by studying women's motivations for consorting with American servicemen.

Several noted historians have addressed the theme of race in relation to women in the United Kingdom. Sonya O. Rose, for example, argues that American soldiers' race was used as evidence of British women's moral degeneracy. Newspapers, serving as the mouthpiece of society, portrayed British women who associated with African-American soldiers as "especially immoral or degraded."⁸ Rose asserts in a subsequent article that since the heightened sense of British national identity precluded interracial relationships, communities saw women who dated black Americans as subversive to the war effort.⁹ By contrast, Simon Topping analyzes the effects of the U.S. Army's segregation policies on Northern Irish women. Whereas Rose believed that racism was rampant throughout Britain (and specifically England), Topping contends that Ulster women, along with Northern Irish society as a whole, were "colour-blind [*sic*]" towards African-American troops and opposed the Jim Crow paradigm.¹⁰ Yet both scholars call attention to the ostracism of women who socialized with black troops, viewing race as a significant factor in the experience of women in Northern Ireland during the war.¹¹

Notions surrounding gender were equally affected as those of race in Anglo-American interactions. Leanne McCormick writes that the GIs ruptured gender norms in Northern Ireland with their modern approach to dating (and social behavior in general), resulting in a liberalization of femininity and female roles. Indeed, the "friendly invasion" catalyzed "the construction and implementation of new patterns of female sexuality."¹² Harkening back to Rose, McCormick asserts that wartime conditions made the enforcement of traditional ideals difficult, eventually giving way to new constructions of gender roles and relationships.¹³ McCormick's research—gleaned from newspaper articles and government censorship reports, among other sources—demonstrates that the American presence was a milestone in the evolution of Ulsterite society, specifically in its beliefs about gender.

Americans' impact on race and gender in their host societies is only one side of the story, however, as historians have also looked into the motivations of British women to pursue American soldiers. In his groundbreaking 1975 book, Norman Longmate lays the foundation for the study of these motivations, providing a wealth of sources from diaries and letters to newspaper articles and government reports. He states that the very novelty of the Americans and their style of dating often attracted girls and women in Britain.¹⁴ For example, he writes, "[in] the memories of British women in particular it was clear the American invasion rated second only to the bombs as the outstanding feature of wartime life."¹⁵ This observation is echoed in several later works, including Juliet Gardiner's *Overpaid, Oversexed, and Over Here: The American GI in World War II Britain*. Gardiner shows that the sheer cultural presence of the freshly-imported Americans—which featured the most popular entertainment

⁸ Sonya O. Rose, "Girls and GIs: Race, Sex, and Diplomacy in Second World War Britain," *International History Review* 19, no. 1 (1997), 146, 159.

⁹ Rose, "Sex, Citizenship, and the Nation in World War II Britain," *American Historical Review* 103, no. 4 (1998), 1148-1149.

¹⁰ Simon Topping, "'The Dusky Doughboys': Interaction between African American Soldiers and the Population of Northern Ireland during the Second World War," *Journal of American Studies* 47, no. 4 (2013), 1131.

¹¹ Topping, "Dusky Doughboys," 1136, 1145.

¹² McCormick, "One Yank and They're Off," 228.

¹³ McCormick, 230, 232, 235.

¹⁴ Norman Longmate, *The G.I.'s: The Americans in Britain, 1942-1945* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1975), 247, 252, 257.

¹⁵ Longmate, xiii.

of the time and was sustained by generous GI paychecks—was enough to enchant scores of local girls and women.¹⁶ Because of this and other factors, Longmate proposes that the Americans left an indelible mark on the British national consciousness during the war.

Other scholars have expanded upon these findings concerning female attraction to the “Yanks.”¹⁷ Exploring the experience of women in Australia, Marilyn Lake argues that their desire for American companionship stemmed from a sexual objectification of the soldiers. In a reversal of traditional gendered behavior, women objectified the GIs in their noticeably pristine uniforms, “which established their difference and group identity and lent the wearers a certain sex appeal.”¹⁸ Lake indicates that Hollywood also contributed to the sexualization of the troops—a phenomenon which Anne Rees confirms in her own argument, writing that the “Silver Screen” played a significant role in Australians’ perception of Americans and the United States before the war.¹⁹ Furthermore, in his examination of the “rich relations” between American soldiers and war-weary citizens in the United Kingdom, David Reynolds asserts that, like many of the young American men who were ferried across the Atlantic to fight the Nazis, British women felt separated from the lives that they had previously known, and the stresses associated with the war only exaggerated their emotional turbulence.²⁰ It is within these complex historical and sociocultural contexts, then, that women in the United Kingdom and across the Commonwealth valued the reprieve from their dim circumstances that the well-dressed newcomers offered in exciting abundance.

This rich scholarly discussion, however, has neglected to even broach the question of how the experiences of women fit into the context of British-American relations. While Rose does connect principles of diplomacy to the role of race in the condemnation of women, her study is primarily concerned with interracial relations and the development of British female sexuality. Moreover, Rose and most other writers center their analyses on Britain as whole, rather than solely on Northern Ireland. As one of the few exceptions to this broad focus, McCormick points out that “the impact of U.S. troops was immediate and dramatic” in Ulster compared to the rest of Britain, especially because of the rural population’s relative isolation, conservative values, and strong religious identity.²¹ Therefore, a detailed analysis of gender relations in Northern Ireland during the war, as well as an inquiry into the relevance of those interactions to alliance-building, is warranted.

Legal Status of GIs in Britain

To recall Juliet Gardiner’s words, an important aspect of “forging” the “reality” of the alliance was the delegation of authority among the allies, specifically in the courts.²² Due to the vast number of foreign soldiers present in the United Kingdom in 1940—many of whom essentially lived in exile after the Nazis invaded their countries of origin—the British Parliament passed the Allied Forces Act, granting foreign armies the power to enforce their own martial regulations. The government did, however,

¹⁶ Gardiner, *Overpaid, Oversexed, & Over Here*, 55, 108, 111-112.

¹⁷ “Yank” is common, predominantly British colloquialism for Americans.

¹⁸ Marilyn Lake, “The Desire for a Yank: Sexual Relations between Australian Women and American Servicemen during World War II,” *Journal of the History of Sexuality* 2, no. 4 (1992), 628.

¹⁹ Lake, “The Desire for a Yank,” 629; Anne Rees, “Stepping Through the Silver Screen: Australian Women Encounter America, 1930s-1950s,” *Journeys* 17, no. 2 (2016), 55.

²⁰ David Reynolds, *Rich Relations: The American Occupation of Britain, 1942-1945* (New York: Random House, 1995), 267-68.

²¹ McCormick, “One Yank and They’re Off,” 231.

²² Gardiner, *Overpaid, Oversexed, & Over Here*, 6.

retain the right to prosecute Allied servicemen who violated British civil law and required the accused to stand trial in British courts.²³

Notwithstanding this law, the United States demanded full authority to arraign its soldiers for violations of martial and civil law. Unlike the British, American soldiers in wartime were normally tried for any crime in a court martial, as stipulated by Article 74 of the Articles of War.²⁴ In May 1942, a few months after the first American troops arrived, the British approved an Order in Council that extended the provisions of the Allied Forces Act to the Americans. In August, Parliament passed the United States of America (Visiting Forces) Act, which granted the U.S. military complete jurisdiction over GIs stationed in the U.K. Even in cases of murder or sexual assault, sentencing would fall under the sole discretion of the United States military. From then on, there existed an official double standard in the treatment of Allied armies in Britain, for British cabinet officials agreed that “in the paramount interest of the co-operation of the United States with us in the war we must give them satisfaction.”²⁵

Only four days after the United States of America Act went into effect, an American pilot named Travis Hammond was accused of raping a sixteen-year-old girl in an air-raid shelter. Due to the new statute, officers of the U.S. Army Judge Advocate General Corps, rather than wiggled British barristers, conducted the prosecution. The court ultimately acquitted Hammond, and he victoriously drove off in a jeep.²⁶ Having made the final decision in this case and others like it, General Carl Spaatz, commander of the U.S. 8th Air Force in Britain, later said that there were “three crimes a member of the Air Force can commit: murder, rape and interference with Anglo-American relations. The first two might conceivably be pardoned, but the third one, never.”²⁷ One may infer that Spaatz showed less leniency in cases such as that of Hammond, but it is equally plausible that in order to not threaten “Anglo-American relations” (especially when the U.S.A. Visiting Forces Act was in its infancy), he sought to end the matter as quickly as possible. There were undoubtedly other cases of rape during the war in which Americans were found guilty and punished, but the Hammond case, as well as legislation such as the U.S.A. Visiting Forces Act, demonstrates that the preservation of the alliance weighed significantly on matters of military justice.²⁸

It would follow, then, that to preserve the alliance, British soldiers and civilians alike needed to remain on good terms with the representatives of the United States (i.e., American soldiers). Furthermore, to maintain positive relations, British authorities could not afford to be perceived as punishing the very men who had come to support the United Kingdom in its time of need. When two Americans (who were actually volunteers in the Canadian army) were arrested for robbing an English civilian at gunpoint, the judge sentenced both men to six months of hard labor and one to be whipped a dozen times. Even though the individuals did not serve in the U.S. Army, the American ambassador protested that “[no] American soldier would want a comrade to be ordered flogged by a British judge” and persuaded the British home secretary to suspend the beating.²⁹ It would not entail a break with logic to infer that

²³ Reynolds, *Rich Relations*, 145.

²⁴ “The Articles of War,” HyperWar Foundation, [ibiblio](#), accessed November 24, 2019.

²⁵ Quoted in Reynolds, *Rich Relations*, 146-47.

²⁶ Reynolds, *Rich Relations*, 147-148; “U.S. Court-Martial Sitting in Britain,” *Daily Telegraph*, August 11, 1942.

²⁷ “Test Case,” *Time*, August 24, 1942.

²⁸ According to the Articles of War, a soldier convicted of rape faced capital punishment or life imprisonment, which were much harsher sentences than any under British law (see Reynolds, 147).

²⁹ Quoted in Reynolds, *Rich Relations*, 146.

if the British wished to remain “comrades” with the Americans, the former had to exercise caution before meting out discipline on the latter.

Women in Wartime Northern Ireland

If American men could not be blamed for civil offenses such as sexual misconduct, for example, then only one party was left responsible—women. In a booklet issued to troops in Ulster entitled *A Pocket Guide to Northern Ireland*, a small section was devoted to discussing “the girls”: “Ireland is an Old World country where woman’s place is still, to a considerable extent, in the home. In the cities, to be sure, modern trends and the pressure of the war itself have liberalized social attitudes. But in the rural sections—and it is quite possible you will be billeted in areas that are rural beyond your expectations—the old ideas still exist.”³⁰ Rose argues in a section on gender and international relations that these “Old World” convictions played directly into the hands of diplomats and policymakers, because “[an] actively applied sexual double standard coupled with the needs of wartime diplomacy shielded American men from blame for the presumed breakdown of moral standards among young women and girls.”³¹ Therefore, to preserve the Anglo-American alliance, the Northern Irish government and society turned their focus away from the Americans’ disorderly behavior and toward the deterioration of women’s moral purity.

To exacerbate this societal crisis, the press characterized women as having moral culpability in order to facilitate the narrative of female immorality. In an April 1943 issue of *The Londonderry Sentinel*, a journalist recounts the arrest of three young women who were found in a hut on a U.S. naval base. Having met a trio of sailors in Belfast, they traveled with the men to Derry and spent the night in the camp. The women were charged with vagrancy and sentenced to three months’ imprisonment.³² Another piece published the next year describes a Derry woman whom the local constabulary discovered with a sailor behind an air raid shelter; she was imprisoned for one month for “indecent behaviour [*sic*].”³³ Although the *Sentinel* insinuates that women found with American servicemen were of questionable moral character, the most frequent explanation for women being on American military installations had little to do with promiscuous behavior. Oftentimes, the U.S. Army ferried scores of local women in “liberty trucks” or “passion wagons” to attend dances held on bases throughout Britain.³⁴ One English woman remarked that she was treated “like one of several cows being sent to an auction sale,” having been “herded into a truck” and transported to a dance.³⁵ Once inside the dance hall, women would line up for inspection by GIs in search of a partner, a ritual that fostered a “slave-market attitude,” according to a male observer.³⁶ If newspapers accurately portrayed Irish women as immoral, then the U.S. military not only welcomed but also encouraged interactions between American servicemen and such women.

In these reports and others, the Americans with whom the women fraternized are conspicuously absent, and the silence is instructive. If the men were not mentioned, or at least not made the focus of the news stories, then the readers would be less keen to blame them for the misbehavior. Only one piece mentions any consequences for the soldiers, and even then, it is the simple promise that the men

³⁰ United States Army, *A Pocket Guide to Northern Ireland* (Washington, D.C.: War and Navy Departments, 1942), 27, 29.

³¹ Rose, “Girls and G.I.’s,” 150.

³² “Found in American Camp,” *Londonderry Sentinel*, April 15, 1943.

³³ “Sentence on Derry Mother,” *Londonderry Sentinel*, January 13, 1944.

³⁴ Gardiner, *Overpaid, Oversexed, & Over Here*, 109, 115.

³⁵ Quoted in Reynolds, *Rich Relations*, 264.

³⁶ Gardiner, *Overpaid, Oversexed, & Over Here*, 114.

would be “dealt with by their authorities.”³⁷ In another account, the Derry police arrested two girls from the Republic of Ireland (referred to by its Gaelic name, *Éire*) who were repeatedly seen in the presence of sailors in a single evening; yet the numerous seamen involved seemingly suffered no consequences.³⁸ Beyond a mere statement of their existence—comparable to the same level of attention that one would give to an extra in a film—the soldiers’ role in these episodes is wholly dismissed.

Some women did not even need to show romantic interest in the Americans to warrant investigation by law enforcement officers. One edition of the *Sentinel* in March 1943 listed numerous women who were fined for “obstruction,” a term that was apparently used in reference to the women blocking public sidewalks. The women stated that soldiers and sailors had asked them for directions to local restaurants and canteens.³⁹ Later that year, another woman was accused of assaulting a constable after she had been seen with two sailors. The defendant testified that the shipmen had asked for the way to the docks, and afterward a constable approached and questioned her. When she failed to show her identification card (which she had lost), the officer threatened to arrest her and, when she tried to leave, he grabbed her by the shoulders. Interestingly, the American sailors—not the policeman—filed the complaint that resulted in an assault charge, and yet they were nowhere to be found during the hearing. In a very telling conclusion to the article, the Resident Magistrate of Derry was paraphrased: “[One] aspect of the war [is] the great difficulty in cases where British and American subjects [are] involved. They [are] not amenable to the same law and that [makes] the administration frightfully difficult.”⁴⁰ In order to protect the alliance, the British authorities found female culprits to match the crimes that they could not otherwise accuse Americans of committing.

Responses from Ulsterite Society

Such publicity in the press led the Northern Irish populace to believe that a moral catastrophe had erupted in their midst, thus threatening the values of Christian purity that they held so dearly, and so they naturally spoke out. “I wish I could take some of the parents to see the conduct of their girls in Derry—girls from Donegal and Inishowen,” lamented the Roman Catholic Lord Bishop of Derry. “It would be better to take them home and let them live on potatoes and salt.”⁴¹ A Presbyterian minister voiced a similar concern, informing the Presbyterian General Assembly that “the number of girls running through the streets of Belfast and Derry is staggering.”⁴² Once societal norms were challenged, community leaders moved to recover control. The Resident Magistrate considered the rise of promiscuity as an affront to “Irishness” (which even now is exceedingly difficult to define in Ulster) and Irish national icons, ruling on an aforementioned case of immoral conduct: “We Irishmen are rather proud of the purity of Irishwomen, just like the purity of our racehorses.”⁴³ Therefore, the perception of the supposedly wanton females threatened not only the authority of traditional institutions but also certain conceptions of Irish nationhood.

³⁷ “Found in American Camp.”

³⁸ “Éire Girls in Derry,” *Londonderry Sentinel*, September 23, 1943.

³⁹ “Sunday Night Scenes,” *Londonderry Sentinel*, March 2, 1943.

⁴⁰ “Woman and the Special,” *Londonderry Sentinel*, November 11, 1943.

⁴¹ “Donegal Girls in Derry,” *Londonderry Sentinel*, April 29, 1944.

⁴² “Young Women Drinkers,” *Londonderry Sentinel*, June 10, 1943, quoted in McCormick, “One Yank and They’re Off,” 235. Although McCormick attributed the quote to the June 10, 1943 issue of the *Sentinel*, the exact words could not be located in the original article. However, the wording is too similar to the rest of the minister’s statement to be apocryphal and is thus assumed to be credible.

⁴³ “Sentence on Derry Mother.”

Other citizens and leaders demanded concrete action to curb the perceived corruption. Appalled by the sight of “two very undesirable women” pursuing American soldiers, one respondent called for the Belfast constabulary to raise a unit of policewomen for “clearing such women from the streets.”⁴⁴ This tactic had been used during the Great War, motivated by the presumption that women would more readily comply with orders given by other women.⁴⁵ Women police units had garnered enough success in the past—or the purported moral epidemic was severe enough—to persuade city officials to form a “Women’s Volunteer Patrol” five months later until a more permanent police contingent could be established.⁴⁶

Approaching the issue from a different angle, the assistant director of the American Red Cross (ARC) Club in Belfast argued that “[if] American troops [are] drunk or going around with the wrong sort of girls, remember they [have] nothing else to do.”⁴⁷ From her official perspective, any trouble involving the troops stemmed from their female companions, rather than the men themselves. She suggested opening more ARC clubs, designed as “little Americas” in which American favorites like doughnuts and hamburgers were served daily and dances were held several times a week.⁴⁸ The venues, in turn, would feature strictly-vetted hostesses, a curated class of “nice girls” whom ARC organizers hoped would set the standard for the rest of Ulster’s women.⁴⁹ Once again, society blamed women, now differentiated by moral standing, for soldiers’ behavior.

The public outcry and varied attempts at reform, however, were limited by the need for alliance protection. Newspapers such as the *Sentinel* would not dare to publish accusations of impropriety against the Americans nor complaints written by parents whose daughters were victimized. Additionally, the increasingly select pools of both acceptable female companions and admissible places of entertainment did little to influence what transpired outside of the ARC Clubs and supervised dance halls.⁵⁰ Indeed, the very alliance that had created difficulties in Ulsterite society also effectively stymied the efforts to find solutions to those same problems.

Possible Objections and Rebuttal

The complicated, nuanced history of American troops and Ulster women (and women in Britain as a whole) may lead some to believe that community elders’ fears were justified, that there was a marked rise in female promiscuity during the war, specifically targeting the GIs. Admittedly, the symptoms of such a problem were not hard to find. Prostitutes of both casual and professional natures, also known as “camp followers,” were found wherever soldiers were garrisoned or spent their leave days. The most notorious examples were the “Piccadilly Commandos” and “Hyde Park Rangers” of London, and the Rainbow Corner ARC Club was ringed by a seemingly never-ending throng of women seeking out young soldiers who exchanged payment for pleasure.⁵¹

It would be erroneous to assume, however, that all women, or even most of them, engaged in this sort of behavior. Even to claim that women were more “sexed” during the war may prove problematic. Although statistical information on wartime Ulster is largely unavailable, the data on the United Kingdom as a whole is revealing.

⁴⁴ “Need for Women Police,” *Belfast Newsletter*, April 10, 1943.

⁴⁵ McCormick, “One Yank and They’re Off,” 234-35.

⁴⁶ “Women’s Patrol in City Streets,” *Northern Whig*, September 27, 1943.

⁴⁷ “U.S. Troops in Ulster,” *Londonderry Sentinel*, September 3, 1942.

⁴⁸ Gardiner, *Overpaid, Oversexed, & Over Here*, 97.

⁴⁹ Quoted in McCormick, “One Yank and They’re Off,” 242.

⁵⁰ McCormick, 244.

⁵¹ Reynolds, *Rich Relations*, 202.

When one examines the number of births out of wedlock during the war years in England and Wales, for example, it becomes clear that while the totals were still considerable, the ratio of extramarital pregnancies to total maternities actually declined from 13.8% in 1939 to 11.8% in 1943, slightly increasing in 1944 and only reaching prewar levels (14.6% in 1938) by 1945. And even then, many conceptions took place out of an understanding that both partners would soon be married, which sadly did not always occur.⁵² While the war itself disrupted relationships, the U.S. military also developed a strict stance against GI-civilian marriages, which manifested in a public statement that Irish girls who married American soldiers would not automatically receive U.S. citizenship. This “official warning,” issued in response to the “marriage problem,” also informed women that they might very well be left behind at any moment and should thus avoid any situation that would render them dependent on their new GI husbands (e.g., pregnancy).⁵³ In short, while many women did engage in relations with troops, the overarching statistics demonstrate that the behavior was not on the rise and was in fact in decline for the majority of the war.

Conclusion

Over the four years during which GIs resided in Ulster, the preservation of the Anglo-American alliance dictated that Northern Irish women take the blame for the soldiers’ wrongdoings. Within months of the Americans’ arrival, the British government legalized preferential treatment for their allies from across the Atlantic. Almost immediately thereafter, the first case involving an American soldier and a British woman ended in the former’s quick exoneration, decided by a general who keenly sensed the significance of maintaining the alliance. Because the GIs could not be blamed, British society chose to view its own women as the source of the difficulties, a fact that was especially true in Northern Ireland. Ignoring the involvement of American men, newspapers reported that women instigated and were thus culpable of incidents of promiscuous behavior. Ulsterite society, particularly in the Church and in the judiciary, responded with calls for more supervision and control over its female population. Nonetheless, such efforts were necessarily limited by the alliance itself.

Gender relations—in Northern Ireland and elsewhere—played a much more important role in World War II than has been traditionally addressed. Previous scholarship has highlighted the effects of the American presence on local communities, and specifically their attitudes towards race and gender, but no connection has been made between those “rich relations” and the international conflict that brought these groups into contact with one another in the first place. In accordance with total war doctrine, a policy that reached full maturation during the twentieth century, the Allies intentionally targeted the enemy’s civilian population and non-military assets to achieve comprehensive victory. And yet the experience of women in Northern Ireland shows that Allied success exacted a significant cost not only on the innocent residents of bombed-out enemy cities, but also on women at home who interacted with the soldiers fighting for that victory. The price that they were made to pay in order to protect the war effort exposes the integral component of gender and gendered systems in one of the most consequential and devastating conflicts in modern history.

⁵² Reynolds, 273-76.

⁵³ “American Soldiers and Irish Girls,” *Belfast Newsletter*, June 15, 1942.

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THE POLICY OF COOPERATION: American Colonial Politics in Bavaria, 1945-49

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From May 1945 to August 1949 the United States military occupied a wide swathe of southern and western Germany, ruling over more than 16 million people. While there's been much written on the macro-political and ideological concerns of the White House and State Department during the occupation and partition of Germany, far less attention has been paid to the unique role of the military occupiers on the ground, organized as the Office of Military Government, United States (OMGUS). Borrowing from scholars of British and French colonialism, this paper examines the American occupation of Germany through a framework of indirect rule, exploring how OMGUS propped up German political elites in the Christian Social Union in Bavaria party with a vested interest in cooperation with the imperial power, and weakened those who were disinterested in cooperation as an end in and of itself. It was this policy of cooperation, somewhat independent from the pronouncements of Washington, that guided political interactions in America's colonial periphery in Germany.

In July 2013, the German newsmagazine *Der Spiegel* published a bombshell report: for years, the United States National Security Agency (NSA) had engaged in a massive wiretapping operation in Germany.¹ While similar leaks from American intelligence contractor Edward Snowden had exposed the NSA for spying in many countries, the level of espionage that the U.S. conducted in Germany—including tapping Chancellor Angela Merkel's cellphone and soliciting the help of German intelligence services in spying on German citizens—was without recent precedence for such a close American ally.

The Snowden revelations sent commentators scrambling for a new approach to U.S.-German relations, which had long been seen in both popular and academic accounts a joint partnership that emerged in the Cold War, as West Germans elected a government committed to economic development and anti-communism. But while the Snowden leaks call particular attention to it, this narrative of the U.S.-German relationship has long been woefully inadequate. In looking at the dynamic between the two countries since the fall of Third Reich—and in particular, during the Cold War—it is clear that it is not one of equal allies, but of empire, of metropole and colony. This is not mere hyperbole: the U.S. occupied Germany for four years after the end of World War II, serving not only as an economic administrator but also as a political influence, actively shaping the politics of the future Federal Republic of Germany. Examining the American occupation of Germany through the lens of empire and borrowing frameworks from scholars of British and French colonialism in

¹ "Indispensable Exchange: Germany Cooperates Closely with NSA - SPIEGEL ONLINE," *Spiegel Online*, 8 July 2013.

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the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, can offer a better understanding of the roots of America's close, yet unequal, relationship with modern Germany.

As this paper will show, during the post-World War II occupation the United States interacted with occupied Germany like an imperial power managing a newly conquered region: while senior officials in the Washington metropole debated macro-political master plans for their new colony from a distance, it was the officers on the ground who were in charge of actually negotiating the projection of state power. This colonial authority was known as the Office of Military Government, United States (OMGUS). As was the case with the indirect rule of British India and *association* in French Africa, in the American occupation of Germany it was up to OMGUS officers on the periphery to do the micro-political work of developing personal relationships, exploring local interests, and finding subordinate "partners" who could help carry out the metropole's annexation.² To do this, the Military Government focused on propping up local elites with a vested interest in cooperation with the imperial power, and on weakening those who were disinterested in cooperation as an end in and of itself. This policy of cooperation, somewhat independent from the pronouncements of Washington guided political interactions on America's colonial periphery in Germany.

The policy of cooperation, born by OMGUS and its guiding force, General Lucius D. Clay (Deputy Military Governor 1945-47, Military Governor 1947-49), initially served as a way for forces on the American colonial periphery to administer and project influence into a newly conquered territory with the crucial assistance of local political elites. However, as the occupation developed, OMGUS and its policy of cooperation had to respond to changing German party alignments and a much more pronounced interest from Washington in how German affairs aligned with rising Cold War tensions. Wedged between a developing national stage of highly partisan German politics and a newly hegemonic discourse of containment emanating from Washington, OMGUS adopted a much less flexible stance on the policy of cooperation: it demanded even greater loyalty from its German political partners while being much more willing to punish even the slightest apparent dissent against American power. It wasn't a commitment to containment or the pro-market political leader and future West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer that drove the Military Government's newfound aggressiveness, but a need to preserve its own autonomy. With its power and influence at stake on both sides, OMGUS shifted its policy of cooperation, from encouraging flexibility by local political partners to discouraging it, as its priorities changed from effective regional administration to the construction of a new state along the contours of Washington's Cold War dogmas.

This paper will examine how OMGUS developed this policy of cooperation in its relations with the largest political party entirely in the American zone—and therefore one of the Military Government's most important political partners—the Christian Social Union in Bavaria (*Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern*, CSU). While cooperation was always paramount over ideology within OMGUS, the need to remain relevant in a vastly changed colonial project compelled OMGUS to use its policy of cooperation—and thus the close relationships it had fostered with political allies earlier in the occupation—for the ends of Washington's ideological conception of American power in Germany. In looking at this aspect of America's colonial occupation of Germany, the larger historical relationship between the two countries—which has had global repercussions during and after the Cold War—becomes more clear.

² For more on the role of local elites in the extension of colonial power, see Mahmood Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1996).

Literature Review

On the whole, the literature on the American occupation of Germany has focused either on its macro-political or micro-political dimensions, without offering sufficient engagement between the two. During the Cold War, both the traditionalist and revisionist schools of thought, which emphasized Soviet and American machinations respectively, focused on macro-political narratives of ideology and high-level diplomacy. Then, with the end of the Cold War in the 1990's, a new post-revisionist school turned the focus to the non-ideological micro-politics of OMGUS and more regional German political actors like the CSU, utilizing sources opened by the German Federal Archives after reunification in 1991. While this research is heavily indebted to their work, the post-revisionists still failed to unify their approach with a broader examination of the interaction between micro- and macro-politics during the occupation. For example, while Marjorie Lamberti makes excellent use of German-language sources, as well as the Lucius Clay papers, in her 2009 article "General Lucius Clay, German Politicians, and the Great Crisis During the Making of West Germany's Constitution," she focuses entirely on the micro-political dynamic between Clay and the center-left Social Democratic Party of Germany (*Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands*, SPD).³ State Department officials appear merely as individuals interacting with Clay, and not as a macro-political institutional force. Similarly, in his 1993 article "Transforming the German Party System: The United States and the Origins of Political Moderation, 1945-1949," Daniel E. Rogers uses the OMGUS archives to show that Clay played a substantial role in encouraging a centrist "politics of moderation" in occupied Germany.⁴ Yet Rogers treats Clay's micro-politicking with German parties as largely autonomous from the macro-politics of Washington's Cold War discourse. Representative of much of the post-revisionist literature, neither of these articles attempts to unify the very distinct and often confrontational micro-politics of OMGUS and the macro-politics of Washington into a single framework of the projection of American power into occupied Germany.

Rather than seeking to define the dynamics of the American occupation of Germany as micro-political or macro-political, this essay emphasizes the interaction between the two. This interaction is best understood by viewing the occupation through the dynamics of empire, by which OMGUS acted as the imperial presence on the colonial periphery. Balancing the ideological impositions of the metropole with administrative concerns over relations with local elites, OMGUS engaged in a policy of cooperation that, while always paramount, was also always changing in response to these two other forces acting upon it. Thus, while this research examines the occupation from the archival perspective of OMGUS, it places the observations and actions of OMGUS in the context of a broader imperial politics with macro-political concerns from above and micro-political concerns from below. The policy of cooperation, then, becomes more than just the non-ideological, opportunistic negotiation between the United States and the European center-right, as Deborah Kisatsky has explored in great depth, but a negotiation within the American military-diplomatic apparatus itself.⁵

In examining the relationships between Washington, OMGUS, and German political elites, this research draws on frameworks of imperial relationships developed

³ Marjorie Lamberti, "General Lucius Clay, German Politicians, and the Great Crisis During the Making of West Germany's Constitution," *German Politics and Society* 27, no. 4 (2009): 24-50.

⁴ Daniel E. Rogers, "Transforming the German Party System: The United States and the Origins of Political Moderation, 1945-1949," *Journal of Modern History* 65, no. 3 (1993): 512-541.

⁵ Deborah Kisatsky, *The United States and the European Right, 1945-1955* (Columbus: Ohio State UP, 2005).

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by historians of British colonialism in Africa and Asia. Going back to the mid-century scholarship of Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, imperial historians have emphasized the crucial role played by on-the-ground colonial administrators in adapting empire to “conditions found in each periphery,” interfacing between the geopolitical and economic visions of London and the practical concerns of administering an overseas colony, including considerations of indigenous elites.⁶ Since the 1980s and 1990s, this spatial framework has been complicated by the “new imperial historians,” who have explored the often conflicting and contradictory “projects” of metropolitan elites and local colonial administrators and soldiers who, as Fredrick Cooper and Ann L. Stoler put it, “were simultaneously coerced and coercing, who enforced the will of the elite yet made demands themselves.”⁷ At the same time, other “new imperial historians” like Mahmood Mamdani and Olúfẹ́mi Táíwò have taken a critical lens to indirect rule, understanding the propping up of native chiefs and princes not as a good governance reform, but rather as a means for colonial administrators to expand and cement their own hegemony through the entire native population.⁸ In showing how local colonial administrators used networks of local elites to manage interests somewhat autonomous from those of the metropole, the “new imperial history” offers a vital framework for understanding the Military Government’s policy of cooperation in occupied Germany.

Unlike the work of the post-revisionists, this research does not use German-language sources: linguistic capabilities, as well as the time and budget restraints of an undergraduate paper, made use of German archives infeasible. Yet, while the perspective of CSU actors speaking from German-language archives would be informative, it is not necessary in a paper that is fundamentally about a particular set of American actors: the officials of OMGUS. The emphasis is on their policy of cooperation, and its changes in response to the way that they perceived Washington, Munich, and Bonn. This is a history of the periphery of a burgeoning American empire, told from the perspectives of the Americans who were building it on the ground. To that end this paper does make extensive use of OMGUS records housed at the National Archives, as well as Clay’s published papers.⁹

This paper will explore the development of the Military Government’s policy of cooperation over the course of two periods. Of emphasis in both are the thoughts and actions of Clay, who had the unique position of leading OMGUS for the entire period of the occupation, first as *de facto* administrator and then as *de jure* Military Governor, when many of his ideas as Deputy Military Governor became realized in practice. The first period is the early occupation, lasting from May 1945 to May 1947. During that time, OMGUS developed the policy of cooperation as a response to an unwillingness, born of the practical concerns of administering a war-torn territory, to enforce Washington’s distant but radical occupation objectives, emphasizing mass denazification and destruction of industrial capacity. By seeking out cooperative local

⁶ Ronald Robinson, John Gallagher, and Alice Denny, *Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2015), xviii; Ronald Robinson, “Non-European Foundations of European Imperialism,” in *Studies in the Theory of Imperialism*, ed. Roger Owen and Robert B. Sutcliffe (London: Longman, 1972), 117-142.

⁷ Nicholas Thomas, *Colonialism’s Culture: Anthropology, Travel and Government* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994); Frederick Cooper and Ann L. Stoler, “Tensions of Empire: Colonial Control and Visions of Rule,” *American Ethnologist* 16, no. 4 (November 1989): 609-621. For an overview of the “new imperial history” of space, see Alan Lester, “Imperial Circuits and Networks: Geographies of the British Empire,” *History Compass* 4 no. 1 (2005): 124–141.

⁸ Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject*; Olúfẹ́mi Táíwò, *How Colonialism Preempted Modernity in Africa* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana UP, 2010).

⁹ Jean Edward Smith, ed., *The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay: Germany, 1945-1949* (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1974).

elites from a wide ideological spectrum, OMGUS was able to develop a mutually beneficial relationship with the liberal-conservative wing of the CSU, which offered its support to a military government rule that de-emphasized denazification and deindustrialization. Meanwhile, the rival CSU faction, the traditionalists, was punished by OMGUS for obstructing the expansion of American interests in the occupied German state of Bavaria. During this period, when post-war German politics was still very regional and Washington divided on a comprehensive solution to the “German question,” OMGUS was given space on both sides to set the terms of the policy of cooperation and thus empower itself.

In contrast, during the second, later period of the occupation, from June 1947 to August 1949, Clay’s OMGUS was forced to modify its implementation of the policy of cooperation in the face of changes in Washington, Munich, and Bonn. In Washington, advocates for containment and partition won out in the debates over the German question, compelling OMGUS to enforce the newly hegemonic policy. Meanwhile, in Munich, the bifurcation of the CSU between liberal-conservatives and traditionalists ended with a homogenization of the party into a moderate conservative stance that, while ideologically to the right of the liberal-conservatives, was willing to cooperate with Washington’s new German policy. Finally, in Bonn, a new two-party bloc system emerged at the all-Western zone Parliamentary Council, with the CSU allying with future Chancellor Konrad Adenauer’s pro-American, pro-partition, pro-market Christian Democratic Union of Germany (*Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands*, CDU) against an SPD committed to a neutral, unified, socialist German state.

The result of these major changes was a policy of cooperation applied much more strictly than in the early occupation. With Washington taking a much more direct and forceful interest in what had become the central political, economic, and ideological battlefield of the new Cold War, OMGUS had to follow the new contain-and-partition line even more zealously so as to ensure its own relevance and power in constructing the postwar American empire. This meant that the Military Government enforced a new political rigidity, under which even the slightest deviance by the SPD and certain individual CSU politicians from the American policy line was decried as rigid inflexibility, when in fact it was OMGUS that had now become inflexible and unyielding in employing the policy of cooperation. With the stakes of the occupation raised by anti-Soviet hawks in the metropole and a deep partisan divide in Bonn, OMGUS turned the policy of cooperation from a means of ensuring what it saw as a flexible and mutually-beneficial colonial administration into a plow by which all challenges to American power in postwar Germany could be cleared.

Thus, the policy of cooperation, while always remaining paramount for OMGUS, would change its form and purpose substantially over the course of the occupation. While created by OMGUS to serve in regional micro-politics, it would end up enabling the macro-political designs of the American metropole. In this way, the colonial-imperial view of the American occupation of Germany reveals the complex yet crucial way in which micro- and macro-political forces intertwined to produce a unique relationship between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany.

The Early Occupation (May 1945-May 1947)

By the time Allied forces seized Germany in May 1945, Washington had already provided a set of occupation guidelines to the nascent American Military Government. The April 1945 Joint Chiefs of Staff directive known as JCS 1067 would remain the

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official American occupation policy for over two years.¹⁰ Championed by the liberal Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, Jr., JCS 1067 answered the German question through a three-pronged approach: demilitarization, deindustrialization, and denazification.¹¹ While OMGUS would accomplish the first point quite thoroughly and decisively, the other two would be sites of great policy contention throughout the occupation. If every fully implemented, JCS 1067 would have kept the German economy at subsistence levels and banned any and all active and passive supporters of Nazism—a far more extensive group than those tried at Nuremberg—from political, business, and social leadership positions. Many of the politicians in the CSU’s liberal-conservative wing with whom OMGUS would develop such strong, cooperative relationships—mostly educated Protestant professionals, most (but not all) of whom avoided open dissent and concentration camps by participating in the ordinary, daily life of the Third Reich—would have been cast out of politics, and much of public life, by JCS 1067.

But JCS 1067 would never be fully implemented, for by the end of 1946 Clay and OMGUS had already rendered its pillars toothless. While this was due in part to changing political winds in Washington—by the early Truman administration, pro-business, pro-industrialization, anti-Soviet conservatives like Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy were already pushing out liberals like Morgenthau, who resigned from the Treasury Department in July 1945¹²—Clay himself had a different motivation for his actions. Unlike policy makers in the capital, the chief administrator of OMGUS did not have a master ideological plan for Germany beyond increasing his own power and autonomy. In fact, Clay would continue to flexibly apply certain policy planks of JCS 1067—mainly, denazification—when they could assist German politicians who were cooperative with the American occupiers, and punish those who were understood to be obstructing their efforts. In this way, the policy of cooperation would begin to take form as a carrot-and-stick for managing the local political elites who were so crucial to Clay’s imperial project.

Clay’s first major challenge to the dictates of JCS 1067 came in the “Restatement of Policy on Germany” speech he crafted for Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, delivered in Stuttgart in September 1946.¹³ The Stuttgart speech, as it was known, laid down new *de facto* occupation principles that allowed OMGUS more flexibility in building cooperative partnerships with local elites: namely, promoting federalism (in other words, greater regional autonomy) for a future German state, and encouraging industrial development through the creation of a common financial policy and a centralized trade and industry agency for all four Allied zones.¹⁴ This latter plank would be partially realized in January 1947 with the creation of the joint U.S.-British bizonal economic and administrative agencies, known as Bizonia (the French and Soviets refused participation). Clay believed deeply in the power of

¹⁰ “Directive to Commander in Chief of United States Forces of Occupation Regarding the Military Government of Germany,” April 1945, *Germany, 1947-1949: The Story in Documents* (Washington: GPO, 1950), 24-27.

¹¹ Tony Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945* (New York: Penguin, 2005), 105.

¹² Carolyn Eisenberg, *Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944-1949* (New York: Cambridge UP, 1996), 69-70.

¹³ Though officially attributed to Byrnes, historians largely agree that Clay was the real architect of the speech—if he did not actually write it, his communiqué on policy suggestions sent to Washington that July was certainly so influential on the Secretary that nearly all of the Stuttgart speech’s major points—often down to exact phraseology—came directly from Clay. See John Gimbel, *The American Occupation of Germany: Politics and the Military, 1945-1949* (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1968), 85; Jean Edward Smith, *Lucius D. Clay: An American Life* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1990), 387-88.

¹⁴ James F. Byrnes, “Restatement of Policy on Germany,” 6 Sept. 1946, *U.S. Diplomatic Mission to Germany*, 4 April 2014.

Bizonia to solve the practical problem of administering a region cut off from necessary material supplies (most of Germany's valuable mineral deposits laid in the British zone)¹⁵, while viewing federalism as a check on the centralizing tendencies that OMGUS attributed to both socialism and fascism.¹⁶ In this way, Clay began to turn the Military Government into an autonomous actor in the occupation.¹⁷ Rather than merely toeing the line from Washington, it took advantage of the lack of consensus among American diplomatic elites to create powerful institutions for expanding its own political and economic influence. Similar to how British imperialists fused centralized economic coordination with decentralized, indirect political rule by hand-picked native elites (what Mamdani calls “decentralized despotism”¹⁸), Bizonia and the promise of regional autonomy gave Clay the power to promote his cooperative partners, punish his foes, and deepen the Military Government's influence in Germany.

In addition to these new policy orientations laid down in Stuttgart, Clay's actions in 1946 indicate a certain range of ideological possibilities that OMGUS was willing to accommodate in its occupation. One of Clay's consistent and defining desires regarding the kinds of politicians he wanted to work with was a vague sort of liberalism, with the Deputy Military Governor including among his suggestions for a new policy statement to succeed JCS 1067 a need for “the reeducation of the German people through the utilization of liberal-minded Germans into a more democratic and liberal philosophy of life.”¹⁹ While Clay was not inclined to elaborate on the specific nature of this “liberal philosophy” beyond the equally vague concepts of supporting economic development and democratic institutions, the historiography certainly clarifies what was beyond the Deputy Military Governor's range of ideological possibilities in German politics. As Daniel E. Rogers has shown, Clay's support for democratic political parties reached its limits when parties strayed too far to the right of the political spectrum, as was the case in his crackdown on the expansion of the rightist, populist and, in Clay's words, “strongly Nazi” Economic Party of Refugees in Bavaria.²⁰ Similarly, Carolyn Eisenberg has shown that pressure from American businessmen and certain senior economic officials in the State Department and OMGUS led to the defeat in fall 1946 of a proposed decartelization program, thus limiting Military Government cooperation with the SPD on economic policy.²¹

Thus, while OMGUS certainly did have an ideological window—and was unwilling and unable to collaborate with groups and individuals outside of it—*within* that window relations with German politicians were driven most of all by a policy of cooperation. That is, Clay preferred to have the flexibility to work with the political groups that would be most cooperative with Military Government policy, even as it would change rapidly in 1946 and 1947. In his suggestions to the War Department for

¹⁵ Smith, *Lucius D. Clay*, 405.

¹⁶ As Clay insisted in his July policy statement, “The United States favors a decentralized government, composed of a small number of states joined together in a confederation or a federal type of government, which would have sufficient power to achieve economic unity.” Gimbel, *The American Occupation of Germany*, 77.

¹⁷ Not even two weeks after that speech, Clay was already trying to use it as an opportunity to officially abandon JCS 1067, cabling to the War Department that “a revision of JCS 1067 series into a new policy statement is desirable.” Lucius D. Clay, cable to War Department, 16 October 1946, document 157 of Smith, *The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay*, 263.

¹⁸ Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject*, 17.

¹⁹ Clay to War Department, 16 October 1946, document 157 of Smith, *The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay*, 264.

²⁰ Rogers, “Transforming the German Party System,” 526.

²¹ Carolyn Eisenberg, “U. S. Policy in Post-War Germany: The Conservative Restoration,” *Science & Society* 46.1 (1982): 29.

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a new policy statement, Clay recommended that it be “short and concise ... an overall policy objective which would seldom require modification and the detailed interpretation of that policy could be modified by implementing directives without change in the basic document.”²² In other words, Clay wanted a policy document that would allow OMGUS personnel to adapt the broad directions from Washington to the changing local needs and conditions that projecting American economic and political authority into Germany demanded.

Armed with Bizonia and discretion over denazification, and given an incredible amount of *de facto* autonomy as the Truman administration remained divided on the German question, OMGUS was well-positioned to develop a cooperative relationship with one particular group of local political elites, who would prove vital in legitimizing and carrying out the American occupation project: the liberal-conservative wing of the CSU. The CSU, begun in August 1945 as a series of local Christian democratic parties in Bavaria, was less a coherent political party during the early occupation period than a marriage of necessity between two often diametrically opposed factions.²³ The liberal-conservatives, led by Party Chairman Josef Müller, were a grouping of Catholic and Protestant professionals, described by OMGUS as “liberal” and “progressive”—terms that signified the potential for cooperation with American authorities rather than a specific ideological program.²⁴ They stood in contrast to the traditionalists, an overwhelmingly Catholic formation that took an ultra-conservative attitude towards the role of religion in public life.²⁵ OMGUS had many reasons to dislike and distrust the CSU traditionalists: they were strongly resistant to denazification (in contrast not only to the Social Democrats and Communists, but also to the liberal-conservative wing of the CSU), had an agenda of Bavarian political separatism (including an openness to the return of the Wittelsbach monarchy, which had abdicated following World War I), and many of its leaders have been key figures in the conservative Weimar-era Bavarian People’s Party (*Bayerische Volkspartei*, BVP). OMGUS took this latter point as a serious issue, worrying that the traditionalists would prioritize the resuscitation of Weimar-era Bavarian politics over the creation of a new, American-aligned political order.²⁶

Thus, for the first few years of the occupation, it is useless to think of the CSU as a single ideological entity. Rather, for both OMGUS officials and historians, the CSU must be understood as divided between two factions that, at least until 1948, were constantly at odds with each other, even to the point of forming multi-party coalitions to keep each other out of government.²⁷ As the Military Government increasingly observed and interacted with the CSU, it came to view the liberal-

²² Clay to War Department, 16 October 1946, document 157 of Smith, *The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay*, 264.

²³ Peter James, *The Politics of Bavaria—An Exception to the Rule: The Special Position of the Free State of Bavaria in the New Germany* (Aldershot: Avebury, 1995), 94; Walter M. Hudson, “The U.S. Military Government and Democratic Reform and Denazification in Bavaria, 1945-47,” (MA thesis, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2001), 44.

²⁴ Lucius D. Clay, letter to John J. McCloy, 5 October 1945, document 47 of Smith, *The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay*, 94; OMGB to Director of Intelligence, OMGUS, “Periodic Report for Week ending 24 Hours 11 September 1946,” Munich, 13 Sept. 1946, Periodic Reports OMGB 27 Sept—20 Dec 1946, CSU (Pol. Act.), Office of Military Government, Bavaria (OMGBY), Land Director, Investigative Correspondence and Reports, 1945-1949; Records of U.S. Occupation Headquarters, World War II, Record Group 260 (RG 260), National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD (NACP).

²⁵ James, *The Politics of Bavaria—An Exception to the Rule*, 95.

²⁶ Clay to McCloy, 5 October 1945, document 47 of Smith, *The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay*, 94; OMGB to Director of Intelligence, OMGUS, Periodic Reports OMGB 27 Sept—20 Dec 1946, CSU (Pol. Act.), Correspondence and Reports, 1945-1949, RG 260, NACP.

²⁷ James, *The Politics of Bavaria—An Exception to the Rule*, 113.

conservatives as ideal partners in its policy of cooperation, while the traditionalists were largely viewed as intransigent in their relations with the American occupiers. For example, in an April 1946 intelligence report on the small Bavarian city of Aschaffenburg, the local Office of the Military Government (OMG) noted just before municipal elections that “the Christian Social Union in Stadt Aschaffenburg is a well-balanced Party and the one best suited for democratic Government.”²⁸ The report makes clear that the CSU in Aschaffenburg belonged to the liberal-conservative wing of the party, noting that “contrary to the general bavarian [*sic*] trend” of traditionalist dominance of the CSU and in contrast with the “rightest [*sic*] influence of the [local Catholic] church,” the Aschaffenburg party was “liberal” and “progressive”—buzzwords that were less about describing a particular ideology than a potential for partnership with the American occupiers. In a similar vein, the report emphasizes how the Aschaffenburg CSU leadership was “previously politically inactive.” More than just a shorthand for saying the leadership had not been Nazis (which the report separately notes), this assessment conveys the positive attitude that OMGUS officials had towards new politicians who they could mold into local collaborators with the occupation. This is in contrast to the local SPD, described in the report as “reactionary” and having “not changed in membership from pre 1933 years. The thoughts and ideals of its members do not reflect any progressive political ideology.” In fact, the report is quite explicit in stating that its support for Aschaffenburg’s CSU over its SPD is “due almost entirely to the affiliation of some young, liberal, and politically inactive leaders.”²⁹

Though OMGUS would not often intervene in electoral politics on behalf of the CSU’s liberal-conservatives (unlike its more extensive meddling against the fiercely anti-American, far-right populist parties³⁰), it twice took decisive steps in the early occupation period to prevent the Bavarian premiership from falling into the hands of the uncooperative traditionalists: once to depose an uncooperative minister-president (the head of government in a German state) and then, just over a year later, to install a one. While OMGUS took contradictory policy positions in these cases, its commitment to punishing uncooperative politicians and rewarding cooperative ones—ensuring local political elites remained loyal to the imperial project—remained constant.

The first case was in September 1945 when, under pressure from OMGUS, Bavarian minister-president and CSU traditionalist leader Fritz Schäffer was forced to resign his post. Schäffer had been named minister-president by American military forces in May 1945, but lost the confidence of OMGUS when he appointed a number of ex-Nazis to his cabinet and when anti-Semitic speeches he had made as a BVP politician during the Weimar Republic came to light.³¹ Among those supporting Schäffer’s resignation was Clay, who was frustrated by his insufficient progress on—and often downright obstruction of—denazification. Writing to John McCloy soon after Schäffer’s dismissal, Clay elaborated on how the ex-premier “did not adequately reflect the liberal elements in the population” and had “protested that he would not be able to continue to operate the German agencies if certain of his officials were

²⁸ “Annex No 1 to Political Activity Report,” Aschaffenburg, Bavaria, 30 April 1946, 114A CSU April 1946 to July 1946, OMGB, Records of the Intelligence Division, Intelligence Records of the Information Control Division, 1946-47, RG 260, NACP.

²⁹ Here, terminology like “progressive” and “reactionary” is not deployed in its conventional usage as short-hand for “left-wing” and “right-wing,” but rather in reference to the rigidity of politicians’ ideological commitments.

³⁰ Rogers, “Transforming the German Party System,” 512-41.

³¹ Hudson, “The U.S. Military Government and Democratic Reform and Denazification in Bavaria, 1945-47,” 128-32.

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removed under the denazification program.”³² It didn’t matter that Clay had his own reservations about and inconsistencies in applying denazification; interpreting JCS 1067 was up to him, not German politicians. In complaining about denazification, Schäffer challenged the Military Government’s ultimate political authority—a grave violation of the policy of cooperation.³³

While the Schäffer episode shows that OMGUS was willing and able to intervene in political affairs to prevent uncooperative politicians from gaining positions of influence, the debate over the denazification of CSU liberal-conservative leader Josef Müller shows how the Military Government protected and supported cooperative politicians. The controversy began on November 12, 1946, when the Munich newspaper *Süddeutsche Zeitung* published a report that Müller had expressed National Socialist sympathies to the Nazi-era political police.³⁴ As the CSU was the clear favorite heading into the Bavarian parliament (*Landtag*) elections two weeks away, some OMGUS officials were concerned that a Nazi collaborator could become minister-president of Bavaria. With the Schäffer debacle fresh in everyone’s mind, Brigadier General Walter J. Muller, Director of the Office of the Military Government, Bavaria (OMGB), launched an investigation into Müller’s Nazi-era activities. Writing to Clay, Muller recommended that the Deputy Military Governor authorize the banning of Müller from any political activity (including running for office and continuing to serve as CSU Party Chairman) on the basis of his past involvement in the *Abwehr*, the Nazi military intelligence agency.³⁵ Charles K. Gailey, Clay’s Chief of Staff, responded to Muller, authorizing Müller’s dismissal from the CSU Party Chairmanship, as well as the submission of a denazification charge against Müller to the Bavarian government and the establishment of a Military Government hearing into Müller’s activities as CSU Chairman.³⁶ It appeared Müller’s career was over.

However, just a week later Clay suspended any action against Müller, including his denazification case. As he explained to Assistant Deputy Military General Frank Keating, who had protested the decision, there was a great difference between investigating Müller as party leader and *Landtag* delegate and investigating him as minister-president (the CSU did indeed win the *Landtag* election, with Müller set to take office as minister-president), an action that could discredit the premiership’s legitimacy in the eyes of the Bavarian people.³⁷ But this explanation was likely disingenuous—after all, Clay had halted the investigation into Müller

³² Lucius D. Clay, letter to John J. McCloy, 16 September 1945, document 36 of Smith, *The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay*, 82.

³³ Not inclined to forget the faces of those who were unwilling to cooperate with his occupation project, Clay would actually ban Schäffer from all political activity the following spring, when his support for the return of the pre-World War I Wittelsbach monarchy would even more flagrantly challenge American supremacy in Bavaria. See Hudson, “The U.S. Military Government and Democratic Reform and Denazification in Bavaria, 1945-47,” 55 and Rogers, “Transforming the German Party System,” 520-24.

³⁴ OMGB to Director of Intelligence, OMGUS, Periodic Reports OMGB 27 Sept—20 Dec 1946, CSU (Pol. Act.), Correspondence and Reports, 1945-1949, RG 260, NACP.

³⁵ Muller (OMGB) to Acting Deputy Military Governor (OMGUS), “Dr. Joseph Müller, Chairman of the CSU for Bavaria,” Munich, 18 Nov. 1946, AG 000.1 Politics (Josef Mueller), Executive Office, Office of the Adjutant General, General Correspondence and Other Records (“Decimal File”), 1945-49, RG 260, NACP.

³⁶ Charles K. Gailey, Chief of Staff to Acting Deputy Military Governor (OMGUS), “Revocation of Approval of Dr. Joseph Müller,” 26 Nov. 1946, AG 000.1 Politics (Josef Mueller), Executive Office, Office of the Adjutant General, General Correspondence and Other Records (“Decimal File”), 1945-49, RG 260, NACP.

³⁷ Clay to Keating (OMGUS), “Re your radio about Joseph Müller”, 7 Dec. 1946, AG 000.1 Politics (Josef Mueller), Executive Office, Office of the Adjutant General, General Correspondence and Other Records (“Decimal File”), 1945-49, RG 260, NACP.

before the *Landtag* election. As Keating had noted to Clay earlier, if the Military Governor had proceeded quickly with OMGB's recommendation to ban Müller from political office before the election, it wouldn't have been seen as overturning the will of the electorate.³⁸ Moreover, Clay's dismissal and banning of Schäffer shows that Clay had no problem with conducting a very public and direct political dismembering of a minister-president.

The real difference was that Schäffer had directly obstructed OMGUS directives, while Müller was a cooperative partner in the American occupation project. Clay recognized that the first democratically elected Bavarian minister-president in over a decade was a position of great significance—for the first time since 1933, the minister-president would represent the political will of the Bavarian people. With a liberal-conservative in this position, Clay would have a crucial ally in the German state-building project, an ally who would support the growing, centralized economic bureaucracy OMGUS was building into Bizonia. It was to this end that Clay defended his decision not to have OMGUS directly interfere against Müller, on the shaky ground of advice from "reliable sources that [Müller] did participate in move to get rid of Hitler" (which was not mentioned in Keating's own summary of Müller's Nazi-era activities³⁹) and that German courts should be allowed to decide the course of investigation. This last proposal would effectively spare Müller from any serious retribution, given the tendency of Bavarian courts to either terminate denazification cases or actually help former Nazis into political office.⁴⁰ While ultimately the traditionalists would force the liberal-conservatives to compromise on the moderate Hans Ehard as minister-president, Müller continued to serve as the influential Party Chairman.⁴¹

The Müller and Schäffer episodes show that, even as Clay and OMGUS took inconsistent and even contradictory policy positions, they were always consistent in valuing local political partners who would cooperate with the occupation. In this way, the first eighteen months of America's occupation of Bavaria was defined by the relative autonomy of the occupying military authority from the policy dictates of the metropole. As long as the Truman administration's internal conflicts between doves and hawks remained unresolved, Clay was able to spin policies however he liked in the interest of building up a cadre of German politicians loyal first and foremost to his occupation project. But by 1947 that would begin to change, as a Washington consensus around Soviet containment and German partition emerged. Denied the cracks of ambiguity with which he could advance his personal interests, the final 30 months of the occupation would see Clay's willingness to intervene in German party politics continue, but in the interest of Washington, rather than just OMGUS. Whereas the policy of cooperation had initially served the needs of America's on-the-ground colonial administrators, by 1947 it would be wielded in support of Washington diplomats and their ideological demands for a new West German state.

The Late Occupation (June 1947-May 1949)

A series of events over the course of about eighteen months marked a transition from an occupation that was still interested in denazification and quad-zonal cooperation to one with the prime objective of partitioning Germany and creating an industrialized,

³⁸ Keating to Clay, 2 Dec. 1946, AG 000.1 Politics (Josef Mueller); General Correspondence and Other Records ("Decimal File"), 1945-49; RG 260, NACP.

³⁹ Keating to Clay, 2 Dec. 1946, AG 000.1 Politics (Josef Mueller); General Correspondence and Other Records ("Decimal File"), 1945-49; RG 260, NACP.

⁴⁰ Hudson, "The U.S. Military Government and Democratic Reform and Denazification in Bavaria, 1945-47," 115, 141.

⁴¹ James, *The Politics of Bavaria—An Exception to the Rule*, 113.

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Western-aligned state in the American, British, and French zones. As Carolyn Eisenberg has shown, one major pivot point was the unveiling of the Marshall Plan in June 1947.⁴² Unlike Morgenthau's vision of denazification and demilitarization, Secretary of State George C. Marshall's plan to offer economic assistance to the European participants in World War II—and the refusal of this plan by the Soviet Union and the countries of its developing bloc—had strong support from Americans on the ground in Germany, who could read the writing on the wall that the era of quad-zonal cooperation was over and that communists, rather than just the far-right, were the new enemy.⁴³ Clay himself zealously adapted the new containment line, purging his staff of any communist sympathizers in October 1947.⁴⁴

Cementing this turn by OMGUS towards the new contain-and-partition line was the replacement of JCS 1067 by a new Joint Chiefs of Staff German policy statement, JCS 1779, in July 1947.⁴⁵ In JCS 1779, the Military Government's micro-political and Washington's macro-political concerns came together to produce a dramatic shift in official German policy. Clay got what he had long asked for: the encouragement of political decentralization and Allied-led centralized economic institutions in occupied Germany. Meanwhile, the new occupation directive almost entirely ignored denazification: the document referred only to the principles of the 1947 Moscow Conference between the four Allied Foreign Ministers, which had stripped the formerly massive policy plank of much of its teeth by abandoning attempts to prosecute "the mass of nominal members of the Nazi Party."⁴⁶ Clay also retained the support of Washington in forming cooperative relationships with a wide range of German political partners, even including left-of-center groupings like freely organized trade unions, workers' councils, and voluntary cooperatives.⁴⁷ This gave Clay the flexibility to, as late as spring 1949, pursue collaboration with the SPD when it suited his administrative objectives.⁴⁸

Yet JCS 1779 also marked a great victory for the conservatives who now dominated the Truman administration's foreign policy team. While Clay may have seen the abandonment of mass denazification as simply one less limitation on his autonomy, conservative diplomats like John McCloy saw in JCS 1779 a means to support and promote powerful business magnates who had collaborated with the Nazis.⁴⁹ At the same time, JCS 1779's planks on political decentralization and the *de facto* collapse of quad-zonal economic collaboration gave a green light to the hawks who wanted to partition Germany into Western- and Soviet-aligned halves. By June

⁴² Eisenberg, *Drawing the Line*, 9.

⁴³ After the Soviet refusal of the Marshall Plan, Louis A. Wiesner, an American diplomat stationed with OMGUS in Berlin, wrote to Clay's political advisor, Robert Murphy, that "We and our Allies should immediately begin to get just as skillfully tough toward the Communists in Western Germany and Western Europe as the Soviets are towards non-Communists in Eastern Germany and Eastern Europe," adding on that, in order to prevent a strike by Communist coal miners in Germany, "A bit of terror against the KPD leaders might help in this regard." Louis A. Wiesner to Robert Murphy, Ambassador, "Some Political Aspects of Application of Marshall Plan to Germany," 25 June 1947, Political Activity April 16, 1947—Dec 31, 1947, Political Parties and Activities Files, 1945-1947, Office of the Political Advisor, RG 260; NACP.

⁴⁴ Rogers, "Transforming the German Party System," 535.

⁴⁵ "Directive to Commander in Chief of United States Forces of Occupation Regarding the Military Government of Germany," 11 July 1947, *Germany, 1947-1949*, 35.

⁴⁶ "Denazification, cumulative review. Report, 1 April 1947-30 April 1948,"

Office of Military Government. University of Wisconsin Digital Collections; Denazi, 137.

⁴⁷ "Directive to Commander in Chief of United States Forces of Occupation Regarding the Military Government of Germany," 11 July 1947, *Germany, 1947-1949*, 40.

⁴⁸ Lamberti, "General Lucius Clay, German Politicians, and the Great Crisis During the Making of West Germany's Constitution," 46.

⁴⁹ Eisenberg, *Drawing the Line*, 12.

1948, with the Western Allies' announcement of a path to West German statehood and the Soviet blockade of West Berlin, this Cold War discourse from Washington had thoroughly infused OMGUS.⁵⁰ In order to retain its relevance in an imperial periphery that was no longer so peripheral, the Military Government had to use its policy of cooperation to enforce even tighter allegiance to American authority. Thus, cooperation grew from a tool of imperial control by peripheral elites into an extension of the metropole's ideological, macro-political, and colonial designs.

Just as the politics of containment was realigning the Washington foreign policy establishment, it was also changing the Military Government's relations with the CSU. While the liberal-conservatives had been the cooperative partners of the early occupation, Josef Müller's advocacy for Berlin as the capital of a future German state alienated his faction from OMGUS and its more ideologically-driven occupation project in 1947-49.⁵¹ Meanwhile, traditionalist leader Alois Hundhammer, who had been an early critic of OMGUS, sided with staunch American ally Konrad Adenauer on the need for political decentralization.⁵² With the CSU's most hardline conservative, anti-American members defecting to the new, far-right Bavaria Party in March 1948,⁵³ Hundhammer led his moderate traditionalists to seize most of the party leadership, setting the stage for a realignment in the OMGUS-CSU cooperative relationship.⁵⁴

Yet with the stakes for cooperation so high in a nascent Cold War environment, Clay held the entire CSU to a much higher standard for cooperation than he did the liberal-conservative faction in the early period. The Military Governor showed no mercy for those Germans who exhibited any lack of cooperation with American interests, even if they were generally ideological allies. Such was the case of Johannes Semler, a CSU traditionalist leader and the Bizonal Director of Economics. In January 1948 Semler gave a speech before the CSU's *Land* committee attacking OMGUS economic policies, which he blamed for failing to avoid a food crisis.⁵⁵ Most pointedly, he said that Germans should stop being thankful for Allied aid, which he said required them to pay in dollars for *Hühnerfutter*—literally,

⁵⁰ For example, the OMGUS Governmental Structures Branch had to lay down strict guidelines in June for American academics who were brought to Frankfurt to discuss issues of federalism in anticipation of the assembly of the Western ministers-presidents. Statements suggesting the creation of a unified German state or the formation of separate states by individual *Länder* would not be tolerated. Hans Simon, Chief, Governmental Structures Branch, to Pabsch, "Coordination of Federalism Project," 9 June 1948, Governmental Policy—Federalism, Records of the Civil Administration, The Policy Enforcement Branch, General Records of the Policy Enforcement Branch, 1945-1949, RG 260, NACP.

⁵¹ "Weekly Report of Political Activities Branch for Week Ending 2400 Hours 20 February 1947," to Vacca, 19 Feb. 1947, 3P CSU Jan-Jun 1947, Research Branch on Political Parties in Bavaria, 1945-1949, RG 260, NACP.

⁵² For more on the developing close relationship between Adenauer and American authorities in the first few years of the occupation, see Kisatsky, *The United States and the European Right*, 30, 33.

⁵³ James, *The Politics of Bavaria—An Exception to the Rule*, 98-99.

⁵⁴ By December 1948, when OMGB sided with Hundhammer's Bavarian Ministry of Education in supporting greater CSU-led state control over student unions—against the strong protest of Bavaria Party student leaders—it was clear within Bavaria that the liberal-conservative/traditionalist wedge in Military Government support had been replaced by an endorsement of the party's majority, moderate traditionalists. For more on the Bavarian student union episode, see "Hundhammer-AStA Controversy", OMGB, Records of the Intelligence Division, Research Branch on Political Parties in Bavaria, 1945-1949, RG 260, NACP.

⁵⁵ His critique was biting: Germany had been left with insufficient assets and Allied-fixed prices for goods were too low for German firms to make a profit on the international market. For a full overview of the Semler episode, see Gimbel *The American Occupation of Germany*, 191-93 and Jürgen Domes and Michael Wolffsohn, "Setting the Course for the Federal Republic of Germany: Major Policy Decisions in the Bi-Zonal Economic Council and Party Images, 1947-1949," *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft / Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics* 135, no 3 (1979): 338.

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“chicken feed” (a caustic reference to rations of corn).⁵⁶ These statements did not go over well in the Military Government: after being chastised by the OMGUS spokesman, Clay dismissed Semler from his Bizonal directorship.⁵⁷ The following month, when the Bavarian *Landtag* defied OMGUS by electing Semler to the newly expanded Bizonal Economic Council, Clay flew Minister-President Hans Ehard and CSU Chairman Josef Müller to Berlin, where he displayed a proclamation dissolving the Bavarian *Landtag*, already drafted in the event that the CSU leadership did not withdraw their support for Semler. Upon the leaders’ return to Munich, the *Landtag* promptly elected a replacement delegate.⁵⁸

This episode quite acutely shows Clay’s growing inflexibility with any lack of cooperation by German politicians with OMGUS. The actual content of Semler’s complaints was not really the issue here: as John Gimbel has noted, Clay had actually expressed many of the same frustrations about Allied economic policy in a May 1947 cable to Secretary Marshall.⁵⁹ What was at stake was Semler’s open, blatant, and flamboyant refusal to cooperate with OMGUS objectives, which constituted an outright challenge to Clay’s supreme authority in the American zone. In other words, Semler’s insubordination was seen and framed as total inflexibility in adjusting to the changes, inconsistencies, and incompleteness of OMGUS policies.⁶⁰ With the White House and State Department closely watching events in Germany, macro-political consideration compelled Clay to wield his micro-political might more strictly than he did just a few years earlier.

Another example of Clay’s new rigidity in German politics was his actions during the Parliamentary Council, elected by Germans across the Western Allied zones to draft the West German constitution—the Basic Law—in Bonn from September 1948 to May 1949. The Council was dominated by two competing factions: the SPD and the Adenauer-led CDU/CSU, or “Union,” bloc.⁶¹ Though the SPD had initially held all the Economic Ministries in Bizonia, by the time of the Council OMGUS was meeting the Social Democrats with a cooler reception, on the grounds of their refusal to cooperate on major issues of Allied control in Germany, such as American-led currency reform and Bizonia’s authority over the coal and steel industries. In other words, the SPD was increasingly adopting the anti-American position in contrast to the pro-American position of the CDU/CSU.

While the SPD led the initial draft of the Basic Law, in March 1949 Adenauer presented a counter-proposal that gave greater powers to the sub-national states, the *Länder*.⁶² With the SPD and the CDU/CSU having an equal number of delegates in Bonn, Clay recognized that it would take both public and backroom Allied support and brokering to settle which party grouping would ultimately decide the new

⁵⁶ Gimbel, *The American Occupation of Germany*, 192.

⁵⁷ Domes and Wolffsohn, “Setting the Course for the Federal Republic of Germany,” 338.

⁵⁸ Gimbel, *The American Occupation of Germany*, 193.

⁵⁹ Gimbel, *The American Occupation of Germany*, 191.

⁶⁰ In a cable to the War Department a few days after Semler’s speech, Clay insisted that, “Semler’s statements if correctly attributed are malicious lies and would warrant his dismissal although he is most competent of German directors.” While Clay clearly did not believe that the actual content of Semler’s statements were untrue, given that he had expressed similar concerns himself, the phrase “malicious lies” must be understood as targeting any public contradiction of OMGUS authority, any inability to bend with the changing winds of policy from Berlin and Washington. Clay, cable to Daniel Noce, 9 January 1948, document 312 of Smith, *The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay*, 528.

⁶¹ For more on the formation of the Union bloc, see Domes and Wolffsohn, “Setting the Course for the Federal Republic of Germany,” 334-37.

⁶² Kisatsky, *The United States and the European Right*, 34.

constitution.⁶³ The Military Governor set the stakes in a teleconference with Assistant Secretary of the Army Tracy Voorhees in April: “To accept German proposal on Basic Law means that open defiance by SPD leader Schumacher has won. It makes him greatest figure in Germany and repudiates CDU/CSU which has loyally stood by and which represents great majority in our zone.”⁶⁴ Even as the Allied foreign ministers urged Adenauer to give concessions to the SPD later that month, Clay continued to passionately attack any attempt at compromising with the Social Democrats, telling his political advisor Robert Draper and Voorhees that “we in offering compromise now bow to the arrogance and defiance of Schumacher and make him the top hero in Germany for his defiance. If you want that go ahead. Don’t ask me to do it.” The Military Governor even threatened to resign over the Allied compromise agreement. Though Voorhees refused to entertain this offer, Clay’s view of the future of Germany was bitter and grim: “I see four years’ work being destroyed.”⁶⁵

Though Clay made it clear that he disagreed with the SPD’s proposal for a more powerful central government versus the *Länder*, his vitriol had less to do with policy planks and more with Schumacher’s unwillingness to compromise with OMGUS at such a crucial time in and of itself. After all, American officials had very close relationships with more cooperative members of the SPD, such as West Berlin Mayor Ernst Reuter, whose vilification of the Soviet blockade of the city in 1948-49 and acceptance of American supplies was held up as a symbol of Western anticommunism.⁶⁶ In other words, to be a socialist was not a crime in the eyes of OMGUS, even in 1949, but unwillingness work with the Military Government was. Though Clay derided Schumacher as stubborn and inflexible, it was actually Clay himself who now applied the policy of cooperation so rigidly, excluding all but the most completely loyal political partners with a zeal that exceeded that of the more removed diplomatic minds across the Atlantic. Ironically, even though the conservative business establishment in Washington had despised the SPD for much longer than Clay, it was the Military Governor who now took the hardest line against the Social Democrats. For the occupation was Clay’s legacy, the instrument by which the former Army engineer had become one of the most powerful men in Europe. Now the SPD, in standing firm against Allied exhortations, appeared to threaten that legacy. Should Schumacher emerge from Bonn a victor and win West Germany’s first national elections on a platform of neutrality and nationalism, everything Clay had worked for—a Germany created by America in its own image, a loyal colony of a powerful empire—would be ruined.

Ultimately, Clay’s pessimism was misplaced. A pro-American coalition led by Adenauer’s CDU/CSU narrowly won the first West German federal elections of August 1949, cementing American influence in the heart of Europe well into the twenty-first century. Of course, as Deborah Kisatsky has shown, many of the hallmarks of West Germany’s early concessions to American wishes, such as the country’s entry into NATO in 1955 and the continuing presence of American military bases, were the product of tense negotiations across the Atlantic.⁶⁷ Yet these negotiations were built upon the imperial foundation that Clay’s OMGUS built during

⁶³ “Composition of Council: Excerpt from Report of Military Governor,” Aug. 1948, *Germany, 1947-1949*, 277.

⁶⁴ Clay, teleconference with Tracy Voorhees, William Draper, Goldwaithe Dorr, Edward Litchfield, 2 April 1949, document 702 of Smith, *The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay*, 1068-1081.

⁶⁵ Clay teleconference with Tracy Voorhees, Robert Murphy, 21 April 1949, document 723 of *The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay*, 1121-24.

⁶⁶ Kisatsky, *The United States and the European Right*, 35.

⁶⁷ For more the policy of cooperation in the early Federal Republic, see Kisatsky, *The United States and the European Right*, 36-58.

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the occupation. Cooperative relationships that OMGUS began in the early occupation, and then tightened under metropolitan pressure in the late occupation, would yield political fruit for decades to come.

Conclusion

In examining this piece of the American occupation of Germany through the lens of empire, the interplay between macro- and micro-politics stands out as one of the central tensions of the period. While the micro-political policy of cooperation was always paramount over ideology in the eyes of OMGUS, its application changed to suit the macro-politics of the metropole as the Military Government became an enforcer of Washington's Cold War discourse of containment and partition. OMGUS moved itself into alignment with Washington not necessarily because of ideological affinity, but rather because of a need to maintain its privileged position as the negotiator between metropole and colony at a time when the metropole itself was exerting more direct authority over its territory. This urgency, made more intense by the Military Government's immediate proximity to the high-stakes debates in the Parliamentary Council, compelled Clay to use the policy of cooperation to strictly enforce the new policy line from Washington. Thus, in order to retain a seat at the table of both American diplomacy and German politics, Clay moved OMGUS into alignment with Washington to the point where it actually became the metropole's strict enforcer through the policy of cooperation. OMGUS used the language of flexibility to create a clear dichotomy not between a socialist bloc and a bourgeois bloc in Bonn, but between one that would cooperate with a narrow and inflexible American line, and one that would not.

This narrative thus provides an insight into the way that German-American politics would develop during and after the Cold War. It would be defined by a closeness beyond that of allies, and more like that between an empire and a former colony that, while nominally independent, in actuality remained dependent. In those formative early years of the Cold War, the United States had no closer, more cooperative partner in Europe than Germany: it banned the Communist Party even as communists built up strong bases of support in France and Italy, it joined NATO as France was undermining American control of the organization, and decades later it was implicated in an NSA spy operation targeting its own citizens on a scale not seen in any other European country.

But this paper isn't just about this one piece of how and why the United States-Federal Republic relationship developed—it's about the broader question of how American institutions functioned as the United States projected its influence into a postwar power vacuum. This is a topic of interest not just for students of Cold War American foreign policy, but those of empire more broadly. This research has shown the crucial role of peripheral colonial actors in negotiating the establishment of direct foreign rule (and subsequent, softer forms of political influence) between the metropole and local elites. With precedents in the indirect rule of the nineteenth and twentieth century British and French colonial empires, this power dynamic is one that merits further research into other colonial and postcolonial spaces.

It is also crucial in evaluating this research and its implications to not see OMGUS as a moderating, detached actor stuck right in between two diametrically opposed forces, trying merely to balance interests and keep all parties pleased. Rather, as Clay's rhetoric when discussing the SPD shows, the peripheral colonial force is fundamentally an arm of empire. Its self-interest is not in balancing the desires of colonial and colonized elites for their own sake, but in maintaining its position of power over people who have not elected it, who have not given it a mandate to rule. Thus, the Military Government's embrace of political elites in early occupation

Bavaria was useful not because the latter held the confidence of the people (elections would come after the cooperative relationship with the liberal-conservatives began to develop), but rather because they could shape the American-occupied proto-state in a way suitable to the administrative needs of the occupiers. Abandoning mass denazification, for example, allowed the Military Government to fill the Bavarian power vacuum with a liberal-conservative elite that would be happy to work with American occupiers who would not hold professional and business success during the Third Reich against them. A grassroots political movement of those who had been on the margins of Nazi society may not have been so cooperative with OMGUS after the initial glee of liberation gave way to expansion of American political and economic interests in Germany. All this is to say, while the type of empire that OMGUS practiced fairly autonomously in the early period of the occupation was less strict than its engagement during the late period, in both times the aim was the same: the expansion of American political and economic power in the vacuum left behind by the Third Reich. That is not to say that many ordinary people did not benefit as much as the CSU elites from the American occupation—from the return of democratic elections to the “economic miracle” of the 1950’s, West Germans could reap many benefits from their country’s special relationship with the United States. But, just as the developmentalist colonial states of early twentieth century Britain and France ultimately served the metropole more than the colony, so too did the relationship between the United States and the Federal Republic after World War II serve the interests of Washington, OMGUS, and their local allies first, and only after consider those of ordinary Germans.

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JOURNALISTIC INTEGRITY AND THE “SETTING SUN”: Nancy Crawshaw and the British Information Environment in the Cyprus Emergency

James Richie

From 1955 to 1959, the British government battled an armed insurgency in their colony of Cyprus. The topic of this paper is the extent to which independent journalists like Nancy Crawshaw prevented the colonial government from dominating the information environment. This study relies on secondary work and the unpublished Nancy Crawshaw Papers found in the Special Collections section of the Princeton University Library. It will look at the origins of the insurgency and the information environment that existed in Cyprus at the time, then discuss the role journalists played in the conflict, and finally move into Crawshaw’s contributions to the colonial government’s inability to control the information environment. This study finds that the British failed to dominate the information environment surrounding the war in Cyprus because they assumed independent journalists like Nancy Crawshaw would support the colonial agenda. However, these journalists formed their own opinions and did not act as agents for any particular side.

The armed insurgency the British government battled in the colony of Cyprus from 1955 to 1959 was one of many the British opposed during the first two decades following World War Two. The war was initiated with and included significant propaganda from both sides, and the British struggled to control the information environment within Cyprus due to intense domestic and international pressure. Just like conflicts today in Afghanistan, Syria, and in the Maghreb, states and organizations have battled and will continue to battle over the domination of information. This is not to suggest that the battle over the information environment is a new invention, and despite the recency of world leaders decrying “fake news,” attempts by various factions to manipulate information for political and military reasons have long existed and played a key role in the outcome of conflicts. The British had effectively applied censorship to private journalists as far back as 1853 in the Crimean War.¹ Policies of censoring private journalists continued throughout the Boer War and are well known to have played a significant factor on the Homefront during World War One.² The British effectively organized the Press Corps in World War Two and journalists often felt it their “patriotic duty” to boost the morale of readers back home.³ Following World War Two the British Empire entered into a series of decolonization wars that could not be characterized as black and white as an

¹ Brian Hannon, “Story Behind the Stories: British and Dominion War Correspondents,” (PhD diss., The University of Edinburgh, 2015), 136.

² Donal P. McCrachen, “The Relationship Between British War Correspondents in the Field and British Military Intelligence During the Anglo-Boer War,” *Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies* 43, no. 1 (2015): 117.

³ Hannon, “Story Behind the Stories,” 121.

absolute war against Nazi Germany. These wars of decolonization signaled the end of European empires and contributed to the “setting sun” of the global British government which had been described as “the empire on which the sun never sets.” Even in this time of decline, the British government tried to maintain dominance over the information environment. However, the Cyprus Emergency clearly shows they no longer had the control they once had over information.

An underexplored topic in the history of the Cyprus Emergency was the effect of the information environment on the British strategic outcome in Cyprus. A rich historiography exists covering loyalists and policing, ethnic organization and conflict, and international pressure on the conduct and outcome of the war.⁴ There are, however, several gaps in the historiography concerning the role of information in the conflict. One piece that is missing is an analysis of British attempts to counter misinformation or critical information, especially when it came from a non-English source. Western journalism influenced international, and especially British, public opinion, but these came largely from private British newspapers and did not always support the colonial government’s perspective. Greek and Turkish media are even less explored but still had a tremendous impact on the way their respective countrymen viewed the conflict. Finally, influential individuals such as Archbishop Makarios III petitioned on the international arena and in the United Nations and would have had some impact on outside pressure against Britain.

The influential British journalist Nancy Crawshaw covered the Cyprus Emergency from its beginning, often writing from a British perspective to an English audience. Later in the conflict, she visited United Nations as a committee member of the Carnegie Endowment of International Peace on Cyprus.⁵ Crawshaw is representative of a class of British journalists who, following WWII, were influential in shaping public perceptions of British policies abroad, yet were not always uncritical of the Colonial government. The British government failed to dominate the divisive information environment during the Cyprus Emergency because they assumed influential British journalists like Nancy Crawshaw would “toe the party line.” However, these journalists instead formed their own opinions in ways that made them independent actors and not agents of any particular side. Using Nancy Crawshaw as a case study, this paper illustrates the often tense dynamic during the Cyprus Emergency between the British colonial government, which hoped its journalists would be “good patriots,” and the journalists themselves, who sought to behave with “journalistic integrity.”

This paper seeks to first give a broad overview to the origin and situation which existed during the Cyprus Emergency, including some key players and ideas which contributed to the unrest. Following this, the information environment is characterized with a focus given to written and spoken media as a form of information distribution. Next, this paper provides a brief summary of past British war journalism and discusses how this may have contributed to the British government’s unrealistic expectation of pro-government coverage. Finally, this paper uses the experience and writings of British journalist Nancy Crawshaw to explore to what extent British

⁴ On loyalist and policing see “Allies at the End of Empire” by David Anderson and Daniel Branch, *Policing and Decolonisation* by David Anderson and David Killingray, “Toads and Informers” by David French, and “British Intelligence and the Cyprus Insurgency” by Panagiotis Dimitrakis. On ethnic organization and conflict see *Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus 1954-1959* by Robert Holland, *Fighting EOKA* by David French, “The God Dilemma” by Andrew Novo, and “Newspapers, Nationalism, and Empire” by Jonathan Stubbs and Bahar Taseli. On international pressure on the conduct and outcome of the war see *Isle of Discord* by Ioannis Stefanidis, *British Counterinsurgency* by John Newsinger, *Cyprus Revolt* by Nancy Crawshaw, and *Brutality in an Age of Human Rights* by Brain Drohan.

⁵ Nancy Crawshaw Papers (hereafter NCP) 2/8, Biographical Note.

officials expected British journalist to conform to the party line, and to what effect independent journalism had on the ability of the colonial government to control the information environment during the Cyprus Revolt. In addition to Crawshaw's primary source material, the memoirs of EOKA General Georgios Grivas provide details regarding EOKA tactics and information distribution. Articles featured in *The Manchester Guardian*, *Reuters*, and *The Times* are also incorporated to connect the journalism of Nancy Crawshaw to the wider phenomenon of independent journalism during the period of the Cyprus Emergency.

Several words important to the argument of this paper need to be defined beforehand. The word "journalist" is used to describe someone working in some sort of paid capacity to provide information regarding a situation which is meant to be transmitted to a wider audience in written or spoken form. "Objective" is a term used in the context of journalistic reporting and refers to the reporting of facts, logic-based analysis of those facts, and limited evidence of outside biases. Finally, the phrases "journalistic integrity" and "independent actor" are used to describe a journalist writing in an objective manner, being one who does not compromise the legitimacy of their work for a larger political, cultural, or monetary objective.

Origins of the Emergency

From 1955 to 1959 an armed insurgency brought international attention to the British colonial island of Cyprus. The National Organization of Cypriot Fighters, abbreviated in Greek as EOKA, operated a largely urban guerrilla warfare campaign against the local colonial government. Their leader, Georgios Grivas, was the former leader of a Greek based, right-wing insurgency, who fought Greek communists during World War Two.⁶ EOKA received financial and public backing from Archbishop Makarios III, leader of the Church of Cyprus, and major influencer of the Greek majority on Cyprus.⁷ The situation within Cyprus bordered on ethnic civil war because of the large Turkish Cypriot minority which inhabited the island but were excluded from the goals of the Greek-minded EOKA and Cypriot Orthodox Church. While EOKA fought for the goal of *enosis*, or the acquisition of Cyprus by Greece, Turkish Cypriots originally desired the continuation of the colonial state and later, partition of the island. Before the war, the colonial police had been made up mostly of Greek-Cypriots. However, as the war dragged on, Turkish Cypriots were hired in large numbers to replace these Greek policemen who were being plagued with threat induced resignations. Religious and cultural differences isolated the Turkish Cypriot community on the island and further ingrained their idea of themselves as a helpless minority who would only be further marginalized through *enosis* with Greece. As with many anticolonial wars fought in the decades following World War II, the international and domestic information campaign was a key aspect of the war.

International influence from Greece, Turkey and Britain played an enormous role in the decision of Cypriot independence versus alternatives such as *enosis*, Turkey's acquisition of Cyprus known as *taksim*, or the continuation of the colonial structure. Ioannis Stefanidis argues that Turkey's objectives in Cyprus were the maintenance of positive Greek and NATO relations and the prevention of Greek

⁶ Nancy Crawshaw, *Cyprus Revolt: An Account of the Struggle for Union with Greece* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1978), 348.

⁷ Panagiotis Dimitrakis, "British Intelligence and the Cyprus Insurgency, 1955-1959," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 21, no. 2 (2008): 386. British intelligence operations discovered that contributions given to the Cypriot Church constituted the main funding source of EOKA. Grivas' financial discipline and the low operational cost of EOKA (averaging only £1,540 per month in 1956) ensured that the revolt could continue despite limited sources of funding.

territorial acquisitions on its Southern Coast.⁸ This was directly counter to Greece's desire for *enosis* and David French argues that EOKA was supported by arms shipments from Greek ships. Unlike other insurgencies the British had fought such as Malaya or Kenya, Greece held a position within the United Nations and could report the British for violations of human rights.⁹ Brian Drohan suggests the international community, and especially Greece, acted as a watchdog against human rights violations in Cyprus.¹⁰ Through a powerful state backer like Greece, EOKA acquired international sympathy and placed pressure on Britain to relinquish its colony. Following the loss of the Suez Canal in 1956, the British could not risk giving up such a strategic location in its entirety and fought for the land rights to establish permanent military bases on the island.¹¹ The British policy at the start of the conflict was the preservation of her colony. However, faced with mounting outside political pressure and difficulties in controlling the peace within Cyprus, the British opted for Cypriot independence. Throughout this process, British officials didn't expect to convince Cypriots about the validity of British policy but hoped that influential journalists would help maintain support in Britain, and to a lesser extent, convince the educated international elite who would have read British newspapers of the logic of British policy.

On January 15, 1950, the future Archbishop Makarios III held a referendum in all Orthodox churches across Cyprus in which the question of *enosis* was proposed. The 'vote' was conducted in the format of an open book at the front of every church in which its members were heavily encouraged to sign their names in favor or against *enosis*. At the referendum's conclusion, 96 percent of those who signed did so in favor of *enosis*.¹² The way this vote was conducted was clearly unfair, with *enosis* heavily associated with the Church and open books which led one Cypriot to announce, "Why should I have my windows broken...?"¹³ Instead of countering the illegitimacy of the Church's referendum, the British largely ignored the results and four years later the Under-Secretary of the Colonies Henry Hopkinson said Cyprus will "never" be independent.¹⁴ Makarios and the Greek government played off these two events masterfully, showing an international arena that even when the Cypriot people voted in favor of independence, it was bluntly denied by the British colonial empire. Regardless of the reasons for not combatting referendum propaganda more aggressively, this was a huge, but not sole example of British failure in the international information campaign and one that would haunt them in the United Nations in the coming years.

⁸ Ioannis D. Stefanidis, *Isle of Discord: Nationalism, Imperialism and the Making of the Cyprus Problem* (New York: New York University Press, 1999), 207.

⁹ David French, *Fighting EOKA: The British Counter-Insurgency Campaign on Cyprus, 1955-1959* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 305, 307-8.

¹⁰ Brian Drohan, *Brutality in an Age of Human Rights: Activism and Counterinsurgency at the End of the British Empire*, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2017), 16-17, 46.

¹¹ David M. Anderson and David Killingray, eds, *Policing and Decolonisation: Politics, Nationalism, and the Police, 1917-65* (New York: Manchester University Press, 1992), 189; John Newsinger, *British Counterinsurgency*, 2nd Ed. (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 92.

¹² Crawshaw, *Cyprus Revolt*, 46-49.

¹³ NCP 9/Press Cuttings, "Why Cyprus is not Handed Over to Greece: Issues in a Long-Standing Dispute," *The Manchester Guardian*, November 15, 1954,

¹⁴ Crawshaw, *Cyprus Revolt*, 76. Hopkinson claimed that he had no memory of using the particular word 'never' but nonetheless, the usage of such a word in the context of Cypriot self-determination had far reaching consequences. Soon there were massive strikes by Greek newspapers, anti-western sentiment spread throughout the island, and Makarios III even gave a speech in front of a large congregation in which he declared the battle cry, 'Enosis and nothing but Enosis.'

Since the British occupation of Cyprus in the late 19th century and the formal acquisition of the island in 1923 through the Treaty of Lausanne, tensions between the local populace and Britain had been growing.¹⁵ These tensions exploded on October 21st, 1931 when the colonial governor's house was burned to the ground. The tensions which existed in 1931 were similar to those two decades later and largely consisted of Greek-Cypriot calls for *enosis*.¹⁶ Instead of recognizing this early Greek-Cypriot goal and countering it with pro-British propaganda, the British simply increased the size of their military force on the island.¹⁷ Within Cyprus, the British did not seem to improve their relations with Greek Cypriots by the start of the Emergency and, because of this, there was a significant lack of Greek speaking workers in the colonial government in 1955.¹⁸ The Colonial Office pressured journalists to deny misinformation pushed out by EOKA, or it would remind the Cypriot elite of their elevated status due to British rule but there is little evidence the British ever conducted a large-scale propaganda campaign with the common Greek-Cypriot as their target audience. A consistent supply of one-sided information being funneled to the Cypriot masses helps explain their disinterest in remaining under British rule.

The Information Environment of the Cyprus Emergency

The information consumed by both the Greek and Turkish ethnic communities in Cyprus became increasingly polarized throughout the duration of the Emergency. Athens Radio was a Greek language broadcast that supported enosis, allowing many Greek-Cypriots to feel connected to a Hellenic culture. "Voice of the Fatherland," one of the broadcasts, was known for broadcasting proclamations made by General Grivas, often telling "students to raise the banner and to continue the struggle with zeal."¹⁹ Nancy Crawshaw wrote an article in early 1956 entitled "The Voice of Evil," in which she outlines attempts from the state-controlled broadcaster to influence the situation in Cyprus as far back as before the Emergency began. On January 7th, Crawshaw recorded a broadcast from Athens Radio saying, "until the tyrants who desecrates churches, seizes the belongings of bread-winners, and rapes virgins...is driven from the Land of our fathers...let us continue the struggle that awaits us."²⁰ In a private letter, Crawshaw questions a *Times* editorial which objected to any attempt to censor Radio Athens, writing, "we take care to see that pornography and perversion in their visual and written form are not allowed to further juvenile delinquency. Why should an exception be made of spoken word?"²¹ The Turkish-Cypriot community derived much of their information from domestic newspapers, which a senior member of the colonial administration described as "little more...than political propaganda sheets."²² Rauf Denктаş, founder of the right-wing paramilitary organization TMT, also founded the newspaper *Nacak*. *Nacak* derived its name from a traditional Turkish

¹⁵ David French, "Toads and Informers: How the British Treated their Collaborators during the Cyprus Emergency, 1955-9," *The International History Review* 39, no. 1 (2016): 71.

¹⁶ Robert Holland, *Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus 1954-1959* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 1-3.

¹⁷ Holland, *Revolt in Cyprus*, 3, 4.

¹⁸ Dimitrakis, "British Intelligence," 379-80.

¹⁹ NCP 20/5, Notebook #5: Second Visit to Cyprus, 1955-1956.

²⁰ NCP 24/8, "Cyprus and Its Crisis V – The Voice of Evil," *The Manchester Guardian*, February 7, 1956. Athens Radio also was known to call for the death of Greek-Cypriots who worked in the colonial government. Crawshaw quotes an example, "the punishment of the detestable special constable, who agreed to betray his country for a few pounds, is severe but just. Let his punishment be a lesson to those who forget their most holy duty (to Enosis)!"

²¹ NCP 1/6, Private Letter, 29 January 1956.

²² Jonathan Stubbs and Bahar Taseli, "Newspapers, Nationalism, and Empire: The Turkish Cypriot Press in the British Colonial Period and its Aftermath," *Media History* 20, no. 3 (Fall 2005): 286.

hatchet and intended to “reflect the identity of the newspaper as a weapon.”²³ The polarization of information existed outside of newspapers and radio broadcast as well and featured prominently in the ethnically administered schools on the island.

To appeal to the Cypriots, the colonial government allowed for the Turkish and Greek ethnic communities to run their own schools since the late 19th century. The schools received financial and educational support from Turkey and Greece and were therefore at risk of exposure to nationalistic propaganda. General Grivas found that school children were some of the most passionate supporters of EOKA and he even developed the ANE, or the Valiant Youth of EOKA.²⁴ These youth would act as messengers, members of strikes or riots, or even plant bombs.²⁵ Crawshaw wrote of Greek-Cypriot schools being tear gassed after protests became violent, mass school strikes, and even children inflicting fatal wounds on enemies of EOKA.²⁶ To a lesser extent but still significant was the propaganda provided in the Turkish-Cypriot schooling system. Rauf Denктаş, owner of the Turkish nationalist newspaper, *Nacak*, as well as a founder of the Turkish-Cypriot paramilitary organization TMT, was made inspector general of Turkish-Cypriot public schools by the Turkish government following his removal as British crown prosecutor.²⁷ It can be inferred from the domestic situation and the type of person the Turkish government placed in charge of schooling, that these schools contained a hefty amount of nationalist propaganda. By not using public schooling as a mechanism to indoctrinate a future generation of Cypriots, the British sacrificed an asset of the information campaign to the Greek and Turkish governments.

The most prevalent domestic propaganda on the island was a pro-Greek, anti-British message promoted by EOKA and the Cypriot Orthodox Church. As opposed to Athens radio or the public education program, this message was homegrown and distributed largely by non-violent supporters of the revolt. General Grivas used leaflets to call for strikes, cease fires, list the accomplishments of EOKA, accuse the British of human rights violations, and list ‘traitors’ who needed execution.²⁸ Although Makarios and Grivas had their differences, EOKA was largely the mouthpiece of the Church on the island and through its effective information distribution networks effectively crippled the island’s economy several times through organized strikes and boycotts. Crawshaw stated, “Amateurish news-handling and inefficiency characterize the Cyprus Government.”²⁹ EOKA claims of ill-treatment

²³ Stubbs and Taseli, “Newspapers, Nationalism and Empire,” 294. By the end of the war, *Nacak* was regularly publishing lines from a prominent Turkish poem which stated, “What makes a flag is the blood on it.” In addition to Denктаş, future Cyprus Vice President Fazıl Küçük owned a newspaper named *Halkın Sesi*, which received substantial financial support from the government of Turkey and would therefore be supportive of a Turkish viewpoint.

²⁴ NCP 9/Press Cuttings, “Mass Intimidation in Cyprus: The Tyranny of EOKA,” *The Manchester Guardian*, October 6, 1958.

²⁵ NCP 9/Press Cuttings; George Grivas, *The Memoirs of General Grivas* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1965), 173. Apart from being easily manipulatable, Grivas found school-age children unsuspecting targets and small enough to carry out daring operations. He recounts an episode in which he had a 15-year-old crawl inside a storm drain which ran in front of a police station and plant two mines. The child was the perfect size to fit inside the drain and was able to plant and later detonate the mines which Grivas claims caused “nearly twenty British casualties.”

²⁶ NCP 9/Press Cuttings, “Cyprus Village Under Curfew: Ordered to Pay Fine of £1,500,” *The Manchester Guardian*, December 13, 1955; NCP 9/Press Cuttings, “Cyprus and its Crisis I – Mounting Hostility,” *The Manchester Guardian*, January 20, 1956.

²⁷ Stubbs, and Taseli, “Newspapers, Nationalism, and Empire,” 291, 294; NCP 21/1, Notebook 11: “Clerides on Denktash,” June 1958.

²⁸ Grivas, *Memoirs*, 88-89, 115, 124, 133.

²⁹ NCP 9/Press Cuttings, “Monasteries Searched in Cyprus: Inadequate Facilities Hamper Press Coverage,” *The Manchester Guardian*, December 8.

by the colonial government, “has been helped by the refusal of the authorities to allow overseas correspondents to see the conditions for themselves.”³⁰ Whether or not a legitimate grievance had been brought against the colonial government, the British did not make a sizable attempt to establish a domestic information campaign to rival that of EOKA and the Church.

Much of the pressure on the British government to change its policies, however, came from outside of Cyprus. Although the Conservative Party was in power in the British parliament during the Cyprus Emergency, there was a significant portion of the opposition Labour party which was firmly against British colonialism. Fenner Brockway’s Movement for Colonial Freedom (MCF) repeatedly brought the issue of decolonization and human rights abuses before the British and international public.³¹ Left-wing MP and member of MCF Barbara Castle, was the first to bring the Hola Camp incident, in which 11 Kenyan detainees were beaten to death by guards, to the attention of Parliament.³² The MCF and Labour’s left reminded the British public of events in Cyprus as well, with Barbara Castle even stating in 1957 that if Labour won the next election, the British government would support Cypriot self-determination.³³

While the British Labour party continued to push for a solution to the “Cyprus question” in Parliament, the Greek Foreign Minister Evangelos Averoff brought the issue to the United Nations on three separate occasions. In the United Nations, Greek sponsored resolutions surrounding Cyprus brought the issue to international attention and gave EOKA hope of eventual victory. After three annual sessions in front of the UN general assembly, Greece accomplished little tangible results largely because of a partisan voting along Western World and Communist Bloc lines.³⁴ However, by repeatedly raising the issue, Greece increased pressure on Britain to work towards a solution. With European decolonization in full swing during the second half of the 1950s, Britain was also under pressure to develop a favorable solution before newly independent African and Asian states joined the United Nations, as they would be likely to vote for Cypriot self-determination.³⁵ Internationally in the United Nations and domestically at home, Britain remained on the defensive. The Conservative government struggled to counter the information environment developed by Greece or the MCF, and it became harder to justify the retention of the Empire’s Mediterranean possession.

Journalists as Mouthpieces: British Officials’ Expectations in the Information Environment

British attempts to dominate the information environment in Cyprus were damaged by officials’ common but inaccurate belief that journalists would simply support government policy. After all, journalists had regularly rallied around the flag in the past, either because of patriotism or government-imposed press restrictions. William Howard Russell of *The Times* covered the 1853-1856 Crimean War and became the first British war correspondent to become a household name.³⁶ In response to

³⁰ NCP 9/Press Cuttings, “Justice in Cyprus I – An Inquiry Needed,” *The Manchester Guardian*, July 1, 1957.

³¹ Josiah Brownell, “The Taint of Communism: The Movement for Colonial Freedom, the Labour Party, and the Communist Part of Great Britain, 1954-1970,” *Canadian Journal of History* 42, no. 2 (Autumn 2007): 242-43.

³² Brownell, “The Taint of Communism,” 247.

³³ Drohan, *Brutality in an Age of Human Rights*, 57.

³⁴ Crawshaw, *Cyprus Revolt*, 229, 272, 337-38.

³⁵ Crawshaw, *Cyprus Revolt*, 272.

³⁶ Hannon, “Story Behind the Stories,” 43.

Russell's initial coverage of the poor treatment of enlisted soldiers by officers, the British commander in the Crimea initiated some of the earliest forms of censorship such as forbidding his soldiers to speak to Russell and making him leave camp.³⁷ Following this debacle, the government realized the need to organize a Press Corps to dominate the flow of domestic and international propaganda. During the Boer War half a century later, the War Office set strict requirements on qualifying for a correspondent's license, actively restricting foreigners or those deemed pro-Boer from receiving one.³⁸ Anti-British material was censored and destroyed, and although some negative press reached Britain, journalists who wrote in a pro-British fashion were given priority over more "questionable" journalists.³⁹ World War One and Two represent an era of much more Pro-British journalism as the total war nature of both conflicts demanded more rigid censorship and more support from the home front.⁴⁰ During WWII, many journalists practiced self-censorship to ensure that the official censors would let their work pass quickly to publication. When writing about an event like the British retreat from Rangoon in 1942, a journalist who emphasized the positive aspects of the event and neglected to mention negative details such as the number of deaths would see his work gutted less and published faster than one who focused on negative aspects.⁴¹ As late as the Cyprus Emergency, British military leaders continued to believe in their ability to manipulate the press. In 1958, Major General Sir Kenneth Darling described how in Cyprus he was "deliberately cultivating the Press and using them as a vehicle (although they do not know this) for increasing my initiative and deflating EOKA."⁴² Although most journalists considered it their patriotic duty to promote high morale back in Britain, many also sought to tell the full truth through less restricted means.

Journalists often found it difficult to be independent actors during the conflicts they were writing about due to British censorship laws, and many wrote a much more personal and critical account in memoirs after the fact. Philip Woods covers this idea masterfully in his book, writing, "it was not that they gave deliberately misleading accounts, for instance reporting a defeat as a victory, but that they avoided what might be considered defeatist accounts."⁴³ George Rodger, a photojournalist for Time-Life working in Burma in 1942, focused heavily on the American Volunteer Group (AVG), or the Flying Tiger squadron. Doing so served the dual purpose of showing American support for Chinese nationalists, as well as providing some of the only positive coverage of allied efforts in early 1942.⁴⁴ Using photos of the AVG and the RAF Rodger painted a picture of Allied cooperation and military success, however in his memoir *Red Moon Rising* he expressed anger at American authorities, "who left their boys to fight crack Japanese pilots with nothing but suicide crates to fly in."⁴⁵

³⁷ Hannon, "Story Behind the Stories," 136.

³⁸ McCrachen, "War Correspondents," 101, 104.

³⁹ McCrachen, "War Correspondents," 106-7.

⁴⁰ Nathan N. Orgill, "Reawakening the Nation: British Journalism and the Interwar Debate on the Origins of the First World War," *Journalism Studies* 17, no. 4 (2016): 517.

⁴¹ Hannon, "Story Behind the Stories," 121; Philip Woods, *Reporting the Retreat: War Correspondents in Burma, 1942* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 96, 123.

⁴² Drohan, *Brutality in an Age of Human Rights*, 74.

⁴³ Woods, *Reporting the Retreat*, 8.

⁴⁴ Woods, *Reporting the Retreat*, 65.

⁴⁵ Woods, *Reporting the Retreat*, 67-68. The nature of George Rodger's career as a photojournalist meant his publications were supportive of the allied efforts. Although he could caption his photos, an editor would write the in-depth story, leaving his memoir, *Red Moon Rising*, as Rodger's only avenue to comment on British and American conduct in the War. Rodger's memoir is unique in that it does not criticize the retreat from Burma; however, it does criticize other aspects of the campaign, such as the lack of American support for the AVG.

Rodger was not alone in his criticism, of the 26 correspondents Woods covers in his book, about half went on to write critical reports of the allied handling of Burma.⁴⁶ At a time when long distance telegraph transmissions were expensive and time consuming, and readership relied on whichever newspaper published updates the quickest, journalists were unwilling to risk censorship and delay by publishing a story which may have been more accurate.⁴⁷ These journalists still strove to be independent actors, as seen through their memoirs, and help explain why journalists such as Nancy Crawshaw were willing to criticize the British Government during the Cyprus Emergency.

A Background to Nancy Crawshaw

Nancy Crawshaw was born into a well-off British family in 1914. She was privately educated in England and Germany and attended the Reimann School of Photography where she became a qualified photographer. Knowing French, German, and some Greek, she spent the early part of her career working as a journalist-photographer in the Middle East and Balkans.⁴⁸ Crawshaw's initial interest in the Hellenic world likely began when she accompanied the United Nations investigation team as an independent journalist in communist-held Northern Greece. From 1949 to 1959 in Greece and from 1954 to 1959 in Cyprus, Crawshaw was an accredited special correspondent with the *Manchester Guardian*. In 1958 she was employed by the British Foreign Office in the United States where she was tasked with providing clarity of the British situation within Cyprus.⁴⁹ Just several months later Crawshaw served as one of the two British consultants to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace regarding research in the Cyprus conflict.⁵⁰ Following the independence of Cyprus in 1960, Nancy Crawshaw would go on to deliver lectures to the Royal Naval Staff College and the Royal Institute of International Affairs, write articles for *The World Today* and *International Relations*, and even write a full-length monograph regarding the Cyprus Emergency in 1978.⁵¹

Through these employments, Nancy Crawshaw's perspective on the Cyprus Emergency was influential to both intellectuals on the subject and the common reader of the *Manchester Guardian*. Crawshaw was described by many as an expert on the Emergency.⁵² She had close connections with the British Governor, Sir John Harding, members of Parliament, and Turkish-Cypriot elites such as Rauf Denktaş.⁵³ Exchanging correspondence with influential Greek and Turkish Cypriots was a normal occurrence for Crawshaw and from 1954-1960 she was very aware of the situation within Cyprus. It can be seen through her writing that Nancy Crawshaw leaned towards the colonial government's attitude, yet her work remained relatively

⁴⁶ Woods, *Reporting the Retreat*, 4.

⁴⁷ Woods, *Reporting the Retreat*, 100; Hannon, "Story Behind the Stories," 121.

⁴⁸ NCP 2/8, Biographical Note; NCP 1/6, Past experiences and contributions, 8 April 1954.

⁴⁹ NCP 2/8, Biographical Note.

⁵⁰ NCP 1/8, Dotation Carnegie Pour La Paix Internationale, 5 February 1958.

⁵¹ NCP 2/8, Biographical Note; NCP 2/8, Mrs. N. Crawshaw, 8 November 1967.

⁵² NCP 1/6, Patrick Maitland to Alan Lennox-Boyd, 8 May 1956; NCP 1/7, The Encyclopedia Americana, 2 July 1959.

⁵³ NCP 1/1, Invitation by Harding, 13 July 1957.; NCP 1/4, Christmas Card by Denktaş. Because Nancy Crawshaw was a well-regarded journalist writing for a popular British newspaper, it seems only natural that individuals who had a stake in the outcome of the conflict would seek her attention. Governor Harding sent Crawshaw an invitation to celebrate the Queen's birthday at an official party and Crawshaw called him "splendid," Labour Members of Parliament exchanged letters with Crawshaw asking her opinion on particular matters, and Denktaş even sent her a Christmas card. Obviously, Many who she met with had an agenda in mind but nonetheless, Crawshaw maintained a relationship with some after the conflict, eventually editing a book by Denktaş and receiving New Year's Cards from the Prime Minister of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

objective compared to others at the time. Crawshaw could be described as pro-Turkish, however this may be the result of her strong anti-EOKA attitude rather than any affinity for the Turkish-Cypriot side of the conflict. The position Crawshaw found herself in the late 1950s allowed her extensive access to both the local and international players within the conflict. As the special correspondent for the *Manchester Guardian*, British Foreign Office employee during the 1958 session of the United Nations, as well as other assignments, Crawshaw had the legitimacy and knowledge to claim British mismanagement of the information environment during the war. After returning from the United Nations she wrote, “the significance of U.N as a forum for anti-British propaganda does not appear to be fully understood by many British officials.”⁵⁴ The work of Nancy Crawshaw provides another facet to the study of the information environment during the Cyprus Emergency, and must be considered alongside other independent journalism to understand how the British government failed to dominate information during the war.

Nancy Crawshaw: A Case Study in Journalism

Nancy Crawshaw believed the British failed to understand the gravity international organizations had on foreign opinion, and thus, they did not dominate the international information environment. Nowhere was this more pronounced than in the United Nations. The governments of Greece and Turkey were under immense pressure from their people to present their respective viewpoints in the United Nations and it would have been difficult to silence these governments. The British failed to effectively counter these arguments which reduced their own stance in the eyes of American and other foreign powers. Crawshaw believed the British neglected the importance of the United Nations to the American perspective of Cyprus. The U.N is in America, is funded significantly by America, and attended or watched by many American intellectuals.⁵⁵ Whether due to incompetence or negligence, the British representatives failed to correct misinformation and allowed American audiences to draw many of their opinions of the conflict based on Greek viewpoints. After the fifth time the Cyprus question was brought in front of the U.N with no solution, the New Zealand delegate stated, “few subjects have been debated so extensively and with so little profit.”⁵⁶ Had Britain seen that the Cyprus Emergency was to be solved in the U.N and not on the battlefield, they may have put more effort into bringing American and foreign powers into their line of thinking. The American government would often vote alongside Britain due to a common strategic interest, but in an era of decolonization, the decision to restrict self-determination of the Cypriot people would be a difficult vote for many foreign powers.

Britain’s attempts to monopolize information were further frustrated by media figures such as Nancy Crawshaw who formed their own opinions and did not act as agents of any side. Crawshaw formed her own opinion of the states and actors involved in the conflict and in this way, did not conform entirely to British official opinion as many in the colonial administration pressured her to do. She was Anti-EOKA, not supportive of the Greek Government, and leaned against the Greek-Cypriot community. The majority of this has to do with the violence these actors encouraged and less of her disdain for Greek desires. Crawshaw used words such as “blackmail” and “insidious” to describe actions by EOKA and even titled a 1958 article “Mass Intimidation in Cyprus” as an attempt to convince English readers of the *Manchester Guardian* against the self-propagated ‘righteousness’ of the EOKA

⁵⁴ NCP 19/8, Cyprus and U.S. Opinion Report, February 1959.

⁵⁵ NCP 19/8, Cyprus and U.S. Opinion Report.

⁵⁶ NCP 19/9, Article notes and draft.

cause.⁵⁷ Crawshaw believed the larger Greek-Cypriot community was misinformed, and supported AKEL, the Greek-Cypriot communist organization, because of their aversion to violence. She hoped that “increasing numbers of Cypriots may well look to the Left in the hope of liberation from the tyranny of EOKA.”⁵⁸ Nancy Crawshaw viewed the Greek government and the state sponsored press as instigators of violence in Cyprus and in Greece. Of the Greek-Cypriot public she said, “. . . anger is accelerated further by sensational accounts of non-existent concentration camps,” and “for fifteen months prominent figures in Greece and commentators on Athens radio have been encouraging the youth of Cyprus to lawlessness.”⁵⁹ The fact that Crawshaw’s writings line up with British interest in regard to the Greeks had more to do with her preference of diplomacy over violence than active British coercion.

Nancy Crawshaw was more favorable to the Turkish-Cypriots and Turkey than to the Greeks. However, this has more to do with Turks and Turkish-Cypriots causing fewer problems for the British, as compared to Greek-Cypriot organizations such as EOKA, than for any support of Turkish desires. Her views towards the Turkish-Cypriots and the Turkish state are pragmatic. The British needed Turkish support, which was regarded by some as favoritism, to maintain order on the island because the Greeks were fully devoted to the idea of *enosis*. Although Greek-Cypriots certainly caused more mayhem in Cyprus, Crawshaw’s portrayal of the situation and not over-emphasis of Turkish violence over Greek, gave readers of the *Manchester Guardian* the idea that Greeks were to blame for the violence on the island. Headlines like “Turk killed in Cyprus: demonstrations against Greeks” frame the situation as objective, but certainly relieve Turks of any blame.⁶⁰ After the Turkish paramilitary organization TMT formed, Crawshaw wrote, “responsible Turks are deeply concerned over mob violence, perpetrated mainly by youthful hooligans which puts the Turkish community of formerly restrained, law-abiding citizens in the same category as EOKA fanatics.” The Turkish-Cypriot community on a whole was framed as “responsible” and “law-abiding,” and that unlike the Greek-Cypriots, the majority would like to see TMT disbanded.⁶¹ Crawshaw criticized both the Turkish and Greek governments but discussed the former as more negligent than malicious. When riots in Istanbul broke out in September of 1955 against the Greek minority, Crawshaw framed the situation as an emotional response against actions in Cyprus and not institutional hatred by the state and people against Greeks, even stating, “Responsible Turks, however, are deeply ashamed of the 1955 riots, and diplomatic observers are confident that these events will not be repeated.”⁶²

A summation of Nancy Crawshaw’s work shows her to be undoubtedly pro-British. She defended Britain’s record of human rights during the Cyprus Emergency, the British military policy, and frequently, the honor and dedication of the British soldier. This is not to say she was uncritical at times, such as when she often disparaged British inefficiency and lack of transparency. She wrote from the perspective of a concerned citizen, believing her country to be in the right but at times,

⁵⁷ NCP 9/Press Cuttings, “Mass Intimidation in Cyprus: The Tyranny of EOKA,” *The Manchester Guardian*, October 6, 1958.

⁵⁸ NCP 9/Press Cuttings, “Mass Intimidation in Cyprus.”

⁵⁹ NCP 24/8, “Cyprus Problem Kept Acute in Athens: Irresponsible Elements Damaging Anglo-Greek Relations,” *The Manchester Guardian*, November 13, 1955.

⁶⁰ NCP 9/Press Cuttings, “Turk Killed in Cyprus: Demonstrations Against Greeks,” *The Manchester Guardian*, January 11, 1956.

⁶¹ NCP 9/Press Cuttings, “Turkish-Greek Gulf Widening: Government’s Delay Blamed for Clashes,” *The Manchester Guardian*, June 11.

⁶² NCP 24/8, “The Greek Minority in Turkey: Future of the Patriarchate,” *The Manchester Guardian*, October 10, 1958.

lacking the competence or direction to accomplish the mission. In one article in the *Manchester Guardian* titled “Conditions in Kyrenia Castle: where troops envy the detainees,” Crawshaw described how EOKA propaganda convinced a segment of Cypriots that the prison where EOKA terrorists were held was an epicenter of torture and brutality. Her response, which dismisses this theory, claims “The detainees seemed cheerful and friendly as we toured the castle.”⁶³ Despite praising the British military policy of providing medical aid and financial assistance to communities in an attempt to win them over, Crawshaw commented, “persistent refusal to allow reputable journalists to see conditions for themselves means that irresponsible reports go unchallenged.”⁶⁴ Crawshaw praised many of the British service members’ ability to remain passive in austere settings, writing “most observers agree that the vast majority of the British soldiers have carried out their duties with patience and restraint in the face of immense provocation.”⁶⁵ Nonetheless, after EOKA propaganda alleged British human rights violations, Crawshaw noted Britain’s failure to control the information environment, suggesting “the present allegations, irrespective of whether certain cases are true or not, are part of an intensive campaign to discredit the British.”⁶⁶

The British information campaign relied on concealing and controlling the available information for distribution, which was difficult to do when journalists such as Nancy Crawshaw were British citizens writing for a British paper. Nonetheless, the British still tried appeals and persuasion to convince Crawshaw to write more positively at times when they felt she was being too critical. Crawshaw wrote her husband on September 19th, 1955 saying the RAF “says I have discriminated against them in not getting in touch.”⁶⁷ The Cyprus Administration Secretary’s Office wrote her in early 1956, “The Governor was much concerned at the strong criticisms, made in your recent articles of the Broadcasting and Information Services here,” later writing, “we take the *Guardian’s* comments very seriously.”⁶⁸ Obviously, the Colonial Office understood the importance of the information environment, especially when negative coverage was written by an English author for an English audience. A private letter sent to Crawshaw in early 1957 by the Cyprus Administrative Secretary stated, “We continue to be unhappy...about the handling of publicity at the London end,” and asked if she would “help him to cultivate useful relations with the press.” When the British failed to convince London based newspapers to capitulate and frame colonial policy in a positive light, they offered Crawshaw compensation, (“whatever you considered appropriate”), if she would persuade their work.⁶⁹ Despite her generally pro-British leanings, Crawshaw refused to take what amounted to bribes offered by the colonial government.

Nancy Crawshaw is indicative of many journalists of the era who were generally pro-British, but also had no qualms with criticizing the British government at times. The correspondent for *Reuters* in Cyprus often wrote in support for the Colonial government but did not feel the need to self-censor comments which would

⁶³ NCP 9/Press Cuttings, “Conditions in Kyrenia Castle: Where Troops Envy the Detainees,” *The Manchester Guardian*, November 4.

⁶⁴ NCP 24/8, “Cyprus Village Under Curfew: Some Advantages to the Inconvenience,” *The Manchester Guardian*, May 23, 1957.

⁶⁵ NCP 9/Press Cuttings, “Justice in Cyprus I – An Inquiry Needed,” *The Manchester Guardian*, July 1, 1957.

⁶⁶ NCP 9/Press Cuttings, “Justice in Cyprus I.”

⁶⁷ NCP 1/2, Letter to Husband, 19 September 1955.

⁶⁸ NCP 1/6, Leslie Glass to Nancy Crawshaw Correspondence, 9 February 1956.

⁶⁹ NCP 1/8, A.F.J. Reddaway personal and confidential correspondence with Nancy Crawshaw, 4 March 1957.

have been excluded just a decade prior. In response to “a storm of demands in Britain for tough, immediate action to crush terrorist,” *Reuters* quotes Major General Kenneth Darling stating, “the only terrorist I’m interested in is a dead one.”⁷⁰ However, *Reuters* was not afraid to publish dissent, such as when two “members of the British Governor’s executive council also were reported today to have threatened to resign unless Britain gave some assurance that Cyprus would enjoy the right of self-determination.”⁷¹ A *Times* correspondent wrote much in the same manner. An article entitled “British paratroops from Cyprus receive warm welcome on arrival in Jordan,” describes the happiness and humor of the British soldiers once in Jordan, but ignores the reasons why they are in good spirits in order to leave the insurgency in Cyprus up to the interpretation of the reader.⁷² The tone of most *Times* articles was authoritative and direct, but occasionally a story such as “Cyprus freedom postponed again” showed *The Times*’ willingness to criticize what this correspondent saw as the London government dragging their feet on a decided issue.⁷³ This type of journalist was not unique to the Cyprus Emergency nor to a political affiliation. While Crawshaw could be characterized as center-right, Colin Legum (1919-2003), longtime African Correspondent for *The Observer*, fit a similar mold and was much more left-winged.⁷⁴ Legum supported the Crown’s policies when he believed in their merit but in some of his articles, such as a 1999 report in *New Statesman*, he scolds the British treasury’s handling of the sale of 125 tons of gold reserve, which he argues was detrimental to the African economy.⁷⁵ The journalist, who formed and published his or her own beliefs as an independent actor, personified but in no way isolated in Nancy Crawshaw, was on the rise during the second half of the 20th century and contributed to Britain’s inability to dominate the information environment in Cyprus.

Conclusion

The British failed to dominate the information environment during the Cyprus Emergency because they assumed British journalists like Nancy Crawshaw would “toe the party line” when, in fact, they formed their own opinions in ways that made them independent actors and not agents of any particular side. Internationally, the information campaign against the British originated mainly from Greece or Archbishop Makarios and was seen in newspapers or debates at the United Nations. The Emergency put the United Nations in an awkward position because many countries, including America, did not want to take a formal vote on the issue. Crawshaw claimed this lack of American willpower to quash the thought of *enosis*, and the British inability to convince America to do so, showed British weakness in the international realm.⁷⁶ The domestic information environment was dominated by Greek actors in the form of EOKA or Greek state supported organizations. This is not to say domestic information was monopolized; the Turkish and Colonial communities wrote frequently, but these only reached select individuals because the majority of the

⁷⁰ “British Civilians in Cyprus to Arm: Governor Takes Step to Halt Terrorist Acts – 2 Airmen Slain by bomb,” *Reuters*, November 9, 1958.

⁷¹ “British on Cyprus Battle New Riots: Tear Gas Hurlled at Youths Demanding Greek Union – Building Set Afire,” *Reuters*, September 18, 1955.

⁷² “British Paratroops from Cyprus Receive Warm Welcome on Arrival in Jordan,” *The Times*, July 18, 1958.

⁷³ “Reaction from Cyprus,” *The Times*, September 24, 1958; “Cyprus Freedom Postponed Again: No New Independence Date Set as impasse Continues Over 2 British Bases,” *The Times*, February 9, 1960.

⁷⁴ André Landman, “Serendipitous Discoveries: The Elusive Bloke Modisane in the Colin Legum Papers,” *Social Dynamics* 36, no. 3 (September 2010): 453.

⁷⁵ Colin Legum, “The Sale of Gold was our Darkest Hour,” *New Statesman* 12, no. 579 (November 1999): 21.

⁷⁶ NCP 19/8, Cyprus and U.S. Opinion Report, February 1959.

population was Greek-speaking and devoted followers of Cypriot Orthodoxy. The British failed to suppress or conceal information from the local community, and by letting the governments of Greece and Turkey run Cypriot public schools, it was likely most indoctrination had already occurred. The British did not mold the international and domestic narrative of Cyprus to fit their goals and as a result, faced increasing pressure to relinquish command of the island.

The information environment in Cyprus was different from that of British wars of decolonization in Africa or Asia. The British information campaign in those wars relied on concealing and controlling the type of information available for a domestic and international audience.⁷⁷ This was difficult to do during the Cyprus Emergency because of the large number of independent actors, including journalists like Nancy Crawshaw, who were collecting and distributing information throughout the war. Crawshaw sought to write the narrative of the conflict for a Western audience, and by using her experience as a case study, it is obvious the Colonial Office actively tried to influence her writings and the writings of others. As an independent figure, Crawshaw generally disliked EOKA and the Greek government, tolerated Turkish-Cypriots because of their general nonviolence, and supported the British government. This is not to say she didn't have her public and private reservations which upset the colonial government at times. Criticism of the Colonial Government by her and others, and the government's inability or unwillingness to stop this, influenced the tone of domestic and international information.

The turbulent decades following World War Two caught most of the Western world off guard, especially in regard to the growing trend of governmental distrust and "journalistic integrity." Journalists were becoming more independent, less willing to "toe the party line," and by the American war in Vietnam, were increasingly becoming policy influencers. Nancy Crawshaw was not the first, nor the last of this type of journalists, but she represented an era of change in which colonial powers and particularly Britain could no longer hope to monopolize information distribution in their home press. Although not always the case, Crawshaw represented what we now consider superb journalism; she was critical when it was warranted but offered praise when it was deserved. This flew in the face of journalistic propaganda the British mandated in the First and Second World War, and similar behavior would surprise the French in the Algerian War and the American government in the Vietnam War. Through analysis of the Cyprus Emergency, it seems obvious that when more actors or organizations vie for control of the information environment, it becomes more difficult for a single faction to dominate information distribution. With war and conflict now being broadcasted over television and cell phones, it would not be outlandish to question if the days of information domination are a thing of the past. How this phenomenon affects people and the course of a conflict is already being played out and deserves additional examination. To conclude, further study should be devoted to the extent the information environment played in the outcome of the Cyprus Emergency. This paper has shown that the British failed to dominate the information environment for a variety of reasons including independent journalism, but this means very little unless extended to the broader context of how control of the information environment affected the outcome of the war.

⁷⁷ Newsinger, *British Counterinsurgency*, 2nd Edition.

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REFORMING BLACK GIRLHOOD AND SEXUALITY AT THE MISSOURI STATE INDUSTRIAL HOME FOR NEGRO GIRLS, 1930-1948

Kayla J. Smith

Spearheaded by appeals from the Federated Negro Women's Club of Missouri, the Missouri State Home for Negro Girls in Tipton, Missouri was established in 1916 to house, educate, and rehabilitate black girls who were convicted of crimes related to sexual deviancy. This paper explores the social and political conditions that defined black girls as "criminal" and how the Home shaped and documented black girl's carceral experiences during the late 19th to early 20th century. It finally makes a case for how this early criminalization of black girls and the implementation of reformatories influenced how current educational and juvenile justice systems treat black girls today.

Introduction

Malorie was one of many African American girls who were put away into reformatories for violating social norms of domesticity and virtue by participating in sexual indiscretions. Seventeen-year old Malorie grew up in Saint Louis, Missouri. She was a "slender" yet "attractive" young woman, with a light complexion, light brown hair, and bluish-gray eyes. Her father was a habitual drinker and worked to provide for the family as a janitor while her mother stayed at home to take care of all seven children. Malorie had a reputation for being a runaway and was sent to the Detention Home twice for general delinquency and running away from home. The second time Malorie ran away, she lived with her male "paramour" for almost a year. She also hung around "joints" during late hours of the night. She was charged with "Delinquency" and sent to the State Industrial Home for Negro Girls (i.e. "Tipton" as in Tipton, Missouri) for three years. She admitted to being "incorrigible, unmanageable, and habitually immoral" since she was nine years old.

At Tipton, she was classified as a "sex pervert" and often had a violent temper. She had temper tantrums, fought with other girls, and even attacked a matron and threw her down. Once, Malorie had to be subdued by wet towels to "bring her around." Her conduct led her to being in the third and fourth groups, which had the least privileges. At Tipton, she was considered "among the worst" but also "one of the nicest people here." Eventually, Malorie's conduct improved. Malorie was considered cheerful, calm, dependable, and industrious. She participated in the sewing room, yard & field, art room, and the emergency squad. When she left Tipton, she had "made a complete change." When she returned home, Malorie was so 'put-out' with the conduct and companions of her mother" that she begged to return to Tipton. She wrote letters to Tipton checking on how the girls and officers were doing and Superintendent Ethel Bowles, or as Malorie called her "Mother Bowles," offered Malorie

encouragement and support. “Mother Bowles” even helped her find a job. In the end, Malorie became “a well-adapted and useful citizen” because of Tipton.¹

The Missouri State Home for Negro Girls in Tipton, Missouri was one of the few reformatories for black girls in the country, and its mission was to refashion “incorrigible,” or deviant, girls into “useful citizens.” At face value, it meant improving the girls’ conduct, encouraging the girls to take up a creative hobby, and finding a job for the girls after they were released. However, the motivations behind the creation of reformatories for black girls were more injurious than what reform officers and leaders made them out to be. What was not included in Tipton’s case histories were the deficient inner workings that made Tipton known as one of the worst reformatories in the country. What was even more hidden and systemically injurious were the motivations behind the reformatory’s creation with racialized and gendered notions of who should be reformed, how they should be reformed, and why their “reformation” was beneficial to society.

This reformatory was a piece of a larger Progressive reform movement, and it caused tangible consequences that affect how the black community handles issues about chastity, “ladylike” behavior, and teen deviancy. Their “reformation” and shaming have led to the persistence of stereotypes that has defined black girls as transgressive, unruly, and incorrigible, and it has permeated into how they are treated and regarded today by the black community as well as wider society. These stereotypes have led to increased discipline, punishment, and imprisonment of black girls by those who are expected to protect them: parents, teachers, administrators, and the justice system. This article ultimately aims to answer the following questions: How did progressives and Tipton reformatory supporters and staff come to understand black girls as incorrigible, unmanageable, and habitually immoral like Malorie? How did these perceptions impact the formation of the “reformatory for black girls” as a progressive concept?

The article then makes a case for how this case study resembles a pre-history of the current stereotypes of African American girls as transgressive, unruly, and deviant--the stereotypes that lead to increased discipline, criminalization, and punishment in the current day.

Historiography and Intervention

The idea of reformation directly influences the makeup of the prison system that perseveres today. Thus, it is important to note how historians have studied the creation of the prison system and how it has manifested to ensnare women, with special attention towards black women. Scholarship by Estelle B. Friedman, Nicole Rafter, and Karin Lorene Zipf have contributed to the fields of criminology and social history by bringing to the forefront the impact of the women’s prison system on their subversion, criminalization, and sexual repression.²

They argue that women and girl inmates have been absent from the social reform and criminological discourses, especially those involving the development of prison models. These scholars have centered their focus on women through analyzing

¹ DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, STATE INDUSTRIAL HOME FOR NEGRO GIRLS (Tipton, Mo), CASE HISTORIES OF FEMALE JUVENILE OFFENDERS, 1931-1936, Missouri State Archives, Jefferson City, MO. These files are restricted for privacy reasons, therefore I am not including the box and folder numbers.

² See Estelle B. Friedman, *Their Sisters’ Keepers: Women’s Prison Reform in America, 1830-1930* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1984); Nicole Hahn Rafter, *Partial Justice: Women, Prisons and Social Control*, 2nd ed. (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1990); Karin Lorene Zipf, *Bad Girls at Samarcand: Sexuality and Sterilization in a Southern Juvenile Reformatory* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2016).

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sources including historical newspapers, institutional (reformatory and prison) records, prison organization/association reports, and court documents.

Likewise, black women historians including Kali N. Gross, Sarah Haley, Saidiya Hartman, Talitha L. LeFlouria, and LaKisha Simmons center on black women's narratives in prison, reformatory, and convict lease systems.³ They analyze how themes such as deviancy, resistance, violence, girlhood/womanhood, criminalization, and respectability politics influenced the policing and surveillance of black women in prisons and reformatories. These scholars specifically analyzed primarily archival sources, including court documents, institutional records, punishment records, census documents, medical reports, and newspapers.

This article's original contribution and intervention into this field of black women's history is that it provides an intellectual historical analysis of the concept of "reformatories for black girls." The Missouri State Industrial Home for Negro Girls (Tipton) in 1930s to 1940s Missouri is an ideal case study to explore this concept because it was a state-sponsored reformatory which provides insight into how the state played a role on how black girls were stereotyped, treated, and "educated." Moreover, its study uncovers the overarching ideologies, logic, and sociocultural shifts that led to the persisting phenomenon of criminalization and reformation of black female sexuality in American society. They include the transgression of norms, forms of incorrigibility based on race and gender, institutionalization, reformation, surveillance, and the refashioning of human behavior (specifically sexuality). This article includes primary sources like institutional record collections from the Missouri State Archives about the Missouri State Penitentiary, State Home for Negro Girls, and the Department of Corrections. Specifically, it uses biennial reports from the Department of Corrections, case histories from the State Home for Negro Girls, and a 1946 dissertation titled "Industrial Home for Negro Girls, 1909-1944" by Nancy Ellen Cole. In summation, by focusing on Tipton's operations and the motivations behind its creation, this article detects a prehistory of how black girlhood and criminalization today has been influenced by the reformatory system.

The Origins of Reformation

The idea of the reformatory in the United States started with the Industrial Revolution, which ranged from the 18th century to the 19th century. Though it was a period of economic growth, innovation, and machine manufacturing, it also brought on a range of issues like overcrowding, pollution, dangerous working conditions, and, ultimately, crime. Out of this chaotic environment, Progressivism emerged and advocated for the improvement of society by reform. According to Progressives, the Industrial Revolution disrupted family-centered controls, which threatened public safety and child welfare.⁴ Thus, children were seen as the victims of industrialization, and parents and family were viewed as unable to maintain their children's wellbeing. As a result, Progressives started to rely on the increasing power of the state in order to enact progress. During this period, the idea of the Parental State emerged and changed the

³ See Kali N. Gross, *Colored Amazons* (Durham: Duke University Press Books, 2006); Sarah Haley, *No Mercy Here: Gender, Punishment, and the Making of Jim Crow Modernity* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2016); Saidiya Hartman, *Wayward Lives, Beautiful Experiments: Intimate Histories of Riotous Black Girls, Troublesome Women and Queer Radicals* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2020); Talitha LeFlouria, *Chained in Silence: Black Women and Convict Labor in the New South* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2015); LaKisha Simmons, *Crescent City Girls: The Lives of Young Black Women in Segregated New Orleans* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2015).

⁴ Geoff K. Ward, *The Black Child-Savers: Racial Democracy and Juvenile Justice* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2012), 23-24.

nature of juvenile reform. Instead of the family disciplining their own children, the state became the surrogate parent of the nation and its children with the passing of the decision of *Ex Parte Crouse* in 1838.⁵ The *parens patriae* doctrine gave the state the responsibility to care for those who are legally incapable of caring for themselves, creating a justification for juvenile justice advocates to protect other people’s children. New laws and institutions were established to protect the well-being of children and prevent them from entering a life of crime. Soon, the idea of the reformatory and houses of refuge for children became tangible, and these buildings became the protectors of the nation’s “deviant” children.

The idea of the reformatory was accompanied with support for corrective punishment. Corrective punishment aimed to “reset” the soul and change their behavior for the greater good. American society regarded the “the criminal” as a dangerous threat at the turn of the nineteenth century, so society believed corrective punishment of the criminals’ mind would put an end to crime. In a Biennial Report from the Missouri Board of Charities and Correction, there is a passage in a chapter called “The Crime Question” that indicates the way Missourian criminal justice system regarded criminals and the importance of corrective punishment:

Who are prisoners? They are persons who have offended against individuals and society. [...] Neither society nor the person is benefited by imprisonment, unless a change takes place in the person, and to some extent in society in relation to them. The reformatory purpose is to effect the necessary change, so that the man shall cease to do evil and learn to do well. [...] The real question is how to best save society from the criminal.⁶

Although this passage suggests that society needed to be changed (“to some extent”), it is evident that the prisoner was seen as the most in need of change to “save society.” According to this passage, “prisoners” should have their behaviors and mindset readjusted to societal norms, placing the responsibility on the individual rather than the conditions that produced them. Essentially, since society needed to be protected, the public should have the power to decide who should be judged for punishment and reform: “[...] the power to judge should no longer depend on the innumerable, discontinuous, sometimes contradictory privileges of sovereignty, but on the continuously distributed effects of public power.”⁷ Thus, strategies on how to decrease crime rested in the hands of the public.

THE MISSOURI STATE TRAINING SCHOOLS

Boonville: Missouri’s First Reformatory

This article primarily focuses on Tipton, but it is also important to analyze the State Training School for Girls in Chillicothe, Missouri and the State Training School for Boys in Boonville, Missouri in order to illuminate how each reformatory had different methods of education and discipline that catered to the implied racist and gendered assumptions about what needed to be amended about each group. These two reformatories were created first in Missouri because of the state’s prioritizing of white children’s rehabilitation. The Missouri Training School for Boys, opened in 1889 in Boonville, MO. Boys (all white) who were committed to Boonville typically did crimes against persons or property. Education at Boonville was catered for white boys to gain practical skills that they could bring into the workforce, and their activities

⁵ Ward, *The Black Child-Savers*, 25-26.

⁶ Bound copy of 1901-1907 Biennial Reports, Box 30, STATE BOARD OF CHARITIES AND CORRECTIONS: BIENNIAL REPORTS, 1899-1932, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, STATE DOCUMENTS, Missouri State Archives, Jefferson City, MO, 13-17.

⁷ Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (Pantheon Books, 1977), 81.

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indicate a gendered notion of what boyhood and masculine values are in late nineteenth-century Missouri. Furthermore, “[Boonville] was considered an experiment by progressive minds of the day – child savers wanted ‘wayward youths’ to grow up in a rural environment, thinking that hard work, clean air and green grass would transform troubled young people into model citizens.”⁸ Boonville had a multitude of activities and jobs that encouraged trade work, and establishing a work ethic:

[...] industries were added throughout the years, including a rock quarry, cobbler shop, printing plant, paint and carpenter shops, laundry, ice plant, waterworks, electric generating and distributing system, a cannery, plumbing, a blacksmith shop, a dairy, and even a greenhouse. The boys sold their products to the locals and learned the value of hard work – and, ideally, a trade that would help them once they were released. Baseball and football teams were organized, and there was even a magazine written and published by the inmates named *Our Boys*.⁹

The same gendered curriculum was applied to the reformatories for girls. Within the same year, the State Training School for Girls was founded in Chillicothe, Missouri.

Chillicothe and the Emergence of Policing Sexuality

The focus on policing sexuality is important to note because it informed the starkly different types of offenses under which girls were charged. White girls were charged for 1) delinquency, 2) associating with immoral persons, and 3) incorrigibility, terms that were related to sexual deviancy. The ultimate goal of the Training School for Girls at Chillicothe was to stop the girls’ sexual deviancy and implement domestic ideals and values to change their behavior. Like Boonville, this institution was intended to provide education and work skills to rehabilitate these girls into useful citizens. For instance, at the Training School for Girls, “[...] domestic skills were taught to the girls. Cooking, baking, laundry and sewing filled the long days.”¹⁰ Reforming girls was imperative to the upholding of a social system of patriarchal norms and values and the racial hierarchy that was prevalent. If there was any deviation from domestic ideals and norms, girls were put into reformatories to be “reformed” and refashioned to follow those norms. If they did not, they were considered “failures” and were susceptible to shaming and ostracization.

Essentially, the norms of American society at the time informed penal reformers of what to do to reform these women and girls. Specifically, “[...] whereas the juridical systems define juridical subjects according to universal norms, the disciplines characterize, classify specialize; they distribute along a scale, around a norm, hierarchize individuals in relation to one another and, if necessary, disqualify and invalidate.”¹¹ To clarify, norms are evaluators of who belongs and who does not. Those who do not conform to norms are excluded. One of the major norms that impacted how women were policed and reformed was sexuality. During the Progressive Era, “[...] the individual man could traverse respectability and vice with little risk to personal reputation, class standing, or status as a citizen. This was in stark contrast to the gendered world that women negotiated, which cleaved to standards of sexual behavior and an idealization of sexual purity in the unmarried, and sexual

⁸ Hannah Litwiller, “Boonville’s Reformatory for Boys: 1889-1940,” *Katy Tales*, last modified July 19, 2017.

⁹ Litwiller, “Boonville’s Reformatory for Boys: 1889-1940.”

¹⁰ Mark S. Schreiber, et al., *Somewhere in Time: 170 Year History of Missouri Corrections* (Marceline: Walsworth Publishing Company, 2004), 41.

¹¹ Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 223.

fidelity in the married.”¹² The fear of deviation from this norm informed the legal precautions that reformers took to “protect” young women from sexual exploitation. This double standard of sexuality restricted women’s sexual behavior and shaped early-twentieth century conceptions of victimhood, protection, and morality as well.¹³

These dominant conceptions of womanhood meant closely policing young women’s sexuality, frequently criminalizing their sexual activity, and punishing young women under the guise of protecting them.¹⁴ Women and girls who violated the norms of chastity were considered deviant and non-respectable. This had drastic consequences where women and girls forfeited legal and, possibly, familial protection. As a result, these women and girls were at the mercy of the state. Thus, the reformatory became a place where sexually deviant girls could be retaught the societal values that they pulled away from.

THE STATE INDUSTRIAL HOME FOR NEGRO GIRLS

It took almost thirty years since the construction of Boonville and Chillicothe to build a reformatory for black girls, and those same goals for Chillicothe were implemented at Tipton as well. In 1908, a 12-year-old black girl was committed to the Missouri State Penitentiary, and the Federated Negro Women’s Club of Missouri took action. The President of the Federated Negro Women’s Club of Missouri appealed to the Attorney General, and when the General became Governor, he used his influence to establish a “special institution” for “Negro Girls.”¹⁵ Attempts to build the institution faced resistance from White residents.¹⁶ Regardless, the state government found a location in Tipton, Missouri and the State Industrial Home for Negro Girls opened in 1916.

African American Superintendents of Tipton sent numerous Biennial Reports to the Boards and Departments of Penal Institutions from early 1900 to the 1940s. The purpose of these reports was to assure the Boards and Departments that the Home was running smoothly and that its purpose is for the betterment of these girls:

[...] the great purpose of this Home which is to provide for our delinquent girls such wise conditions of modern education and training as will restore them to useful citizenship [...] Every girl is made to feel at home here; the institution is not a place of punishment, but a school where she may be taught to establish an upright character and habits of industry, and advance them in the branches of knowledge taught in public schools of the State.¹⁷

“Restoring” these “delinquent” girls implies that the Superintendent regarded the girls’ actions as criminal and that they had lost their usefulness as “citizens” of America. As with these Chillicothe girls, Tipton girls were mostly charged for 1) delinquency, 2) associating with immoral persons, and 3) incorrigibility; within their case histories, many were called “sex perverts” or “sex problems.” The African-American staff also believed that the girls only cared about their bodies and therefore didn’t have intelligent mental capacities: “Some of our girls come to us wholly untrained, unbelievably near the animal stage without the least rudimental knowledge

¹² Jessica R. Pliley, *Policing Sexuality: the Mann Act and the Making of the FBI* (Harvard University Press, 2014), 5.

¹³ Pliley, *Policing Sexuality*, 5.

¹⁴ Pliley, *Policing Sexuality*, 6.

¹⁵ Douglas E. Abrams, *A Very Special Place in Life: The History of Juvenile Justice in Missouri* (Missouri Juvenile Justice Association, 2003), 12.

¹⁶ Abrams, *A Very Special Place in Life*, 15.

¹⁷ Report of the Department of Penal Institutions: 1929-1930 Biennial Report. Box 1, Folder 3. ANNUAL & BIENNIAL REPORTS, 1920-2010. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, STATE DOCUMENTS. Missouri State Archives, Jefferson City, MO, 275.

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of clean and decent living and with no respect for law and order.”¹⁸ Saying these girls were “near the animal stage” is an “othering” tactic that is used to imply the “other” is more dangerous and vicious than any “ordinary” human. These assumptions are debilitating and harmful, and the Superintendents, who were sworn to protect them, “cared for” these girls with these biased assumptions in mind.

The Stakes of Reforming Black Children

As it is crucial to understand the gendered conceptions of reformation, it is especially crucial to understand the racial conceptions and assumptions of reforming black children. The main difference between the Chillicothe girls and the Tipton girls was race, and race impacted the difference in treatment and how their programs were structured. Policies governing these facilities were informed by racist mindsets that decided black juvenile offenders were incapable of development (“incorrigible”) while white juvenile offenders were considered susceptible to moral suasion and given a chance to change their ways. In fact, “Black children in white-dominated civil society experienced this denial of black humanity and civil rights, which distorted utilitarian notions of juvenile justice by reconstructing black children as inferior human clay, devoid of the developmental capacity and civil standing presupposed by citizen-building ideals.”¹⁹ Why would states care to make reformatories at all if it viewed black children as “inferior human clay”? Instead of treating black children as capable of becoming full, moral citizens, these reformatories treated black children as bodies that could be trained to benefit the state and uphold white supremacy. The reformatory “underdeveloped” them to maintain the boundaries of a white democracy.²⁰ For black children, reformatories were machines used to churn out, as Foucault terms, “docile bodies” who would work for and uphold the white, patriarchal state. To the white state, “‘Proper education’ [...] meant preparing black youths for roles as servants in a presumably continuingly white-dominated culture, economy, and polity.”²¹ For black boys, they were trained to do manual labor. Black girls were trained to become cooks, maids, and seamstresses.

Reformers put particular emphasis on controlling the sexuality of Black girls because their sexual autonomy was seen as a danger to white and black progress. Specifically, “Black women’s sexuality became an important measure of African American progress.”²² Three fears of the early twentieth century that were associated with African American women were 1) rampant and uncontrolled female sexuality; 2) fear of miscegenation; and 3) independent black female desire.²³ Chillicothe’s superintendent said in a letter to the state Board of Managers, “In accordance with [the Board of Managers’] instructions, I have refused to accept negroes to the present time as it is impossible to keep them separate from the white girls and an intermingling of the races would inevitably result in the demoralization of the whites and nullify, to a great extent, the good we are doing now.”²⁴ White Superintendents and the Department of Corrections viewed black girls as parasites who would debase white progress. To the white Board of Managers and superintendent of Chillicothe, black girls needed to be separated from the white girls not because of overcrowding but

¹⁸ Nancy Ellen Cole, “Missouri Industrial Home for Negro Girls, Tipton, Missouri, 1909-1944,” M.A. Thesis, Washington University, 1946, 15.

¹⁹ Ward, *The Black Child-Savers*, 44.

²⁰ Ward, *The Black Child-Savers*, 47.

²¹ Ward, *The Black Child-Savers*, 46.

²² Patricia Hill Collins, *Black Sexual Politics: African Americans, Gender, and the New Racism* (New York: Routledge, 2006), 71.

²³ Collins, *Black Sexual Politics*, 71.

²⁴ Cole, “Missouri Industrial Home for Negro Girls,” 11.

because they viewed black girls would negatively stunt the progression of the white girls. Specifically, the superintendent said black girls, “would create a disturbance among the inmates and virtually put an end to the reformatory features of the institution, thus making it a prison instead of a reform school.”²⁵ This is a startling assumption that black girls were regarded as criminals who are morally worse than the white girls who were sentenced for the same offenses. In their minds, black girls would stunt the growth of the white girls, so the black girls needed to be separated to protect the integrity of white purity.

On the other hand, why would the black community (including the black staff and Superintendents) support having a reformatory for black girls? The black community truly believed sending their girls to reformatories would make them into better citizens and young, respectable ladies who would contribute to the race’s uplift through work or marriage. Some parents even took their girls to Tipton directly. The norms of this patriarchal society impacted the black community and their norms. In order to challenge the prevailing ideology of black women and girls’ sexual immorality and protect themselves from further scrutiny, middle-class black women adopted and advocated a “politics of respectability” which was “characterized by cleanliness of person and property, temperance, thrift, polite manners, and sexual purity.”²⁶ In addition to their sexuality, the Tipton girls’ existence outside the institution of the nuclear family excluded them. The girls who were sent to Tipton came from broken homes or families in extreme poverty. According to one Biennial Report, “These girls have had no training in homemaking and, in many instances, know little or nothing of personal care. Some have been the victims of social diseases and their cultural training been negligible.”²⁷ This “cultural training” alludes to training these girls to adhere to the social and cultural norms that made them into docile bodies to the social norms of the black community. Specifically, the black community also wanted to make sure these girls would gain domestic and/or work skills. If the girls were married or worked, they were considered to be living a “right woman’s life.” To the black officers and clubwomen, learning the “domestic arts” had a double advantage: it not only made girls marketable, but marriageable as well. Ergo, without these tools, girls were never considered “useful citizens” to American society and their own communities.

Education and Refashioning of Tipton Girls

Thus, Tipton executed a special curriculum to “restore” the girls. The state’s correctional methods did not try to restore the individual to the place in society they had lost by breaking the law. Instead, those methods aimed to create an obedient subject who obeyed rules without question. This was implemented by timetables, compulsory movements, regular activities, solitary meditation, work in common, silence, application, respect, and good habits.²⁸ Systems of grading offender behavior (merit systems) and classifying individual offenders were also developed. Besides educational opportunities and vocational training, military conduct and discipline were adopted.²⁹

According to one report, there were educational classes that varied from elementary to high school each period, depending on the girls’ ages. The girls could

²⁵ Cole, “Missouri Industrial Home for Negro Girls,” 10-11.

²⁶ Collins, *Black Sexual Politics*, 71.

²⁷ Report of the Department of Penal Institutions: 1937-1938 Biennial Report, Box 1, Folder 6, ANNUAL & BIENNIAL REPORTS, 1920-2010, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, STATE DOCUMENTS, Missouri State Archives, Jefferson City, MO, 323.

²⁸ Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 128-129.

²⁹ Mark S. Schreiber, et al., *Somewhere in Time*, 36.

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participate in outdoor recreation like baseball, basketball, volleyball, handball, drills, etc.³⁰ The girls participated in music by playing instruments and singing, and underwent “religious training” where they attended Sunday school and had song services.³¹ Tipton girls were also taught the same domestic and vocational skills at Chillicothe, including cooking, baking, laundry and sewing. Every three months the girls were “detailed” in classes like Domestic Science, Domestic Art, Laundry, Practical Nurse Training, Beauty Culture, Commercial Poultry Raising, Dairy Work, Beautifying and Caring for the Campus, and Gardening.³² Domestic Science consisted of learning how to cook, preparing & baking food, and canning and preserving food.³³ In Beauty Culture, the girls learned about beauty culture, like shampooing hair every two weeks. In Domestic Art, the girls were taught crocheting, tatting, wax-fabric and wood painting, raffia work, basket weaving, embroidering, hemstitching, applique, bead work, and sketches in water coloring.³⁴

Superintendent Ethel Bowles at Tipton also enacted a “Merit System” which, “[...] enables girls to adjust themselves and keep check on their own behavior and attainments. Two merits are given each day for perfect performance in the following:

- Work (Good, bad, or indifferent; punctuality; alertness)
- Conduct
- Attitude
- Personal Appearance
- Sportsmanship.”³⁵

Rewards for good behavior included privileges, honors, parties, good clothes, leadership, and freedom. In order to classify these girls, the girls were placed into four groups from C.O.C to the “Fourth Group.” C.O.C stands for “Cream of the Crop” and these girls had the highest honors and privileges, and this could be achieved from having a consistent, perfect performance. The second group would get a party at the end of the month, and the third and fourth groups would have “minimal privileges.”³⁶ The girls also had after-care after they were paroled from Tipton to ensure that the girls did not “relapse” their criminal behavior. They had a Big Sisters program where the Federated Women’s Club of Missouri allowed for girls to be placed in private homes and jobs. They had parole officers and social workers connected with the institution to give updates about the girls to the Superintendent. The girls even wrote letters to the Superintendent, addressing her as “mother.” A few thanked the Superintendent for believing in them and having faith in them. A few said they found jobs, found love, or had children. Tipton was painted as a success.

Inequitable Conditions at Tipton

At face value, the Biennial Reports showed how effective Tipton was at helping these girls be educated, foster a family, and maintain a livelihood after they left. However, behind the scenes, the institution was so poorly maintained that it gained a reputation as one of the worst reformatories in the United States. This was due to the lack of funds and the mistreatment of the girls. Boonville had appropriated funds of

³⁰ Report of the Department of Penal Institutions: 1933-1934 Biennial Report, Box 1, Folder 4, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, STATE DOCUMENTS, ANNUAL & BIENNIAL REPORTS, 1920-2010, Missouri State Archives, Jefferson City, MO, 438.

³¹ Report of the Department of Penal Institutions: 1933-1934 Biennial Report, 439.

³² Report of the Department of Penal Institutions: 1929-1930 Biennial Report, 280.

³³ Report of the Department of Penal Institutions: 1929-1930 Biennial Report, 282.

³⁴ Report of the Department of Penal Institutions: 1929-1930 Biennial Report, 282.

³⁵ Report of the Department of Penal Institutions: 1933-1934 Biennial Report, 436-437.

³⁶ Report of the Department of Penal Institutions: 1933-1934 Biennial Report, 436-437.

\$1,215,000 for 224 boys (\$5,424 per boy), Chillicothe had appropriated funds for \$318,600 for 137 girls (\$2,325.55 per child), and Tipton had \$48,000 for 28 girls (\$1,714.28 per girl).³⁷ These calculations demonstrate how the children's race and gender affected how much money the State invested into each child.

The institution was run and maintained extremely poorly. Sewage disposal was poor; delivery of supplies was slow; salaries for black staff were far lower than white staff at the white girls' training school at Chillicothe; the superintendent had to hire anyone who applied regardless of qualifications and training; budgetary restrictions made allocated for only the minimum essentials for food with little meat, milk, or fresh fruit; and the school had few medical supplies and no resident medical or dental care.³⁸ These conditions were unheard of at the reformatories for white girls at Chillicothe and for white boys at Boonville.

Overcrowding was a serious issue and a health hazard; three girls were often put into a room meant for one.³⁹ According to the staff, this posed an even more serious problem: "The difficulties of a small staff are further increased by the fact that the building is so constructed that it is not possible to see inside the congregate bedrooms in which many of the girls sleep, when the doors are closed, and as there are not enough matrons to provide one for each bedroom, there is the opportunity for the girls to enter into all sorts of unwholesome sex practices."⁴⁰ Because the staff could not control every sexual indiscretion that might have happened in the rooms or deviant behavior in classrooms, they resorted to more heinous disciplinary measures.

Tipton staff used methods including solitary confinement that staff called "dungeons," whippings, segregation, deprivation of privileges, and withholding of merits resulting in a lower grade standing.⁴¹ The Superintendent responded to an Osborne Association report written about Tipton in 1938, "We have found that the nearest approach to them is through fear. Then we are able to develop 'Pride' and 'Self Respect' and make them realize that they must respect some authority or observe some rules of law and order. If not, they will be hurt physically their bodies are the only things they are conscious of, apparently."⁴²

It is quite peculiar to say that their "bodies are the only things they are conscious of." It is unclear exactly what that means, but it can be implied that the Superintendent felt the girls were not concerned with their mental and possibly spiritual values. According to her, this needed to be corrected through fear and physical pain if the merit system proved inadequate to "reform" them. However, these measures are not only physically excruciating but also psychologically frightening and hurtful for the girls who were in these women's care. Their well-being was not cared for by the staff nor the state as it refused to allocate enough funds to hire professionals and provide adequate sustenance and resources. The allocation of funds and lack of concern for the horrible living conditions at Tipton reflected American society's priorities, and black girls were at the bottom of the priority list.

Conclusion: Harmful and Lasting Implications

The Tipton reformatory was not an isolated incident; more reformatories such as this one continued to be built across the country, intent on controlling the behavior and

³⁷ FY 1948 Annual Report, Box 35, Folder 2, STATE BOARD OF TRAINING SCHOOLS: ANNUAL REPORTS, 1947-1973, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, STATE DOCUMENTS, Missouri State Archives, Jefferson City, MO.

³⁸ Abrams, *A Very Special Place in Life*, 105.

³⁹ Cole, "Missouri Industrial Home for Negro Girls," 22.

⁴⁰ Cole, "Missouri Industrial Home for Negro Girls," 80-81.

⁴¹ Cole, "Missouri Industrial Home for Negro Girls," 157-158.

⁴² Cole, "Missouri Industrial Home for Negro Girls," 157-158.

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conduct of black girls. State and local communities continued to police Black girls, leading to their continued criminalization, and this phenomenon has persisted and festered into the mass criminalization of black girls and women well into the twenty-first century. Although black girls cannot be arrested for delinquency, associating with immoral persons, and incorrigibility any longer, they are still being severely punished for the same “crimes” through disproportionate discrimination, strict discipline, and exclusionary punishment in schools. For example, current dress codes and hair discrimination in schools mirror the “Personal Appearance” component of the merit system at Tipton. While dress codes are said to create a more “suitable” environment for learning, it has done the opposite, in particular for black girls. A 2018 study by the National Women’s Law Center found that black girls in Washington, D.C. schools are singled out by unfair dress codes.⁴³ When enforced, this policy can cause black girls to fall behind in school by removing them from the classroom and even sending them home. A few statements from the report stand out:

Black girls [...] face adults’ stereotyped perceptions that they are more sexually provocative because of their race, and thus more deserving of punishment for a low-cut shirt or short skirt. [...] Black girls are 20.8 times more likely to be suspended from D.C. schools than white girls. One reason for this disproportionate punishment is that adults often see Black girls as older and more sexual than their white peers. [...] When students see educators talking about girls’ bodies, they learn to “sexualize” young women and view them as objects meant for others’ pleasure rather than full human beings. Plus, when educators say girls are “distracting” boys or “asking for it,” students get the message that boys are not responsible for how they behave, and girls who wear certain clothes or makeup deserve harassment and violence.⁴⁴

Black girls are being criminalized because of the *perception* that they are embodying deviant sexuality, and they are punished because of these stereotypes. Hair discrimination also operates in a similar way, as schools expel black girls because of their hair, resulting in media outrage and solidarity in recent years.⁴⁵ Fundamentally, respectability politics is at play within these disproportionate discriminatory practices. Black girls’ expression is stifled and suppressed, and black girls have to assimilate to the standards of an educational system that does not support their presence to avoid punishment.

One recent education study demonstrates the continued scrutiny of black girls’ comportment in the educational system today, specifically in extracurricular programs. Education researchers Tiffany M. Nyachae and Esther O. Ohito explored what primarily working-class black girls in an urban school were taught about girlhood and womanhood through written materials produced by an extracurricular program created for them. They found in their study that this program advanced respectability politics through three themes: 1) Shaming and blaming the individual, 2) Disciplining the black girl’s body, and 3) Promoting moral (self) policing and sexual propriety.⁴⁶ This program’s enforcement of these themes reflects the enforcement of the normative girl/womanhood at Tipton. This curriculum was geared

⁴³ “DRESS CODED: Black Girls, Bodies, and Bias in D.C. Schools,” National Women’s Law Center, last modified April 24, 2018.

⁴⁴ “DRESS CODED: Black Girls, Bodies, and Bias in D.C. Schools,” 1, 16, 27.

⁴⁵ See D. Sharmin Arefi, “Is Hair Discrimination Race Discrimination?” last modified April 17, 2020; Marquaysa Battle, “Times Black Girls Were Suspended for Their Hairstyles,” last modified May 16, 2017; Julia Jacobs and Dan Levin, “Black Girl Sent Home from School Over Hair Extensions,” last modified August 21, 2018; Jacey Bledsoe, “Black Voices: Respectability Politics Contribute to Social and Systemic Racism,” last modified October 22, 2020.

⁴⁶ See Tiffany M. Nyachae and Esther O. Ohito, “No Disrespect: A Womanist Critique of Respectability Discourses in Extracurricular Programming for Black Girls,” *Urban Education* 55, no. 10 (December 2019): 1-31.

to reforming this perceived inner aberrancy by promoting a certain ideal black girlhood: chaste, poised, graceful, dignified.

Based on the aforementioned historical phenomenon of reformation, it is clear that those who do not conform to the patriarchal norms become even more vulnerable to wrenching forms of gendered and racial discrimination as well as the heinous implementation of the carceral regime. This “carceral regime” consists of “the broad expanse of the criminal justice system (including officers, prosecutors, judges, the court, sentencing, parole, and prisons) and its vicissitudes (such as racism, sexism, homophobia, transphobia, brutality, and corruption) that exist in the system’s varied apparatuses.”⁴⁷ Within this carceral regime, black girls are still regarded as sexual deviants. The carceral regime is becoming quite evident within the American school system. With increased surveillance and scrutiny through schools’ architecture, policies, and practices, schools have become carceral sites where black girls are criminalized and even arrested at a young age.⁴⁸

Currently, black girls in high schools are:

- 6 times more likely to be suspended from school than white girls
- 4 times more likely to be arrested than white girls
- 3 times more likely to be restrained than white girls
- 3 times more likely to receive one or more in-school suspensions than white girls
- 3 times more likely to be referred to law enforcement than white girls
- 2 times more likely to receive corporal punishments than white girls.⁴⁹

These disproportionate statistics are the result of almost a hundred years of enforced normativity, shaming of non-normative compartments, and corporal and exclusionary discipline. There is opportunity for further study of the impact of these policies in disciplines such as sociology, education, law, etc., and there are many activists, scholars, educators, lawyers, etc. who are currently working hard to cut these deep roots. The main takeaway from this article is that the girls who were sentenced to go to Tipton did not fail to adjust themselves. Instead, the system failed to adjust itself for their needs, a fact that still rings true to this day, leaving black girls unprotected and unvalued as citizens and human beings.

⁴⁷ See Kali N. Gross, “Policing Black Women’s and Black Girls’ Bodies in the Carceral United States,” *Souls* 20, no. 1 (2018): 1-13; Sarah Haley, *No Mercy Here: Gender, Punishment, and the Making of Jim Crow Modernity* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2016), 9; Dylan Rodriguez, *Forced Passages: Imprisoned Radical Intellectuals and the U.S. Prison Regime* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), 41-44.

⁴⁸ See Carrie Spector, “Schools Need to Acknowledge their Part in the Criminalization of Black Youth, Stanford Scholar Says,” last modified June 18, 2020; Connie Wun, “Not Only a Pipeline: Schools as Carceral Sites,” *Occasional Paper Series*, no. 38 (October 2017): 1-6; Monique Morris, *Pushout: The Criminalization of Black Girls* (New York: The New Press, 2016).

⁴⁹ “Fact Sheet,” Pushout Film, last modified 2019.

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