

The background image is a photograph of a large stadium during an Olympic ceremony. In the foreground, a large, lit torch is visible, its flame glowing brightly. The stadium is filled with a large crowd of people, and various Olympic rings and national flags are visible on the stands. The overall scene is vibrant and celebratory.

The CRIMSON HISTORICAL REVIEW

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CONTENTS

Staff Information		ii
Contributors Page		iii
Letter from the Co-Chief-Editor	<i>Jackson Foster</i>	iv
REVIEWS		
Paula Krebs' <i>Gender, Race, and the Writing of Empire: Mapping the Battle for Imperial Influence</i>	<i>Scott Benigno</i>	01
ARTICLES		
US Imperialism and the Panama Flag Crisis of 1964	<i>James Murphy</i>	04
Beyond All Barriers: The Politicization of the International Olympic Committee in the 1988 Seoul Olympic Crisis	<i>Anna Kate Manchester</i>	17
Seeping Sentiment: Lost Cause Ideology During the Spanish-American War	<i>Caroline Lawrence</i>	35

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FROM THE EDITOR

Dear Readers,

Saying goodbye to the University of Alabama is hard. There is just so much to miss: a beautiful campus and vibrant student life, punctuated by Saturdays at Bryant-Denny Stadium, for one. What is more, there is the U.A. History Department, from which this very journal sprung to life. In my estimation, an undergraduate publication like the *Review* is exceedingly rare, a testament to the ambition of my colleagues and the commitment of the history faculty. Other institutions lay claim to similarly erudite professors and precocious students, of course, and often strong scholarship blossoms from their collaboration. Yet I cannot help but feel, with a hint of almost paternal pride, that the *CHR* is special.

Perhaps it is because of our staff's precise standards. Though we again received many excellent submissions, the current issue is among our shortest. It is common that an otherwise outstanding paper misses only one key element, or requires further development on only one key idea. I am proud that, in these cases, review board members offer detailed feedback, which authors can use to improve their work in the future. Or perhaps it is because Dr. Margaret Peacock has proven the finest leader an organization could ask for. She was fittingly recognized as such this year, winning the John L. Blackburn Award for the best academic advisor on U.A.'s campus.

Or perhaps it is because I consider a great number of *Review* personnel to be not only unparalleled minds, but dear friends, too. I will deeply miss my associates on the executive board: John Pace, Caroline Lawrence, and Lily Mears, who will all graduate with distinction, and Gavin Jones, John French, Kara Hutchinson, and Sarah Jaggears, who I trust will take the *CHR* to new heights. In fact, this edition—which examines the imperialism and Panama Flag Crisis, lost cause ideology during the Spanish-American War, the politicization of the International Olympic Committee, and a book on the Boer War—marks the last to be shaped by some of the *Review*'s founding cohort.

Still, such a change is good: throughout the past semester, I have been energized by the new *CHR* class' fresh perspective, as well as their passion for historical inquiry and writing. To express my gratitude for their enthusiasm and expertise would require reams and reams. So, yes, saying goodbye is difficult, but I am excited to watch the *Review* flourish from afar.

Yours sincerely,

Jackson C Foster
Jackson C. Foster

Co-Editor-in-Chief



Crimson Historical Review

PAULA KREBS' *GENDER, RACE, AND THE WRITING OF EMPIRE*: Mapping the Battle for Imperial Influence

Scott Benigno

Book Information: Gender, Race, and the Writing of Empire:
Public Discourse and the Boer War. *Paula M. Krebs*.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, 221 pp.

According to Paula M. Krebs, “Mafeking Night made jingoism safe for the middle classes by blurring the distinction between jingoism, which had been seen as working-class over-enthusiasm for the empire, and patriotism, that middle-class virtue of support for one’s country against foreign opposition.”¹ Krebs’ description of the night of May 18, 1900, encapsulates her overarching focus on British society: the desire to understand the British imperial message. In her book *Gender, Race, and the Writing of Empire: Public Discourse and the Boer War*, Krebs challenges preconceived notions of widespread pro-imperial support in Britain during the Boer War. A scholar whose ambition is matched by her use of contemporary sources, Krebs argues that key entities, such as the press and literary figures, constantly battled for influence over the British public’s understanding of the British Empire.

In six thematically organized chapters, Krebs lays out the battle for imperial influence in London, South African and British literature, the British press, Victorian gender ideology, and the British concentration camps. Starting with the spontaneity of the celebration following the victory at Mafeking, Krebs dissects Britain’s support for its own imperial effort in the fight against the Boers, noting press writings and private correspondence that shed doubt on the state of the nation. This continues seamlessly into a multi-chapter discussion of the concentration camps built by the British army to “house” Boer women and children. Here, she analyzes the biases of London’s major newspapers and their desire to influence public opinion and the role of individual women and gender in the fight for the soul of the war in the press and beyond. Krebs finishes her book by examining literature of the war from pro-Boer and pro-British authors, detailing how the British home population read about a land, a situation, another white culture, and a war without ever setting sight on South Africa. Public opinion, like imperialism, was as imagined as it was real.

Paula Krebs’ work on Britain, the Boer War, and the British public offers an astoundingly deep study on the cultural battle that one conflict produced. If one thing is sure by the end of the book, it is that the Boer War was far more consequential for British imperialism and views of South Africa than was previously known. Most important are the primary sources Krebs uses, such as H. Rider Haggard’s introduction of Rudyard Kipling at the Anglo-African Writer’s Club, as they include the raw emotion and rhetoric of the imperial age that was used from literary figures to newspapers to capture the public’s attention and, more importantly, support.² These sources not only offer proper context to the reader, but they allow Krebs’ cultural study to stand out in the field and offer readers the opportunity to understand more deeply what was influencing the British public’s views of a conflict on the far end of

¹ Paula M. Krebs, *Gender, Race, and the Writing of Empire: Public Discourse and the Boer War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 2.

² Krebs, *Gender, Race, and the Writing of Empire*, 151.

another continent. Further distinguishing Krebs' work is the inclusion of gender roles and dynamics into her research, combining the more often discussed themes of race and empire with such things like Emily Hobhouse's report on British internment camps or Olive Schreiner's non-fiction essays on Boer-British racial dynamics, of which the former became crucial to the anti-war press's efforts in London.³ Krebs' book successfully intertwines gender, race, and literature with the fight over imperialism within Britain while expanding insight into the era through the usage of a modern historical lens.

While Krebs' choice of sources is certainly what sets her book apart, it is her narrow focus that may diminish the scholarly contribution she offers to the field. By focusing only on the Boer War, the importance of her cultural analysis remains confined to a consequential yet short period of British imperial history, both in the context of the globe and British South Africa. Notably, Krebs does not offer insight into how other British settler colonies, such as Canada or Australia, viewed the conflict and the strength of the British imperial message, as well as the gender and racial discourse within it. Such sources could allow for a slightly more expansive analysis of the success and failings of what the British Empire stood for around the turn of the century. Furthermore, while not indispensable, a final chapter concluding the book and situating the argument in a broader imperial context and within the longer history of South Africa could also widen the scope and audience of Krebs' book immensely. Even still, Krebs' pointed focus, immense detail, and logical analysis allows for readers to envision historical connections that are not themselves written.

I reviewed *Gender, Race, and the Writing of Empire* for my HIST495 Introduction to Historical Interpretation course—the first course in Emory University's Honors History track through which students formulate their thesis ideas and submit a final proposal for a senior honors thesis paper to the department. In terms of the book's pedagogical value, the work itself was highly conducive to our class discussion on how historians are expected to contribute to their own fields in a variety of ways, such as with book reviews, and how past research and historical arguments play into current historiography, including undergraduate thesis proposals. While each student chose their own book to review, our analysis and reflection of these reviews revealed the importance of specific skills to the historical discipline, such as comprehension and synthesis. Reviewing Krebs' work allowed me to hone these skills by attempting to offer a worthy summary of Krebs' work while still providing readers a light but naturally flowing historiographical argument on the book itself.

In terms of my personal scholarly growth, evaluating Krebs' work provided me with my first glimpse into the modern historiography of the Second Boer War and the shaky relationship that British imperialism had with racial thinking in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Beyond merely contributing to my historical knowledge on this subject, Krebs' work and research has since become highly influential to my own honors thesis that deals with British imperial understandings and depictions of the Zulu and the Boers in the British metropole. Whereas Krebs exposes British inconsistencies in gender and racial thinking during the Boer War, my thesis is aimed at building on her work on race and empire by analyzing and comparing how imperial Britain viewed black and white imperial enemies in two separate conflicts connected by time period and geography in South Africa.

Overall, Paula Krebs' cultural analysis stands out in that it goes beyond the military conflict of the Boer War and, instead, uses the clash to analyze the culture of the imperial society fighting the war. Her writing style is both coherent and creative,

³ Krebs, *Gender, Race, and the Writing of Empire*, 32, 111.

GENDER, RACE, AND THE WRITING OF EMPIRE

weaving sources and analysis together into an informative but also captivating read. This book is useful for scholars and readers who are interested in intersections of race and gender at the height of the late imperial and Victorian age, especially so if one also enjoys British, Boer, or South African history. In her work, Krebs blurs no distinctions, and her main message is distinct from beginning to end: the justification for British imperialism was neither uncontested nor clearly defined.

US IMPERIALISM AND THE PANAMA FLAG CRISIS OF 1964

James Murphy

The Panama Canal has been called one of the seven wonders of the modern world, and yet the history of the Canal often stops with the completion of construction and the passage of the first ships. What is missed is decades of diplomatic and foreign relations missteps and power plays that would lead to flag riots in Panama City in 1964. These riots would become the foundation of the United States' eventual handing over of the Canal in 1999. The Panama Canal was important to the self-image of the United States and many in positions of power within the halls of the United States government were adamant about retaining sovereignty over both the Panama Canal and the Canal Zone that bordered it. This essay analyzes many of the root causes of the Panama Flag Riots of 1964 and how the United States' complacency in the decades prior influenced and led to the event.

In January of 1964, the futures of both Panama and the United States changed when a group of high school students at Balboa High School inside the United States-controlled Canal Zone hoisted the American flag outside of their school. Word of the students' actions with the American flag at Balboa High School quickly spread to the Panamanian population outside of the Zone. Two days later, approximately 150 Panamanian students from Instituto Nacional, a high school in Panama City, assembled and marched to Balboa High School intent on raising the Panamanian flag alongside the American flag and declaring that Panama held sovereignty over the Canal Zone. During their attempt to raise the flag, surrounded by approximately five hundred Zonian residents, a scuffle broke out between the two groups and the Panamanian flag was damaged in the melee. Hoping to defuse the situation, Canal Zone police ordered the Panamanian students to leave the Zone and to return to Panamanian soil. On their way back, near Gorgas Hospital, the Panamanian students "start[ed] damaging property by throwing rocks at windows, cars and lamps."¹ News of the scuffle and damage to the Panamanian flag spread like wildfire through Panama City. Widespread riots broke out, overwhelming the local police force. With the Canal Zone's governor, Robert Fleming Jr., in the United States on unrelated business, Acting Governor Colonel David Parker activated the National Guard, fearing the Zone could be overrun by the rioters on its borders. The ensuing riots lasted for three days in total, resulting in the deaths of roughly twenty-two Panamanians and four US soldiers, along with the destruction of property suffered during the riots. The ramifications of these students' actions led the United States to slowly walk back nearly six decades of imperialism. Found scattered throughout the previous two decades are the origins of this event in January 1964, and the violence that rocked Panama for nearly three days. In hindsight, the chain of events combined with the

¹ *Panamanian Situation Report for the President of the United States, Jan 10, 1964* (Washington D.C.: 1964).

US IMPERIALISM AND THE PANAMA FLAG CRISIS

assumptions and actions made by US presidents and other highly placed men are the hands of a Doomsday Clock ticking down the minutes to midnight and disaster.

The events of January 1964 were not manifested in a short amount of time. Tensions had been mounting since the signing of the original Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty in 1903, but actions taken by the United States failed to grasp the context of the situation present in Panama during the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations. This original treaty stipulated the conditions in which the United States held a loose sovereignty over the Panama Canal and the land to either side of the waterway. The treaty was also signed by Panama which had only recently become independent because of the intervention of the United States Navy against Colombia. These oversights resulted in protests over Panamanian sovereignty being an eventuality rather than a distant possibility. Panama became a ticking time bomb. Anti-US sentiment ran high along with Panamanian nationalism that had been on the rise for decades. Previously, President Dwight D. Eisenhower had ordered that American and Panamanian flags could be allowed along the Canal. Shortly before his assassination, President John F. Kennedy expanded on this order, stipulating that both the American and Panamanian flags must be flown at all public sites, with exceptions to US military bases and airfields.² According to Milton Eisenhower's report to the United States government, it was believed that flying the Panamanian flag inside the Canal Zone would soothe the nationalists' wounded pride.³ President Kennedy's executive flag order was never to be fully implemented. Assassinated in Dallas, Texas on November 22, 1963, the implementation of President Kennedy's order fell to Robert Fleming Jr., the governor of the Canal Zone. Governor Fleming was not well liked within Panama or the Canal Zone itself.⁴ Instead of executing the order as President Kennedy had written it, Fleming modified the flag order and stipulated that no flag be flown within the Canal Zone. His action, coupled with the already tense situation present within Panama, was akin to storing gasoline next to an open flame. Residents inside the Canal Zone, or Zonians, felt abandoned by the United States not flying the American flag. Panamanians felt betrayed because the agreement to fly the Panamanian flag within the Canal Zone was five years in the making and the actions of Fleming were seen as renegeing on this.

The riot set in motion the turnover of ownership of the Panama Canal from the United States to Panama in 1977. Panamanian President Roberto Chiari, needing to bolster his political future, used the riots and the denial to fly the Panamanian flag as fuel to empower his reelection campaign by pushing for the United States to renegotiate the treaty that stipulated and governed the Panama Canal. In hopes to reign in the situation, US President Lyndon B. Johnson sent Ambassador Robert Anderson to Panama to negotiate a new agreement between the two countries. This new agreement failed to be ratified in Panama, eventually resulting in a military coup d'état. The issue deteriorated further when US President Richard Nixon's failure to act caused the Panamanian government to raise the issue of sovereignty over the Panama Canal to the United Nations Security Council. This move forced the canal to become a critical problem—something President Jimmy Carter promised to solve during his election campaign. President Carter and the United States then signed the Carter-Torrijos treaty with Panama in 1977. The United States agreed to slowly

² Paul B. Ryan, *The Panama Canal Controversy: US Diplomacy and Defense Interests* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1977), 52.

³ Milton Eisenhower, *The Wine is Bitter: The United States and Latin America* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1963), 216.

⁴ Eric Jackson, "The Martyrs of 1964," *Panama News*, Feb 6, 2006, 1.

withdraw from the Panama Canal over the next twenty years and ultimately handing over ownership of the Panama Canal to Panama at midnight on December 31, 1999.

Historians have conducted a large amount of research on the flag riots of 1964 and the resulting events, but have not closely examined the relationship present between Panama and the United States or why the flag riots in January 1964 are the end of a period of diplomacy between the United States and Panama, not the beginning of one.⁵ By using the firsthand accounts, governmental records, and declassified documents of the United States to explain the United States' behavior in the preceding two decades, a timeline of events emerges. These sources provide a window into the American presidential and State Department thought processes, and highlight the many ignored political, economic, and social indicators, as well as the inefficient actions taken by the United States to show how those actions would ultimately influence what was happening inside of Panama. The flag riots are a critical point in the history of the United States and the diplomacy conducted between the US and Latin American countries, such as Panama. The Panama Canal, one of the biggest engineering projects of the twentieth century, linked the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and helped the United States realize the dream of Manifest Destiny by allowing fast and safe transits between the east and west coasts of America. The Canal allowed the United States to rapidly shift fleets in times of war, and the tolls charged by the Panama Canal for passage provided a source of income. These factors point to the 1964 flag riots as the result of missteps taken by the United States in the realm of diplomacy and foreign relations starting all the way back to the founding of Panama, the construction of the Panama Canal, and the years after World War II which saw the world changing in sudden and drastic ways.

Much has been written about the country of Panama, about the building of the Panama Canal, and about the turbulent experiences it endured during the latter half of the twentieth century. These pieces provide valuable insight to the circumstances surrounding the events that took place in Panama City in 1964, but most of the scholarship sees this event contained within a set of boundary lines. The history of the Panama before is focused on the development of its democracy, economy, and political systems. Other scholarly works, such as *Panama's Canal* by Thalia Chantziara, choose to focus on the disruptive political environment that would eventually produce Manuel Noriega or the diplomatic work required to hand over the Panama Canal and the Canal Zone that surrounded it. Works like Milton Eisenhower's *The Wine is Bitter* and the evaluations performed by the US State Department and Central Intelligence Agency help to demonstrate the vital links of diplomacy and foreign relations in the mid-twentieth century between the United States and Panama preceding the riots that took place, versus contemporary scholarship using the riots as the stepping off point for Panama's modern experience.

The United States viewed the Canal as a central part of its national defense policy and, until President Carter, was loath to let it go under any circumstance.⁶ And yet, due to the US mishandling diplomacy and relations between itself and Panama, a singular event orchestrated by a group of high school students in 1964 reshaped the Western Hemisphere. This body of work will explore how the United States' failure to observe and act, coupled with diplomatic errors, were contributing factors in the decades leading up to January 9, 1964, and not separate from it.

⁵ Thalia Chantziara, "Panama's Canal," *Harvard International Review* 20, no. 3 (Summer 1998): 14. EBSCOhost.

⁶ Mary Swilling, "The Business of the Canal: The Economics and Politics of the Carter Administration's Panama Canal Zone Initiative, 1978," *Essays in Economic & Business History* 22, no. 1 (January 2004): 1. EBSCOhost.

A Seizure in Egypt Lights a Fuse in Panama

To explain how the situation in Panama developed and resulted in the flag riots of January 1964, the Suez Canal Crisis that occurred nearly a decade before must be examined. Egyptian President Gamal Nasser announced to the world in late July 1956 that Egypt had seized and nationalized the Suez Canal, as well as closed shipping through the canal to Israel—a move that surprised Great Britain, France, Israel, and the United States.⁷ The immediate British, French, and Israeli response to nationalization of the Suez was to be military in nature and, according to *The Telegraph* newspaper, something that the British public at the time was strongly in favor of.⁸ The Suez Canal, just like the Panama Canal in the Western Hemisphere, was vital to the economy and defense of Great Britain and France. Goods and warships passed through the Suez Canal to India and Asia, where both Great Britain and France still possessed overseas territories and commitments. Without control of the Suez Canal, travel times and shipping costs would skyrocket by having to travel south around Africa by transiting the Cape of Good Hope. The initial reaction by President Eisenhower was to condemn the actions taken by President Nasser; however, President Eisenhower was sympathetic to the Egyptians and their nationalization of the Suez and remarked to the British and the French that the United States “should not be indifferent to the rights of people who are invested in this. Egypt should operate the Canal efficiently and carry out its promise to those affected—show we are not indifferent but are not going to war over it.”⁹ President Eisenhower made further remarks to British Prime Minister Anthony Eden that the United States could not engage in military action without the sanction of the US Congress, and that the US public could not back any military intervention unless all peaceful measures had been explored and exhausted.¹⁰ Despite this, Great Britain and France, together with Israel, decided to move forward militarily anyway. At a meeting in Sevres, France, plans were drawn up in which Great Britain and France would issue diplomatic ultimatums that Egypt could not agree to, giving Great Britain, France, and Israel reason to publicly enter Egypt with military troops.¹¹ Fearing the Arab world might be more sympathetic to the USSR as a result, the response of the United States was swift in decrying the actions of the British, French, and Israeli governments.

The Suez Crisis was the seed from which Panamanian resistance to the United States-controlled Panama Canal and Canal Zone sprouted, and the reaction by the United States drove relations for the following decade. President Eisenhower, however, minimized the Panamanian position with his official statements and actions as the chief US diplomat. When asked about the US opinion of the Suez nationalization at a press conference on August 8, 1956, President Eisenhower responded:

⁷ Herlihy, Ed. “Suez Canal Seized By Egyptians,” *Universal-International News*, July 30, 1956. Video, 0:40.

⁸ DR Thorpe, “What we failed to learn from Suez,” *The Telegraph*, November 1, 2006..

⁹ Memorandum of Telephone Conversations Between the President and the Secretary of State, July 30, 1956, Foreign Relations Of The United States, 1955-1957, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, Volume XVI, Department of State Office of the Historian. Accessed March 10, 2021.

¹⁰ Letter From President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Eden, July 31, 1956, Foreign Relations of The United States, 1955-1957, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, Volume XVI, Department of State Office of the Historian.

¹¹ S. Ilan Troen, “The Protocol of Sèvres: British/ French/ Israeli Collusion Against Egypt, 1956” *Israel Studies* 1 (Fall 1996): 133.

THE CRIMSON HISTORICAL REVIEW

It is well to remember that we are dealing with a waterway here that is not only important to all the economies of the world, but by treaty was made an international waterway in 1888 and is exactly that. It is completely unlike the Panama Canal, for example, which was a national undertaking carried out under bilateral treaty.¹²

With this reply, President Eisenhower and the United States made one thing clear: the Panama Canal, signed by both the United States and Panama, belongs to the United States by treaty. To further complicate the issue, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles issued a memorandum just five days earlier on August 3, 1956, to diplomatic missions in Latin America advising them “[a]voidance [sic] initiation any discussion linking status Panama Canal with Suez Canal problem will further our foreign policy objectives ... Posts however should seek to de-emphasize any linking of the two canal situations.”¹³ On July 30, 1956, President Eisenhower, possibly foreseeing a problem with the United Nations and Panama due to the Suez Crisis and feeling that the United States could not participate in any procedure in the United Nations in which the United Nations could revoke part or all of the treaty that established the Panama Canal and the Canal Zone, began moving the governmental response farther from any idea of concessions to Panama.¹⁴ In another conversation between President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles on July 31, 1956, there was a discussion that the original 1903 treaty establishing the Panama Canal must be followed lest the United States lose control of the Panama Canal to Panama. In that same conversation President Eisenhower explicitly stated, “not a whisper about this outside this room.”¹⁵ This was a concerted effort amongst the top officials in the United States government to limit what actions Panama could take regarding the canal by referencing the original treaty in 1903 and reveals the US’ efforts to frame the situation in a positive light for themselves while allowing Panama to languish in the press.

The Panamanians did not react to the United States’ position positively. Foreign Minister Aquilino Boyd of Panama immediately said that the treaty for the Panama Canal merely granted “certain powers exclusively for the operation of the canal and nothing else.”¹⁶ This position was not new among the elected officials of Panama, or even within Panama itself. The idea for Panamanian sovereignty over the canal was already an established point taught in schools and publicly demonstrated. Numerous small-scale protests and diplomatic ventures that argued for a more favorable treaty agreement seemed to come to fruition in 1955. At this time, among other economic concessions, the annuity paid by the United States was increased to \$1.9 million USD, but key compromises acknowledging Panamanian sovereignty were left out. Resentment over this became apparent in May 1958, when the police turned back Panamanian students attempting to plant Panamanian flags inside the

¹² “The President’s News Conference August 8, 1956,” The American Presidency Project.

¹³ Circular Telegram from the Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions, August 3, 1956, Foreign Relations of The United States, 1955-1957, American Republics: Central And South America, Volume VII, Department of State Office of the Historian. Accessed March 10, 2021.

¹⁴ Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom, July 30, 1956, Foreign Relations of The United States, 1955-1957, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, Volume XVI, Department of State Office of the Historian. Accessed March 10, 2021.

¹⁵ Memorandum of a Conference with the President, White House, Washington, July 31, 1956, 9:45 a.m., Foreign Relations of The United States, 1955-1957, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, Volume XVI, Department of State Office of the Historian. Accessed March 9, 2021.

¹⁶ Ryan, *The Panama Canal Controversy*, 40.

US IMPERIALISM AND THE PANAMA FLAG CRISIS

Zone. Frustration turned to violence and nine people died.¹⁷ The Panamanians, having long held the belief that the canal was stolen from them, were willing to go to extreme measures to make their displeasure with the situation clearly known. The United States was further made aware of this position held by the Panamanians in May 1958, especially among the Panamanian student population that the US feared had been infiltrated by “ultra-nationalist and communist agitators.”¹⁸ The revision of the Canal treaty in 1955, coupled with the US’ wariness to give away any control in the Canal Zone clearly demonstrated an imperialistic view towards Panama. As a result of this view, the United States may have believed they were acting as a benevolent overseer choosing to ignore the discontent brewing just under the surface.¹⁹ While this was going on, a rising political party within Panama gained a sizable base: the Patriotic Front Party (PFP). Two leaders of the PFP, brothers Dr. Harmodio Arias and Arnulfo Arias, both eventually became Presidents of Panama: Dr. Arias from 1931 to 1936 and Arnulfo Arias in three separate terms spanning 1940-1941, 1949-1951, and for eleven days in 1968. The United States was keenly aware of the activity of the two Arias brothers. Dr. Harmodio Arias represented the old-guard politics within Panama and was seen as the “mastermind” of the PFP, while his brother Arnulfo was credited with violently thwarting a defense-site treaty in 1949.²⁰ The PFP was one of the most dominant political parties present within Panama and commanded a large portion of the population, so what was pushed by the party leadership was ultimately reflected within a large portion of the Panamanian public.

Politically, it is evident the United States was aware of the frustration the Panamanians held over the issue of sovereignty and the Panama Canal. They made these points clearly known in backroom discussions between President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles. President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles understood that even a whisper of concession during the Suez Crisis could mean massive compromises granted to Panama. Therefore, Eisenhower and Dulles stuck to the original 1903 treaty, believed by the Panamanians to be wholly unfair, and made the United States’ position on the sovereignty of the Canal Zone and the canal itself a binding and legal agreement between Panama and the United States—one that Panama could not back out of simply because outside world events hinted that they could. This pattern is something commonly seen throughout history: a statement of control, usually borne out of a position of power, an allusion to the idea that the benefactor provides protection, stability, and economic benefits, and therefore warns the overseas holding that leaving is an ill-advised plan of action.²¹ The imperial power does not, or chooses not, to take the wishes of the people in the area they are occupying into account since those desires generally run counter to the controlling country. In this case, the United States’ ceding any form of sovereignty of the canal to Panama runs counter to its intention to solely control the Panama Canal strategically and

¹⁷ Ralph Skinner, “Students Harass Government-Riots Nick Panama Gains,” *Christian Science Monitor*, May 29, 1958. ProQuest.

¹⁸ Memorandum From the Director of Central Intelligence (Dulles) to the Secretary of State, Foreign Relations Of The United States, 1958-1960, American Republics, Volume V, Department of State Office of the Historian. Accessed March 10, 2021.

¹⁹ Special Report Prepared by the Psychological Strategy Board, September 11, 1953, Foreign Relations Of The United States, 1952-1954, General: Economic And Political Matters, Document 223, Volume I, Part 2, Department of State Office of the Historian. Accessed March 9, 2021.

²⁰ *Probable Developments in the Republic of Panama Through mid-1952, January 21, 1952.* (Washington D.C.: 1952): 3-5.

²¹ J. A. Hobson, *Imperialism: A Study* (New York: Gordon Press, 1975): 358. EPUB.

economically out of a fear that those strategic and economic wishes would be threatened if Panama were to be a more equitable partner. The diplomatic actions taken by the United States regarding the Suez Canal and how that impacts Panama changed the time on our Doomsday Clock. It is now two minutes to midnight.

The Economic Boom after World War Two Bypasses Panama

Post-World War II, many countries enjoyed an economic boom like never seen before. The countries that were ravaged by the war were at or above their pre-war levels within three years, and production rose to above pre-war levels in countries not affected by the war directly (the United States and Canada).²² But as the United States' economy expanded and GDP rose, Panama's economy remained stagnant. The disparity between Panama and the United States rose to a level that could not be ignored by the citizens of Panama near the Canal Zone, a daily reminder of the affluence of the United States and the relative economic dearth suffered by Panama.²³

Panama, according to the United Nations World Economic Survey in 1959, suffered from repeated year-after-year economic hardships and downturns ending 1959 with a negative \$79 million trade balance, a \$3 million decrease from the previous year.²⁴ The poor economy present for so long within Panama hampered every facet of the country's infrastructure outside the confines of the US-held Canal Zone. According to the United States Special Study to Latin America, Panama suffered from an increasing cost-of-living coupled with high unemployment and poor education that was crippling Panama City and Colón, while the agricultural sector suffered from bad roads and poor farming strategies severely limiting economic productivity in rural areas.²⁵ The inability to produce enough raw materials and foodstuffs forced Panama to import large amounts of raw goods to support the economy, leading to the negative trade balance. That same report startlingly revealed that while "almost two-thirds of the population live in rural areas and the country has unused land suitable for cultivation Panama must import 12 percent of its food requirements."²⁶ This is in stark contrast to the economic surplus enjoyed within the United States that extended into the Canal Zone.

In March 1955, the CIA reported on a source of information about the current conditions in Panama. The report explains that former President Arnulfo Arias had whipped up the people with talk of better salaries and brighter economic futures because of the newly negotiated Eisenhower-Remón Treaty signed earlier that year. No such promises existed within the context of the revised treaty, and Arias' words merely served to stoke and encourage anger and dissent amongst the Panamanian people. What had been established shortly after the Panama Canal had been completed, however, was a payroll system that distinguished general labor positions from skilled positions, called silver and gold payrolls respectively.²⁷ The revised treaty of 1955 did promise to remove the silver and gold payroll system and provide for more equality of salary between Panamanians and Americans working within the Canal Zone, but this did little to improve the lives of Panamanians that could not get

²² "Post-War Reconstruction and Development in The Golden Age Of Capitalism," United Nations, Accessed March 8, 2021.

²³ Committee on Foreign Affairs, Special Study Mission to Latin America: Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, Panama, Costa Rica, H.R. Rep. 223, 33.

²⁴ "World Economic Survey 1959," (United Nations): 179. Accessed March 8, 2021.

²⁵ Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Special Study*, 33.

²⁶ Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Special Study*, 32.

²⁷ *CIA Report on History of Relations between US and Panama, 1955* (Washington D.C. 1955): 4-7.

US IMPERIALISM AND THE PANAMA FLAG CRISIS

work with the US companies operating in the Canal Zone, and never fully went into effect. In 1963, the last full year before the Flag Riots in January 1964, 3,766 individuals received pay at the gold rate, and 10,370 received pay at the silver rate.²⁸

The United States believed that Panama could succeed economically if it drastically reformed its economy and abandoned the idea that the Panama Canal would solve their economic problems.²⁹ The United States also believed that the Panamanian government was unwilling to undertake the large amount of effort and lacked the will to see the changes through to improve their current economic situation. Further, to improve economic conditions present throughout Latin America, President Kennedy established the Alliance for Progress in 1961. The Alliance for Progress provided a set of goals and achievements intended to raise the per-capita income of each country in the agreement, thereby strengthening their economies.³⁰ For Panama especially, this program was referenced by the United States government as the path Panama should follow to improve the economy and allow the annuity payments from the US-held Panama Canal to simply be a surplus to their budget. Better farming techniques, infrastructure, and utilization of raw materials by Panama would provide jobs and export income, and hopefully reduce its dependence on the Panama Canal, in turn reducing the diplomatic tension associated with the canal and the earnings it provided. The United States had an incredible interest in improving the economic situation in Panama because it reduced the shortfall that existed between the US-held Canal Zone and Panama, and therefore it would resolve tensions between Panamanians and the United States government. Instead of acting as foreigners who seized the strip of land that split the country in two, the US brought infrastructure, development, and investment into Panama as a partner in the western hemisphere.

In the Panama Canal Company Annual Report for 1958, the company president W.E. Potter proclaimed that the number of ships transiting the Canal and the tolls collected from the traffic passing through “broke all records.”³¹ Four years later, however, a Committee on Foreign Affairs report blithely stated:

These demands [for a 50-50 split of gross receipts] rest on an emotional rather than on a rational basis ... Gross revenue from the Panama Canal Company, a US-owned corporation (which includes tools, sales of commodities, and rentals) amounted to \$100 million in fiscal year 1962. Net revenue, however, was only \$7.3 million ... Those who view the issue through their emotional bias are probably not receptive to logic.³²

So, while supposedly doing record business with ships transiting the Panama Canal, the United States downplayed canal income to such a degree that the message essentially sent to Panama was thus: the Panama Canal is an expensive investment and endeavor for the United States that has yet to pay off, and, furthermore, Panama lacks the economic ability to properly support the operation of the Panama Canal. In 1962, the annuity paid to Panama was \$1.93 million USD, while the United States received \$7.35 million USD, nearly four times as much.³³ This figure also does not consider the strategic cost of moving US Navy vessels through the Panama Canal

²⁸ John Major, *Prize Possession* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 380.

²⁹ Committee on Foreign Affairs, Report on United States Relations with Panama, H.R. Rep. 2218, 14.

³⁰ John F. Kennedy, “Papers of John F. Kennedy. Presidential Papers. President's Office Files. Subjects. Alliance for Progress,” JFK Presidential Library, Accessed March 11, 2021.

³¹ Panama Canal Company, *Annual Report Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1958*, 2, Internet Archive.

³² Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Special Study*, 37.

³³ Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Special Study*, 37.

which, due to the location and ownership of the entire length of the Canal, is nearly priceless. Our Doomsday Clock marches forward again, it is one minute to midnight.

US Fear of Communism and Discrimination Poisons Panama

One important contribution to the deterioration between the United States and Panama leading up to 1964 is the social phenomenon all too common for this period: discrimination. These events were before the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and involved a group of people that were not American by birth. Discrimination was present within the Canal Zone between White and Black United States citizens, but there was also a noticeable feeling of resentment between the primarily White Panama Canal Company employees and the non-White Mestizo, Indigenous, and Black Panamanians outside of the Canal Zone. Many of the White Panama Canal supervisors and management believed that the Panamanians were “administratively incompetent” and that the ability to manage the Canal was “just beyond Panamanian ability at this time.”³⁴ The same CIA report that discussed the payroll system present within the Panama Canal Company, a corporation owned and operated by the United States government, discussed local racial tensions present between the American workforce and the local Panamanians. One US employee remarked about how he is “not anti-Panamanian or anti-Negro ... When White Americans walk by my house, the dogs do not bark. When Negroes or Panamanians walk by, the dogs rush out and bark at them day or night ... I believe that this illustrates the discrimination in the Canal Zone which is so actual that even the dogs are opposed to Negroes and Panamanians without being taught.”³⁵ The report further details how Panamanians that are seen walking around the neighborhoods populated by United States citizens; in places like Ancon, Balboa, and Cristobal, they are followed by the police until they leave the area. Additionally, White parents “hate to visualize Negro and brown and Indian Panamanians living with them, playing with their children, the young people intermarry-ing, etc.”³⁶ Commissaries provided goods imported from the United States and were only available for use by employees of the Panama Canal Company or military personnel assigned to the Canal Zone. K-12 schools were available to company employees, along with recreation facilities such as pools, movie theaters, and bowling alleys.³⁷ All of this stood in stark contrast to the unemployment and lower wages that Panamanians were experiencing just miles away and served as a daily reminder of what the United States had because of the Panama Canal versus the resources Panamanians lacked.

This separation between the haves and have-nots extended into Panamanian society as well. Panamanian society had largely been a plutocracy throughout Panama’s short history up to this point, with most of the political offices, candidates, and higher management of corporate and financial institutions coming from the wealthy, White elites of Panamanian society largely located in the two largest cities of Colón and Panama City. These plutocrats had a vested interest in preserving the social and political climate present within society to advance their individual goals and ambitions, many of which ran counter to the needs of the common Panamanian.³⁸

³⁴ *CIA Report, 1955, 5.*

³⁵ *CIA Report, 1955, 7.*

³⁶ *CIA Report, 1955, 6.*

³⁷ Panama Canal Company, *Living and Working in the Canal Zone, 7-19.*

³⁸ Hansom Baldwin, “Storm Over the Panama Canal,” *New York Times*, May 8, 1959 quoted in Paul Ryan, *The Panama Canal Controversy* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1977), 47.

US IMPERIALISM AND THE PANAMA FLAG CRISIS

A further social wrinkle that the United States government seemed to be fully aware of and yet did not fully consider was the social context that was born out of the political climate present within Panama. For many years prior to 1964, Panamanian politicians and elites had been espousing nationalist ideas, such as the goods sold inside the Canal Zone only hurt Panamanian producers and manufacturers to engender a dislike of the United States. According to Paul Ryan's history of Panama, this created a lifetime of political and social indoctrination to the idea that the original Hay-Bunau-Varilla 1903 treaty "cheated" Panama out of proper rights and sovereignty over the Panama Canal.³⁹ Panamanian politicians had whipped up such a fever of nationalism within Panama that they could no longer ignore the firestorm that they had created. Instead, each successive political candidate had to try and out-do the current political climate, further escalating the tension between Panamanians, the Canal Zone, and the United States by extension. This tactic had been so continuously used in the years preceding 1964 that the Central Intelligence Agency believed "any of the principal candidates might resort to a coup rather than accept defeat."⁴⁰ This warning proved to be nearly prophetic as the country endured a military coup d'état in 1968 that formed a military-led government enduring until 1989. This tension, which Panamanian politicians had so carefully cultivated over the years, created a diplomatic and social minefield that both the United States and Panama had to carefully navigate. The US stance was simple: the Panama Canal is ours. The Panamanian stance, however, had to weave anti-US nationalism into their message to please the masses, but not so much that the United States became uncomfortable with the social and political climate that developed. The CIA seemed to see Fidel Castro and communism wherever anti-US sentiment was present and kept a close watch on organizations such as Partido del Pueblo (PdP). The CIA believed the PdP was infiltrating various labor unions and educational groups throughout Panama and was one of the primary agitator groups that could cause violence and protests from time to time.⁴¹

The social inequality facing Panamanians from within Panama and in the United States Canal Zone provided fertile ground for resentment and poor public approval of the United States. Those in power in Panama actively cultivated this idea, and this fact was known to the United States intelligence services. The US diplomatic and executive services, however, relied on social stereotypes such as "hot-blooded Latinos" to explain away the almost cyclical periods of protests and violence that occurred within Panama. The US also depicted infiltration by Castroists and communists whenever it was convenient. This willful ignorance of the social situation in Panama let an angry populace grow angrier with every diplomatic action, economic concession, and Panama Canal Company decision. The hands of the Doomsday Clock move forward once again and strike midnight.

Panama as a Precedent

With the striking of midnight and the bells ringing with the events of January 1964 that shall echo through the decades to come, it must be asked if at any point the hands could reset or wound back. Hindsight provides a sort of melancholic truth to these events and their contributions to what happened at Balboa High School on January 9,

³⁹ Ryan, *Panama Canal Controversy*, 41.

⁴⁰ Special National Intelligence Estimate, March 11, 1964, Foreign Relations Of The United States, 1964-1968, South and Central America; Mexico, Volume XXXI, Department of State Office of the Historian. Accessed March 14, 2021.

⁴¹ *Central Intelligence Agency Office of Reports and Statistics, El Partido del Pueblo, Panama, Oct 30, 1950* (Washington D.C.: 1950).

THE CRIMSON HISTORICAL REVIEW

1964. By examining this event and the causes that led to it, it is more evident that the United States has not escaped the imperialist tendencies of its European counterparts. Furthermore, as a nation, understanding the course of events helps us to recognize when we are traveling down a similar path. The United States still traditionally overlooks issues on the ground in countries around the world due to the vast differences in culture, development, and economy and relies instead on political strongmen. As with Panama and the rise to power of Manuel Noriega, these foreign countries birth powerful political or military leaders that look to take advantage of instability and nationalism that arises from diplomatic errors and mistakes, often with tragic consequences. In hindsight, a clear line is drawn between the three different realms present within this event, but the biases and doctrine of the time created blind spots and defilades where alternatives existed, and time and the hands of the Doomsday Clock continued to tick away to midnight. Eventually, the United States signed the Carter-Torrijos Treaty in 1977 that gradually transferred the Panama Canal to Panama—an act that was anathema to US Presidents twenty years prior, and essentially reset the hands of the Doomsday Clock on relations between the United States and Panama.

US IMPERIALISM AND THE PANAMA FLAG CRISIS

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BEYOND ALL BARRIERS: The Politicization of the International Olympic Committee in the 1988 Seoul Olympic Crisis

Anna Kate Manchester

The Korean Peninsula found itself engrossed in an international sporting conflict given political significance by the overarching Cold War tensions at play in the 1980s after it was announced that Seoul would host the 1988 Olympic Games. South Korea pursued their bid in search of legitimacy on the global stage, and North Korea sought to prove the legitimacy of Kim Il Sung's authoritarian regime. However, the purportedly apolitical International Olympic Committee (IOC) wielded the idealistic nature of the Olympic Movement, the organization's relative stability, and the diplomatic experience of President Juan Antonio Samaranch to lead the charge in the co-hosting negotiations for the 1988 Seoul Games. This paper argues that, under Samaranch, the IOC not only solidified itself as a viable non-state actor amid the 1988 Olympic crisis but also temporarily diffused broader political tensions on the Korean Peninsula, bringing the Soviet and Western blocs together in one of the most successful Olympic events to date and legitimizing itself as an independent actor in the sphere of foreign affairs.

Introduction

The 11th Olympic Congress was coming to a close at the 1981 International Olympic Committee (IOC) session in Baden-Baden, West Germany. IOC representatives had just heard closing statements from the delegations representing Nagoya, Japan, and Seoul, South Korea, during the final round of presentations in the fight to host the 1988 Summer Olympics. Japan was a seasoned Olympic host, having organized two Olympic Games in the previous two decades; South Korea, on the other hand, was a newcomer to the Olympic Movement, boasting an up-and-coming economy but suffering from a great deal of political instability. Japan did not hesitate to take several rhetorical jabs at South Korea's unpredictability, and this dismal portrayal of Seoul made it even more shocking when, following a secret ballot vote by IOC members, the world learned that Seoul was selected over Nagoya with a final tally of fifty-two to twenty-seven.

North Korea's opinion was clear from the moment the IOC announced South Korea's win, as its IOC delegate was recalled from Baden-Baden back to the North Korean capital of Pyongyang almost immediately.¹ By awarding the games to South Korea alone, North Korea perceived the IOC to have slighted both Kim's authoritarian regime and the one-third of the Korean population that lived within its borders; in the eyes of the North, if the entirety of Korea was not hosting the Games, then the Games simply could not be held in Korea. The North Koreans' perception of the IOC

¹ Richard W. Pound, *Five Rings Over Korea: The Secret Negotiations Behind the 1988 Olympic Games in Seoul* (Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1994), 58.

disrespecting their legitimacy on the international stage set the tone for a sporting proxy war on the Korean Peninsula that would ultimately disrupt larger Cold War tensions, thereby necessitating the mediation of the IOC.

South Korea pursued a bid for the 1988 Seoul Olympics in search of legitimacy on the global stage, and North Korea sought to derail South Korea's success to prove the legitimacy of Kim Il Sung's authoritarian regime, first by aiming to have the Games moved from Seoul and then by demanding to co-host with the South as a symbol of Korean unity. However, with political tensions so deeply engrained into the agendas of both the North and South Korean delegations in the co-hosting negotiations leading up to the 1988 Summer Olympics, it was the IOC that was able to drive the dialogue on the Seoul Games while also igniting broader discussions about Korean reunification. The crucial role played by the IOC in the secret negotiations begs the question of how an independent non-state actor with little means to enforce its aims was able to successfully involve itself in a global sporting crisis-turned-proxy war and emerge more legitimized than any other party involved. The previously apolitical IOC was able to wield the idealistic nature of the Olympic Movement, the organization's relative stability, and the diplomatic experience of President Juan Antonio Samaranch to lead the co-hosting negotiations for the 1988 Seoul Games. Under Samaranch, the IOC not only gained public recognition as having successfully resolved the 1988 Olympic crisis but also diffused broader political tensions on the Korean Peninsula, bringing the Soviet and Western blocs together in one of the most successful Olympic events to date and legitimizing itself as an independent actor in the sphere of foreign affairs.

American Olympian Eric Heiden famously stated that "sports and politics don't mix" in reference to President Jimmy Carter's decision to boycott the 1980 Moscow Games.² As much as sporting organizations like the IOC might like to believe that they are several times removed from global politics, in an increasingly globalized world, this notion could not be farther from the truth. The rise of sports literature is challenging traditional conceptions of international relations as a state-centered discipline.³ Global sporting competitions are increasingly used as soft power mechanisms, which has heightened the study of sport diplomacy. There has been a similar growth in the body of scholarship focusing on the role of non-state actors in international affairs; however, with sports literature centering more on the impact of fans, digital media, and corporations, there is a current lack of knowledge regarding how international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) function as political actors in the global sporting arena.⁴ To accurately present the personal motivations of each party involved in the negotiations and to better understand the political situation surrounding the 1988 Seoul Games, this article relies on public statements of foreign leaders, personal correspondences between President Samaranch and members of the international community, meeting minutes from the negotiations, and media reports. With the credibility offered by the preponderance of both primary and secondary source analysis, this paper seeks to establish the 1988 Olympic crisis as a test case for how a non-political INGO such as the IOC was able to influence an issue as politically contentious as inter-Korean relations. Additionally, with little existing literature discussing the Seoul Games in general, this piece also aims to fill a current gap in

² Thomas Gift and Andrew Miner, "'Dropping the Ball': The Understudied Nexus of Sports and Politics," *World Affairs* 180, no. 1 (Spring 2017): 132, JSTOR.

³ Verity Postlethwaite and Jonathan Grix, "Beyond the Acronyms: Sport Diplomacy and the Classification of the International Olympic Committee," *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 27, no. 2 (2016): 296, Taylor & Francis Online.

⁴ Postlethwaite and Grix, "Beyond the Acronyms," 299.

sports literature by presenting the story of the 1988 Olympic negotiations as somewhat of an historical narrative focusing on the stories of the specific individuals involved. All this being said, by increasing its diplomatic legitimacy to sit on par with that of the involved state actors, the IOC's role in the secret negotiations points to the importance of non-state actors in the resolution of crises in an interdependent world order.

Historical Context

The KOREAN CONFLICT and its RESIDUAL EFFECTS

It is best to refer to the end of the Second World War to gain an understanding of the specific Cold War tensions underpinning the 1988 Olympic crisis. The United States and the Soviet Union agreed to divide Korea at the 38th parallel to restabilize the country in what the West thought would be a temporary arrangement; however, reunification was not so easily resolved.⁵ The mostly ideological conflict turned physical when the North, with the Soviet Union's support, invaded the South in June of 1950. The United Nations, relying mostly on the military strength of the United States, joined in the fight on the side of the South Koreans and, after over 4 million casualties were incurred on both sides of the 38th parallel, the fighting came to a close in July of 1953.⁶ Negotiations in the year following the armistice proved fruitless for those hoping to see a reunited Korea, and there has been both a cultural and physical divide between the North and South ever since.

The Korean people suffered not only massive loss of life but also ruinous economic devastation in the aftermath of the Korean War. North Korea reported the loss of over 600,000 residences, roughly 8,700 manufacturing plants, and almost one million acres of farmland.⁷ North Korean leader Kim Il Sung, known for his tendency to sugarcoat the sufferings of his people, simply stated that his "people's economy [had] been *totally* destroyed by the war."⁸ The South Korean economy fared no better, losing almost twice as many industrial facilities and suffering property damage valued at over \$2 billion; however, Western aid and a desire to internationalize allowed South Korea to slowly recuperate from their economic losses in a way that North Korea's isolationist tendencies prevented.⁹ The successful recovery of the South Korean economy by the 1980s and its emergence as a regional economic superpower made it possible for Seoul to compete to host the 1988 Summer Olympics and, in a similar vein, it was the continued suffering of the North Korean economy that made co-hosting so appealing.

The plight of North Koreans after the war motivated Kim Il Sung to pursue the ideological indoctrination of his citizens in an effort to maintain control over his state.¹⁰ The United States had become his foremost enemy due to their involvement in the Korean conflict, a reputation that was propagated by North Korea's insistence that the United States had actually caused the war; Kim repeatedly claimed in the decades after the Korean War that he was prepared to destroy the United States so as to protect his state, and engaging in negotiations disruptive to the 1988 Games was yet another metaphorical battlefield on which Kim could face off against South Korea and its ally, the United States. This continual perpetuation of lies about the culpability

⁵ "Korean War," Encyclopedia Britannica.

⁶ B.C. Koh, "The War's Impact on the Korean Peninsula," *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 2, no. 1 (Spring 1993): 57, JSTOR.

⁷ Koh, "The War's Impact," 59.

⁸ Koh, "The War's Impact," 58.

⁹ Koh, "The War's Impact," 59.

¹⁰ Koh, "The War's Impact," 64.

of the United States in the Korean War and Kim's repeated denial of responsibility for the atrocities that ensued was one of many factors that contributed to the weakening of North Korea's trustworthiness in the eyes of the South which, in turn, affected the attitudes with which the two parties entered negotiations. The possibility of Korean reunification was bleak well in the 1980s as a result of this mutual distrust and, with the judgement of both Korean delegations clouded by disdain, the Olympic negotiations would necessitate an impartial mediator who could resolve the sporting crisis against the backdrop of decades-long tensions.

The CONVERGENCE of COLD WAR TENSIONS

Both state and non-state actors derive their legitimacy from other political actors. States like the two Koreas are able to exhibit their power via economic success or military strength; however, non-state actors like the IOC rely on the recognition of their status by other actors in order to be perceived as influential and salient.¹¹ With the 1988 Olympic crisis serving as a microcosm of the broader Western and Soviet tensions at play during the latter half of the 20th century, relations to the Cold War's superpowers both guided and restricted the actions of the state and non-state actors involved in the co-hosting negotiations.

South Korea feared that the larger ideological conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States regarding the two Koreas posed the most imminent threat to the 1988 Seoul Olympics. According to President Chun Doo-Hwan, "Without the support of [the USSR or the USA], North Korea can do absolutely nothing and if it were to do something, that would be an act of self-destruction ... If North Korea attacks, it will be destroyed."¹² The South had the support of the United States who desired a peaceful Seoul Games. American Senator Ted Stevens, in a 1988 letter to Samaranch, implored the IOC not to use Seoul as a way to propagate the its own foreign policy but to instead use the Games as an opportunity to facilitate cultural exchange between the North and the South.¹³ Stevens had been in consistent communication with Samaranch because his constituency in Anchorage was in search of a Winter Olympic bid, but this explicit begging on Stevens' behalf displayed not only American support for South Korea but also increasing global recognition of the IOC's political motivations. James Lilley, American ambassador to South Korea during the Games, suggested that Seoul was "much more stable than LA was in '84," putting the full faith of the United States behind the Seoul Games and legitimizing the IOC's efforts to create political stability both within South Korea and on the Korean Peninsula as a whole.¹⁴

On the other side of the Cold War conflict, the Soviet Union had the most established relations with the North Koreans during the 1988 Olympic crisis due to

¹¹ Steven Ward, *Status and the Challenge of Rising Powers* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017): 35.

¹² Sergey Radchenko, "It's Not Enough to Win: The Seoul Olympics and the Roots of North Korea's Isolation," *The International Journal of the History of Sport* 29, no. 9 (June 2012): 1251, Taylor & Francis Online.

¹³ Ted Stevens, "Letter from US Senator to the President of the International Olympic Committee on Reagan and Gorbachev's Support of De-politicizing 1988 Seoul Olympics," July 5, 1988, *History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, International Olympic Committee Archives* (Switzerland). Obtained for NKIDP by Sergey Radchenko, Wilson Center Digital Archive.

¹⁴ Mark McDonald, "Seoul's Show Ready for World Stage," *The Dallas Morning News*, September 11, 1988: 2K. NewsBank.

BEYOND ALL BARRIERS

their ideological similarities and military alliances. However, these shared understandings were not strong enough for the Soviet Union to be willing to engage in another proxy war on North Korea's behalf. The Soviets had long provided the North with its nuclear missiles and, with violent outbreaks in and around the Korean peninsula expected to occur prior to the Games to destabilize the region and deter states from attending, the Soviet Union publicly assured the world that they would do everything in their power to ensure a successful Olympic event.¹⁵ Gorbachev supported the North in a public address accusing the South Koreans and the United States of attempting to "slow down the process of unification," but he privately "appreciated the patience of the IOC" in dealing with the absurdity of North Korea's demands.¹⁶ The Soviets and the Americans realized that using the 1988 Seoul Olympics as yet another proxy war would serve more harm than good, which allowed the IOC to prompt the Olympic negotiations and mediate Korean relations.

The OLYMPIC GAMES as POLITICAL STAGE

The original Olympic Games enjoyed over twelve centuries of prestige in the ancient era. In 1894, Pierre de Coubertin established the International Olympic Committee in preparation for the revival of the Olympic Games, with the first Olympic event of the modern era slated to occur in Athens, Greece, the birthplace of the Olympic Movement, in 1896.¹⁷ The return of the Olympic Games was intended to serve as a break from the political conflicts of the era, and the IOC was touted as possessing a sense of "political neutrality" that would allow it to indiscriminately promote the concept of Olympism around the world.¹⁸ The Olympic Charter, established by Coubertin following the IOC's inception, champions Olympism as:

... a philosophy of life, exalting and combining in a balanced whole the qualities of body, will, and mind. Blending sport with culture and education, Olympism seeks to create a way of life based on the joy of effort, the educational value of good example, social responsibility and respect for universal fundamental ethical principles.¹⁹

The Olympic Movement hoped that countries would be able to overcome political strife for the sake of their athletes and for the benefits of cultural exchange amongst global citizens. With the development of the IOC as the ultimate nonpartisan international sporting organization, Coubertin believed that the modern Olympic Games could transcend the decline in quality and the political entanglement that befell its ancient predecessor.²⁰

¹⁵ Pound, *Five Rings Over Korea*, 297.; "Soviets, Chinese Vow to Help Keep Olympics Terror Free," *The Dallas Morning News*, July 17, 1988: 28A. NewsBank.

¹⁶ Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, "Statement by M.S. Gorbachev: 'The Amelioration of the International Situation, Strengthening of Peace'," November 11, 1986, *History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Archive of the Gorbachev Foundation*, Fond 5, opis 1, Dokument 20669. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Sergey Radchenko, Wilson Center Digital Archive.; Willi Daume, "Information Note on a Visit by Soviet Olympic Committee President Gramow to Munich," January 15, 1988, *History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, International Olympic Committee Archives* (Switzerland). Obtained for NKIDP by Sergey Radchenko, Wilson Center Digital Archive.

¹⁷ Jean-Loup Chappelet and Brenda Kübler-Mabbott, *The International Olympic Committee and the Olympic System* (New York: Routledge, 2008), 78; "Pierre de Coubertin: Visionary and Founder of the Modern Olympics" International Olympic Committee.

¹⁸ International Olympic Committee, *Olympic Charter*, (Lausanne: Comité International Olympique, 1908): 11.

¹⁹ IOC, *Olympic Charter*, 11.

²⁰ History.com Editors, "The Olympic Games," HISTORY, updated February 7, 2022.

The Olympics were quickly employed by foreign states as platforms upon which they could promote their own policy aims. Adolf Hitler infamously used the 1936 Berlin Games to propagate his new Reich.²¹ The IOC was the first international organization to cut all ties with South Africa due to their apartheid and, two years later, the 1972 Munich Games served as the execution site of eleven Israelis in the Black September terrorist massacre.²² The type of Cold War politicization that the Seoul Olympics suffered from emerged in 1980 with the US-led boycott of the Moscow Games. In response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, American president Jimmy Carter announced that the United States would be boycotting the 1980 Summer Olympics, and he convinced sixty-four other nations to join in protest.²³ The Soviet Union attempted to return the favor at the 1984 Los Angeles Games, but “the world [was] tiring of Olympic boycotts,” and it was only able to convince thirteen of its satellites to follow suit.²⁴

As the world became more interconnected on all fronts, it was inevitable that governments would shift their perception of global sporting events as opportunities to promote “international goodwill” toward, instead, using competitions like the Olympics as soft power mechanisms to garner prestige.²⁵ While the ideological appeal of Olympism persisted, the heightened politicization of the Olympic Games and, more specifically, Olympic boycotts aimed at the “pursuit of broader diplomatic goals” required the IOC to assume a more active role on the global political stage in the negotiations to resolve the 1988 Olympic crisis.²⁶

The Negotiations

North Korea initially directed its efforts at promoting South Korea’s instability to derail the 1988 Games while protecting its own legitimacy as a sovereign state, but the North’s transition toward desiring to co-host alongside Seoul necessitated the IOC’s mediation in talks between the two Koreas. The idea of North Korea co-hosting allegedly originated with Italian Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti in June of 1984.²⁷ However, it was brought to international attention following a 1985 interview of Cuban president Fidel Castro in which Castro wished to “avoid the catastrophe which the choice of Seoul alone implies.”²⁸ Castro possessed a great deal of influence both within socialist circles and among non-aligned countries. With Kim’s fragile international standing, the backing of the Cuban government to the North’s desire to jointly host gave credence to North Korea’s new slant on the 1988 Seoul Olympics. Summarized in a report from IOC Vice President Ashwini Kumar following his 1985 trip to Pyongyang, “North Korea now felt that if they boycotted [or disrupted] the Games they would perhaps earn the odium of the whole world and the best way to

²¹ Pound, *Five Rings Over Korea*, 19.

²² Pound, *Five Rings Over Korea*, 25-27.

²³ Pound, *Five Rings Over Korea*, 33.

²⁴ Pound, *Five Rings Over Korea*, 33, 37.

²⁵ Lincoln Allison and Terry Monnington, “Sport, prestige, and international relations,” in *The Global Politics of Sport: The Role of Global Institutions in Sport*, ed. Lincoln Allison (New York: Routledge, 2005), 11.

²⁶ Lincoln Allison, “Sport and globalization: The issues,” in *The Global Politics of Sport: The Role of Global Institutions in Sport*, ed. Lincoln Allison (New York: Routledge, 2005), 11.

²⁷ Radchenko, “It’s Not Enough to Win,” 1245.

²⁸ Fidel Castro, “Interview with Fidel Castro,” interview by Mervyn Dymally, July 25, 1985; *History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, International Olympic Committee Archives* (Switzerland). Obtained for NKIDP by Sergey Radchenko, Wilson Center Digital Archive.

BEYOND ALL BARRIERS

prove the other side wrong was to ask for a unified team.”²⁹

In response to North Korea’s demands, the IOC determined that a meeting between the National Olympic Committees (NOCs) of the two Koreas under its supervision was the best course of action. The IOC was not at all interested in allowing North Korea to co-host the 1988 Games but, by entangling the North in a series of formal negotiations, President Samaranch hoped to avoid any preemptive boycotts that North Korea might organize and buy himself the time to increase acceptance of Seoul as a host city.³⁰ The United States and the Soviet Union both experienced firsthand the devastation of hosting an Olympic event overshadowed by a political boycott, prompting their NOCs to sign an agreement in 1985 that would prevent future boycotts orchestrated on the basis of Cold War hegemonic tensions.³¹ With Castro publicly expressing his support of a Korean co-hosting situation, however, a boycott of non-aligned states presented a noticeable threat that the IOC hoped to quell by entertaining negotiations with North Korea. The awarding of the 1988 Summer Olympics to Seoul was “final and irrevocable,” but Samaranch recognized that appearing to engage with North Korean demands would promote the image of an apolitical IOC and distance the organization from possible insult by Kim’s regime.³² By keeping the North in talks with the South, Samaranch hoped that Kim would have no reason to disrupt an Olympic event that Pyongyang might come to co-host.

The South Korean NOC knew they were not going to be expected to cede Olympic events to the North; they were simply looking to prevent retaliation against the 1988 Games by regional superpowers who might back North Korea, namely the Soviet Union and China.³³ Having witnessed the impact of the 1980 and 1984 boycotts, Seoul accepted the negotiations with North Korea as an opportunity to prevent their Olympics from suffering a similar fate. Most perceived the North’s demands to be authentic, but IOC Vice President Richard Pound theorized that North Korea was hoping to create an unresolvable situation that would allow them to place culpability for the failed negotiations on the IOC and the South.³⁴ Aside from being able to blame the other parties, North Korea also benefitted from the IOC’s exhaustion of boycotts.³⁵ While the IOC and South Korea possessed a shared understanding that North Korea would not serve as a 1988 co-host, the threats posed to the Seoul Games by North Korea’s network necessitated negotiations between the two Koreas in an environment that would allow Samaranch to slyly influence the evolution of North-South tensions to minimize their impact on the success of the Seoul Olympics.

The IOC hosted the NOCs at its headquarters in Lausanne, Switzerland, on three occasions between October 1985 and June 1986 in attempts to promote the stability and success of the 1988 Seoul Games. The North Korean NOC initially demanded to host half of Seoul’s twenty-three Olympic sports in Pyongyang. The IOC and South Korea presented several counteroffers, each consisting of a few small-scale

²⁹ Ashwini Kumar, “Report by International Olympic Committee Vice President on his Trip to North Korea,” July 16, 1985, *History and Public Policy Digital Archive, International Olympic Committee Archives* (Switzerland).

Obtained for NKIDP by Sergey Radchenko, Wilson Center Digital Archive.

³⁰ Pound, *Five Rings Over Korea*, 84.

³¹ “North Korea warns of boycott in 1988,” *Daily Breeze* (Torrance, CA), October 9, 1985: D3. NewsBank.

³² “North Korean Warns of Boycott in 1988.”

³³ Radchenko, “It’s Not Enough to Win,” 1244.

³⁴ Pound, *Five Rings Over Korea*, 78.

³⁵ Pound, *Five Rings Over Korea*, 78.

disciplines like table tennis and wrestling in conjunction with individual events, such as hosting one of four preliminary soccer rounds.³⁶ Over the course of the first three meetings, the North proved unwilling to accept less than eight full sporting events to be hosted on North Korean territory, especially after Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev publicly stated that, as a matter of “arithmetic,” the North should co-host one-third of the 1988 Olympics in proportion to their hosting one-third of the Korean population.³⁷ No matter how many Olympic events the South offered to the North, the North Korean NOC remained unwilling to compromise unless their specific demands were met, suggesting that it was Kim Il Sung’s intention to create a deadlock in order to blame the IOC for favoring the South during the negotiations and, in turn, advocating for the South’s primacy on the Korean peninsula.

Prior to the first meeting, IOC Vice President Ashwini Kumar traveled to Pyongyang to meet with North Korean sports officials to investigate the current state of inter-Korean tensions and their potential effects on the Seoul Games. Kumar, in his letter back to Lausanne, advised Samaranch not to rush the negotiations due to their entanglement with larger political issues. In the words of Kumar, “Talks are going on other subjects where there are differences between the two countries and if they come to a decision on those subjects, I have no doubt that they will come to a fruitful decision on the sports front also.”³⁸ North Korean officials did not speak on the logistics of co-hosting, but they promised Kumar that, if granted the opportunity to co-host, they would provide “much better facilities than the archaic ones” provided by Los Angeles.³⁹ The IOC returned a year later to check on Pyongyang’s preparations. The infrastructural development occurring in the North impressed the IOC; Pyongyang was in the process of constructing four stadiums, nine gyms and a health complex, as well as media facilities and three hotels.⁴⁰ The costly investments made by the North Koreans created the appearance of their commitment to co-hosting, but this physical preparation was incongruent with the development of the North’s argument as the IOC negotiations progressed.

The negotiations had resulted in few conclusions by the time the third Lausanne meeting had occurred, and it was at this point that both the IOC and the South Koreans were beginning to realize the absurdity and inflexibility of the North’s demands. The meetings focused on logistical issues that would have to be resolved in order for Pyongyang to co-host, such as the opening of the border along the 38th parallel to the Olympic family and foreign media; however, the North Korean delegation preferred to talk about more trivial issues, such as whether cycling races would start or end in Pyongyang.⁴¹ It became evident that the North’s “position was moving from the unrealistic to the surreal” when they convened a fourth and final meeting just over two months before invitations were to be sent out and revisited their initial demands for half of the twenty-three sporting events.⁴² While the years-long inter-Korean negotiations under the supervision of the IOC failed to come to an agreement, Samaranch recognized the necessity of maintaining control over the political tensions at play in the 1988 Olympic crisis, both for the success of the Seoul

³⁶ Pound, *Five Rings Over Korea*, 78.

³⁷ Gorbachev, “Statement by M.S. Gorbachev.”

³⁸ Kumar, “Report.”

³⁹ Kumar, “Report.”

⁴⁰ James Miles, “North Koreans prepare to co-host 1988 Olympics Games,” *Houston Chronicle*, December 21, 1986: 24. NewsBank.

⁴¹ Pound, *Five Rings Over Korea*, 181, 216.

⁴² Pound, *Five Rings Over Korea*, 301.

Olympics and for the protection of his personal and institutional legitimacy.

The Necessity of Legitimacy

SOUTH KOREA

South Korea sought to use the 1988 Summer Olympics as a form of “public diplomacy,” a soft power mechanism wherein the government of one state aims to manipulate public opinion amongst citizens of a second state in order to coerce the second state’s government to bend to its will.⁴³ The southern half of the Korean Peninsula had begun to emerge as a regional economic power by the 1980s, and it was hoped that the Seoul Games would legitimize South Korea as a viable political actor, as well. This search for legitimacy prompted South Korean presidents Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan to pursue an Olympic bid, but it also encouraged South Korea to agree to IOC-led negotiations with North Korea when doubts of Seoul’s stability emerged. With the backing of the IOC and the United States, the South hoped to conquer the North in the Olympic negotiations to resolve broader Korean tensions on their own terms.⁴⁴

North Korea was not the only global actor to express doubts about the selection of Seoul as the 1988 host city. South Korea lacked a favorable international reputation when it bid for the 1988 Summer Olympics due to its entanglement in the Korean conflict. The IOC’s decision to award the Games to Seoul was even more politically contentious when one considers the fact that South Korea lacked membership in the United Nations following the Korean War and South Korean-Soviet negotiations were practically non-existent.⁴⁵ With the world eager to avoid another Olympic boycott, the choice of a host country so far removed from the Soviet bloc was perceived as a volatile oversight even by Samaranch, who questioned: “How ... any member of the IOC could vote for a country that had no diplomatic relations with most countries, that is not represented at the UN?”⁴⁶ South Korea had its own doubts in pursuing the 1988 Summer Olympic bid, so much so that Seoul seriously considered withdrawing its candidacy in 1981 for fear of losing.⁴⁷ South Korea had previously embarrassed itself after having to forfeit its hosting of the 1976 Asian Games due to Seoul’s lacking infrastructure.⁴⁸ The country was unexpectedly able to defeat Nagoya for the Olympic bid, though Seoul’s win may be accredited to the fact that Japan had hosted the Olympics twice in the previous two decades: the 1964 Tokyo Summer Games and the 1972 Sapporo Winter Games.⁴⁹ Almost immediately after Seoul’s win, several cities, including Los Angeles, New York, Berlin, and Mexico City, volunteered to host the 1988 Games should Seoul prove unable to do so, shedding light on the widespread expectations of South Korean failure in successfully staging the Olympics; however, the Olympic Charter allows for the relocation of an Olympic event only in the case of war, and, when asked if the 1988 Games were going to be held in another city, Samaranch stated that “either we go to Seoul or there will

⁴³ Jarol B. Manheim, “Rites of Passage: The 1988 Seoul Olympics as Public Diplomacy,” *The Western Political Quarterly* 43, no. 2 (June 1990): 279, JSTOR.

⁴⁴ Radchenko, “It’s Not Enough to Win,” 1244.

⁴⁵ Radchenko, “It’s Not Enough to Win,” 1245.

⁴⁶ Radchenko, “It’s Not Enough to Win,” 1245.

⁴⁷ David R. Black and Shona Bezanson, “The Olympic Games, Human Rights and Democratisation: Lessons from Seoul and Implications for Beijing,” *Third World Quarterly* 25, no. 7 (2004): 1251, JSTOR.

⁴⁸ Black, “Olympic Games,” 1252.

⁴⁹ Black, “Olympic Games,” 1251.

be no Games.”⁵⁰

Cities tend to be interested in serving as an Olympic host for one of two reasons: they need an outlet through which to promote their country, or they desire the economic benefits associated with the convergence of hundreds of thousands of individuals upon their city; in the case of Seoul, the associated boosts in international prestige and economic profit were equally motivating. As has been previously mentioned, Park Chung-hee originated the idea to host the 1988 Olympics in Seoul to legitimize his authoritarian regime and, after stealing power in a military coup, successor Chun Doo-Hwan pursued the Games for similar reasons. Chun saw the Seoul Games as an opportunity to bring international awareness to the North Korean threat which would, he hoped, serve as somewhat of an insurance against North Korean attacks.⁵¹ Seoul desired to emulate Japan’s use of the 1964 Tokyo Games to reintroduce itself as an advantageous diplomatic partner and, though it was not candid in this regard, it became increasingly clear that Seoul recognized the economic benefits of the Olympics, as well.⁵²

South Korea could not ignore the boost that would come to Seoul as thousands of athletes, Olympic officials, foreign figures, and spectators traveled to and profitably engaged with its hotels, restaurants, and shops. Seoul was the world’s fifth-largest metropolitan area at the time of their winning bid, and the infrastructural developments being made to transportation systems to accommodate the convergence of the Olympic family would only add to the city’s modernization.⁵³ A member of the Seoul Olympic Organizing Committee (SLOOC) commented that “the purpose is not to make money, but we do think we have a big prospect, financially speaking.”⁵⁴ This unspoken search for profit even motivated the SLOOC to attempt to circumvent the IOC in joint negotiations for American television rights, which were and continue to be one of the largest sources of Olympic income for host states.⁵⁵ South Korea hoped that, by drawing the attention of international media, it would be able to reintroduce itself to the world and further develop into the political and economic superpower it longed to be.

The anticipation of this attention functioned as a catalyst for South Korea’s rapid democratization. “All South Koreans [supported] the Olympics” and, although South Korean civil society had agreed to put long-term labor disputes on the backburner in support of the Olympic Games, a small number of radical student protests projected the image of an unstable South Korea to the world.⁵⁶ Domestic activists had long been calling for constitutional reforms to alleviate themselves of authoritarian regimes but, a year before the 1988 presidential elections, Chun Doo-hwan “suspended debate” on the issue of constitutional reform so that the country could focus on South Korea’s “twin hurdles: the change of government and the Seoul

⁵⁰ Associated Press, “IOC Would Cancel Rather than Move Olympics,” *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, July 8, 1987: G10. NewsBank.

⁵¹ Manheim, “Rites of Passage,” 282.

⁵² Spencer Sherman, “1988 Summer Olympics – Countdown in Seoul: One year to solve problems,” *Houston Chronicle*, September 20, 1987: 10. NewsBank.

⁵³ Fred Brown, “To Seoul, Olympics More than Fun, Games – ‘88 Games are Catalyst in South Korea’s Boom,” *The Seattle Times*, June 30, 1985: C6. NewsBank.

⁵⁴ Brown, “To Seoul.”

⁵⁵ Robert K. Barney, Stephen R. Wenn, and Scott G. Martyn, *Selling the Five Rings: The International Olympic Committee and the Rise of Olympic Commercialism*, (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 2004), 216.

⁵⁶ Sherman, “1988 Summer Olympics.”; McDonald, “Seoul’s Show.”

Olympics.”⁵⁷ As riots turned more violent, Chun’s Democratic Justice Party needed to quell outcries that would further delegitimize South Korea as both a modernizing state and a suitable Olympic host city. Roh Tae-Woo, the presidential nominee from the Democratic Justice Party, released his Eight Point Proposal in June of 1987, promising democratic ideals like tolerance to political opposition, freedom of the press, and devolution from national to local seats of government; Roh would ultimately go on to win South Korea’s first presidential election with a thirty-seven percent plurality.⁵⁸ With the world’s televisions tuned in to Seoul in anticipation of the 1988 Summer Olympics, South Korea used the attention as an opportunity to increase its standing on the global stage and strengthen its agency against its neighbor to the North.

NORTH KOREA

Kim Il Sung’s authoritarian regime found itself constantly at war with the international community as a result of its flagrant human rights record. After having propagated the “American imperialist aggressors” as the primary threat to North Korean government and, therein, the safety of North Korean citizens, Kim decided to ignite the debate over whether the North should be able to co-host with the South in order to appear as though he was engaging with the United States on yet another front.⁵⁹ North Korea had pursued a path of relative isolationism following the Korean War, aside from maintaining bilateral relations with the Soviet Union, China, and other socialist states who found it easy to ignore Kim’s humanitarian violations. As South Korea began to emerge as a regional power, the North realized that it, too, needed to search for outlets through which it could strengthen its lacking international connections. Due to its inherent connection to the United States and the Western bloc, the United Nations had been an enemy of the North Korean regime since the Korean conflict; however, “since the 1960s and the independence of former European colonies, taking part in the Games has been seen as a sign of sovereignty as strong or perhaps even stronger than being admitted to the United Nations.”⁶⁰ With North Korea lacking UN membership, its participation in the 1988 Games was crucial to its international standing, and co-hosting would only serve to increase its global credibility.

While the international media attention associated with hosting the Olympics spurred impressive democratization in South Korea, it proved to be the main obstacle in North Korea’s demands to co-host. Foreign journalists were rarely allowed into North Korean territory, which was Kim’s way of ensuring that his regime’s human rights abuses went unrevealed; however, the IOC questioned the North Korean NOC throughout the negotiation process as to how the North would make the transition from maintaining strictly closed borders to welcoming thousands of members of the Olympic family and, more specifically, foreign media representatives who could broadcast camera footage of starving North Korean citizens halfway across the world in a matter of seconds. The North claimed that they would facilitate “free travel by road, rail, air and ship” during the Games but, when the IOC delegation traveled to Pyongyang to check on the North Korean capital city’s infrastructural progress in 1987, Kim declined their request to open the de-militarized zone to IOC executives

⁵⁷ Han Sung-Joo, “South Korea in 1987: The Politics of Democratization,” *Asian Survey* 28, no. 1 (Jan. 1998): 53, JSTOR.

⁵⁸ Su-Hoon Lee, “Transitional Politics of Korea, 1987-1992: Activation of Civil Society,” *Pacific Affairs* 66, no. 3 (Autumn 1993): 356-357, JSTOR.

⁵⁹ Koh, “The War’s Impact,” 64.

⁶⁰ Chappelet and Kübler-Mabbott, *International Olympic Committee*, 10.

who wanted to know how such transborder travel would work.⁶¹ The disconnect between wanting to increase its global stature and looking to hide the atrocities suffered by North Korean citizens not only impeded any progress that might have come out of the negotiations but also proved the North's ulterior motivations to the world.

North Korea hoped to pose a physical threat to the Seoul Olympics, but while the North's military had a slight edge over that of the South in regard to its heavily populated soldiery, its superiority was declining.⁶² North Korea's compulsory military service made its armed servicemen more numerous than the South Korean military but, with the South's technological sophistication and backing by American armed forces, South Korea perceived acts of aggression from the North to be increasingly less serious. Furthermore, economic constraints were causing Kim to implement budget cuts in military spending which, at its highest point, accounted for twenty-five percent of the gross national product.⁶³ These same economic restrictions made co-hosting the Games practically infeasible for Pyongyang. Serving as an Olympic host city requires investment not only upfront in the construction of stadiums and lodging but also after to maintain the infrastructure.⁶⁴ North Korea's isolationist tendencies had closed it off to a world of trading opportunities and, with debt being inevitable for host cities lacking the necessary infrastructure, co-hosting would have further destabilized Kim's regime. Similar to South Korea, the North desired to host the Olympics so that they might reap the economic benefits but, because of its self-inflicted alienation and declining security and financial capabilities, North Korea was unsuccessful in negotiating a co-hosting arrangement, further delegitimizing the North Korean state in view of an already wary international community.

The North Koreans' inadvertent isolation in the months leading up to the Seoul Olympics cemented the Games' success. North Korean agents bombed Korean Air Flight 858 on November 29, 1987, ultimately killing the 115 people on board and eliciting global outrage.⁶⁵ This blatant expression of violence and volatility quickly turned the international community against Kim's regime; as the North's demands became more absurd, North Korea lost any support it may have had from socialist or non-aligned states who feared that associating with the North would, in turn, destroy their own credibility. With the North Koreans essentially destabilizing their own reputation, the IOC and South Korea escaped the co-hosting negotiations unscathed, allowing them to focus their efforts on the Seoul Olympics.

The INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE

Due to its degrees of separation from inter-Korean tensions and its organizational stability, the IOC under Samaranch was best positioned to increase its political legitimacy by participating in the 1988 Olympic negotiations. The IOC, by

⁶¹ "North Korea warns of boycott in 1988."; Pound, *Five Rings Over Korea*, 216.

⁶² Dr. Klaus Georg Wieck, "Information Note from Dr. Klaus Georg Wieck to International Olympic Committee President on the Issue of Security and Terrorist Threats to the 1988 Seoul Olympics," July 6, 1988, *History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, International Olympic Committee Archives* (Switzerland). Obtained for NKIDP by Sergey Radchenko, Wilson Center Digital Archive.

⁶³ Brown, "To Seoul."

⁶⁴ Volker Nitsch and Nicolai Wendland, "The IOC's Midas Touch: Summer Olympics and City Growth," *Urban Studies* 54, no. 4 (March 2017): 972, JSTOR.

⁶⁵ Susan Chira, "Korean Plane, 115 Aboard, Crashes in Southeast Asia," *The New York Times*, November 30, 1987.

international relations classifications, is an “undemocratic, unelected, transnational, multi-billion-dollar, not-for-profit, non-governmental organization.”⁶⁶ The overarching Cold War tensions of the late twentieth century placed a great deal of focus on state actors, especially those connected to the bipolar hegemons of the time. While the IOC was recognized as a viable legal entity under Swiss law on account of its headquartering in Lausanne, its status as an international non-governmental organization (INGO) offered it little leverage in global affairs.⁶⁷ The IOC’s non-profit status does not take away from the fact that the organization itself is financially independent.⁶⁸ This self-sufficiency allows for independence from state actors, and the resulting agency, especially when employed by President Samaranch, enabled the IOC to stand apart from and above North and South Korea.

The diplomatic background possessed by former Spanish ambassador Samaranch facilitated the IOC’s involvement in politically contentious issues. While many viewed Samaranch’s presidency as dictatorial, no doubt fueled by his insistence on being called “Excellency” and the fact that he raised the age limits for IOC presidents twice during his presidency to prevent himself from aging out of the position, Samaranch set the precedent for an “executive [IOC] presidency,” being onsite in Lausanne more frequently than past presidents and involving himself in more IOC functions overall.⁶⁹ The IOC administration underwent rapid expansion following Samaranch’s election, thereby allowing it to devote itself to developing an international reputation not just as the gatekeeper for global sports but also as an influential non- state actor.⁷⁰

In expanding the IOC’s administration, Samaranch made himself responsible for larger difficulties stemming from the increasingly complex bureaucracy in conjunction with prior financial mismanagement. Lord Killanin, the IOC president before Samaranch, was known to spend frivolously and almost contributed to the collapse of the IOC in the late 1970s.⁷¹ Aside from having to facilitate the IOC’s financial recuperation, Samaranch was also tasked with taking responsibility for its bureaucracy. The intricate connections between the organizations comprising the Olympic Movement makes accountability quite hard to place and so, in most Olympic failures, culpability fell on the IOC and, therefore, on Samaranch.⁷² However, Samaranch was able to increase both the international prestige of the IOC and its funding by successfully procuring rights to the Olympic rings.⁷³ By selling rights to the Olympic rings to transnational corporations, the Samaranch heightened the brand recognition of the Olympic Movement and incurred a steady income for its organizations, thereby solidifying the IOC as a competitive and adaptive INGO within the international sphere.

⁶⁶ Postlethwaite and Grix, “Beyond the Acronyms,” 295.

⁶⁷ Postlethwaite and Grix, “Beyond the Acronyms,” 301.

⁶⁸ Dr. Efthalia (Elia) Chatzigianni, “The IOC as an International Organization,” *Sport Management International Journal* 2, no. 1-2 (2006): 98, EBSCOhost.

⁶⁹ John Hoberman, “Think Again: The Olympics,” *Foreign Policy*, no. 167 (Jul. – Aug. 2008): 26, JSTOR.; Chappelet and Kübler-Mabbott, *International Olympic Committee*, 21, 24.

⁷⁰ Chappelet and Kübler-Mabbott, *International Olympic Committee*, 28.

⁷¹ Barbara Keys, “Political Protection: The International Olympic Committee’s UN Diplomacy in the 1980s,” *The International Journal of the History of Sport* 34, no. 11 (2017): 1161, Taylor & Francis Online.

⁷² Ryan Gauthier, *The International Olympic Committee, Law, and Accountability* (London: Routledge, 2017): 67.

⁷³ Chappelet and Kübler-Mabbott, *International Olympic Committee*, 107.

Non-state actors like the IOC tend to seek legitimacy because they lack the ability to encourage compliance with their aims through the application of violence.⁷⁴ Samaranch understood the need to be perceived as credible when dealing with international affairs, and the IOC had already experienced several failed forays into global politics. Samaranch attempted to obtain observer status in the UN for the IOC; however, “Eastern bloc enthusiasm made the initiative less appealing to Western European countries” who interpreted the IOC’s attempts as being “communist-inspired,” causing the initiative to fail.⁷⁵ The disasters in Mexico City and Munich, as well as the boycotts in Moscow and Los Angeles, further necessitated the success of the 1988 Seoul Olympics.⁷⁶ Samaranch was looked upon by some as “an unreconstructed Spanish fascist” who allowed corruption to run rampant within the IOC, with accusations even swirling about the possible bribery of IOC members contributing to Seoul’s win over Nagoya in 1981.⁷⁷ The IOC had previously resolved the “immense problems of the two Germanies and the two Chinas,” so Samaranch took it upon himself to navigate the IOC through the issue of the two Koreas and take charge of the resulting negotiations so as to allow the success of the Olympics to reflect positively on the IOC.⁷⁸

Samaranch’s diplomatic background enabled him to maintain personal relationships with South Korean leaders. Both the IOC and South Korea recognized that North Korea would not be granted the opportunity to co-host, but Samaranch involved himself in South Korea’s political transition to ensure that the Seoul Games were in the best position to succeed otherwise.

During South Korea’s democratic transition, Samaranch overstepped in some of the demands he made, going so far as to ask Chun Doo-Hwan to postpone South Koreans’ first presidential election until after the Olympic closing ceremonies in order to ensure that the Seoul Games would remain unmarred by political controversy and potentially violent public protests.⁷⁹ He suggested that Roh Tae-Woo hold off on the annual Team Spirit military exercises exemplifying the physical strength of the South Korean and American militaries so as not to provoke the North.⁸⁰ Samaranch visited Seoul two days prior to the public delivery of Roh’s watershed June 29, 1987 Declaration envisioning a newly democratic South Korea and, with Roh’s repeated mentioning of the Olympics in his address, there are even rumors that Samaranch prompted Roh to deliver this statement in an attempt to quell political opposition to the Seoul Games.⁸¹ By directly involving himself in South Korea’s political transition, Samaranch ensured that South Korea would not be the cause of a failed Olympic event that could further tarnish the IOC’s reputation.

Conclusion

The International Olympic Committee’s functioning as an INGO inherently drew the

⁷⁴ Gauthier, *The International Olympic Committee, Law, and Accountability*, 27.

⁷⁵ Keys, “Political Protection,” 1169.

⁷⁶ Gauthier, *The International Olympic Committee, Law, and Accountability*, 34.

⁷⁷ Hoberman, “Think Again,” 26.; Chappelet and Kübler-Mabbott, *International Olympic Committee*, 87.

⁷⁸ Pound, *Five Rings Over Korea*, 304.

⁷⁹ Pound, *Five Rings Over Korea*, 168.

⁸⁰ Juan Antonio Samaranch, “Letter from the International Olympic Committee President to Roh Tae-Woo, Requesting the Adjournment of the ‘Team Spirit 88’ Exercises for the Safety of the 1988 Seoul Olympics,” January 21, 1988, *History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, International Olympic Committee Archives* (Switzerland). Obtained for NKIDP by Sergey Radchenko, Wilson Center Digital Archive.

⁸¹ Black, “Olympic Games,” 1251.

BEYOND ALL BARRIERS

organization into global politics; however, under the leadership of President Juan Antonio Samaranch, the IOC underwent a transformative politicization in its resolution of the 1988 Olympic crisis. Though the prosperity and democratization that occurred in South Korea in the years precipitating the 1988 Seoul Games facilitated its emergence as a regional powerhouse, the South, along with North Korea, was still marred by its history of political instability and tied down by its loyalty to its Cold War hegemon. The IOC, on the other hand, entered the co-hosting negotiations with organizational stability and the universal appeal of Olympism. With Samaranch's diplomatic capabilities at the helm, the IOC emerged from the Korean negotiations most victorious, having not only put on a wildly successful Olympic Games but also subduing tensions between the two Koreas, thereby proving itself to be a serious and effectual non-state actor.

Though the IOC's recent selection of Sochi and Beijing as host cities raises questions about its newfound anti-democratic leanings, the Olympics Games nonetheless present a unique opportunity for the promotion of human rights. As the cameras of the foreign media put on display the impressive infrastructure of a host city or the interactions between the world's most impressive athletes, panning a little to the left might reveal immense urban poverty or the suppression of political opposition. Such was certainly the case in Seoul in 1988. Though it would be inaccurate to say that the IOC directly prompted the democratization of South Korea, Roh Tae-Woo recognized that international headlines highlighting the repression of student protests and Chun Doo-Hwan's pressing pause on constitutional reforms would only serve to weaken the international community's perception of South Korea as a valuable trading partner and a forward-thinking political ally. The recent 2022 Winter Games in Beijing serve as a prime example of this continued confluence of human rights and global sporting events. The United States, along with nine other states, participated in a diplomatic boycott of the Games in protest of human rights abuses against Muslim populations in China's Xinjiang province. Whether this boycott will improve the conditions of China's vulnerable Uyghur population has yet to be seen. However, it not only offers proof of the inextricable linkage between the Olympics and issues of human rights but also suggests that states recognize the legitimacy of the IOC and the potential of the organization to enact positive political change in arenas where state governments may not prove as effective.

There can be no doubt that the IOC became politically active the moment it selected Seoul as the 1988 Summer Olympics host city, and the success of this first political venture established the IOC as a legitimate actor, creating more space for non-state sporting actors to influence international politics in an increasingly globalized world. This analysis of the IOC's ascendancy to not only sit on par with state actors but, in the case of the 1988 Olympic crisis, outpace them proves the ever-important role held by non-state actors and suggests that looking to INGOs during times of crisis (especially those related to human rights violations) may help to promote international norms of peace and cooperation when state governments are either unwilling or unable to do so themselves. As states continue to collaborate in formal international institutions and informal cultural exchanges, non-state actors operating in the realm of global sports are increasingly functioning as informal channels for state communication and, therefore, warrant further exploration as to their impact on present and future global crisis.

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SEEPING SENTIMENT: Lost Cause Ideology During the Spanish-American War

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In 1898, the Spanish-American War was the first major conflict for the United States in the wake of its Civil War; as America called upon troops from the former Confederate states to the war effort, the Spanish-American War also represented a critical moment of reconciliation for a bitterly divided nation. This reconciliation, however, did not come without compromise.

Proponents of the Lost Cause ideology—a series of ideals utilized to promote Southern benevolence post-American Civil War—used American patriotism and the war effort as a vessel, spreading the ideology into Northern states as Union veterans protested. This paper utilizes student-run university newspapers from the North and South to show a geographic gap in Civil War memorialization among students, but also as evidence to demonstrate the generational gap between Union veterans and university students in the North concerning the Lost Cause. This generational gap between veterans and students was wholly absent in the South during the Spanish American war period. The spread of Lost Cause ideology shown through the writing of university students serves as a window into the ideals of the Northerners and Southerners who would shape the politics of the twentieth century.

On May 31, 1898, the student writers of the *Harvard Crimson* declared that “the memory of those fallen and yet to fall in the present war will be as dear as that of our past heroes. If we keep to our declared policy of war only for the liberation of Cuba, then they will have an enduring place in history.” One day prior to the Battle of San Juan Hill, the most infamous battle of the Spanish-American War, the students continued, “if, in the end, we pervert these ends, and are inspired by the lust of conquest, they will be remembered only as men of valor. Only wars of high aims leave behind imperishable names of greatness. *The fate of the dead hero is in the hands of those who survive him.*”¹ It is clear, then, that the Harvard students were conscious of their duty to the memory of their peers. The dead hero’s fate does lie greatly in the hands of those who survive him, just as the histories of nations have been in the hands of those who have written them. Still, these students failed to apply this understanding to the remembrance of the American Civil War whose fallen heroes they neglected.

While the *Harvard Crimson* abandoned the memory of their region’s veterans of the Civil War over the year of 1898, universities of the South, equipped with Lost Cause ideology, preserved and defended the honor of their Confederate veterans in a manner “entirely compatible with sectional reconciliation,” which refers to the cultural and social reunification of the Northern and Southern regions of the United

¹ “Memorial Day Services,” *The Harvard Crimson*, May 31, 1898.

States following the Civil War.² This is especially relevant to the analysis of ideas seeping from the South into the North within the younger generations of 1898 in direct opposition to the pleas of Union veterans. Through the spread of Lost Cause ideology, Southerners solidified the importance of Confederate memorialization across generations. People of previous Confederate states maintained the offensive in the battle of Civil War memory, while university students in the North were indifferent to the preservation of the memory of Union veterans during the Spanish-American War period. Proponents of the Lost Cause in the South, namely the students at The University of Alabama and Sewanee: The University of the South, utilized this moment to contextualize their admiration for the Confederacy along the lines of loyalty to the United States. This provides a point of comparison between the North and South to examine the impact of a generational gap concerning reconciliatory sentiment and Civil War memory in terms of the implications and effectiveness of Lost Cause mythology. The year of 1898, then, provides a valuable point of study to explore the generational gap concerning Civil War veterans' and the students' perception of the past and then-current wars.

The field of Civil War memory has been thoroughly explored within the past few decades. There is discussion of the moment of reconciliation, and among many of the field's historians, the Spanish-American War is seen at the very least as a significant marker in the path toward reconciliation between the North and South.³ As a catalyst for this reconciliation, the abandonment of Reconstruction and the acceptance of the South's racial policies helped to cool tensions among White Americans. David Blight, a historian of Civil War memory, has asserted that "the sectional reunion after so horrible a civil war was a political triumph by the late nineteenth century, but it could not have been achieved without the re-subjugation of many of those people whom the war had freed from centuries of bondage."⁴ Blight considered the Spanish-American War to be a moment of reconciliation due to the North's acceptance of the South's Lost Cause tenets. To be clear, the terms North and South as used here refer to groups that held the systematic power to shape social and cultural dynamics, namely the demographic of affluent, White male attendees of the universities discussed in this paper. This article also leans heavily on Barbara Gannon's work in "They Call Themselves Veterans': Civil War and Spanish War Veterans and the Complexities of Veteranhood," which provides an extensive analysis of reconciliatory feelings among Union veterans, namely among members of the Grand Army of the Republic (GAR), who often perceived Spanish-American War veterans as undeserving of the title of 'veteran.'⁵ Gannon provided a context for generational analysis between the Civil War and Spanish-American War veterans and their dispute over veteranhood and membership of veterans' associations as she illustrated that "the GAR's exclusion of Spanish War veterans from GAR membership

² Robert Cook, "A Quarrel Forgotten? Toward a Clearer Understanding of Sectional Reconciliation," *Journal of the Civil War Era* 6:3 (September 2016): 416, JSTOR.

³ David W. Blight, *Race and Reunion: The Civil War in American Memory* (Cambridge: Harvard University, 2001), 347, 352-53; Cook, "A Quarrel Forgotten?," 427-29; Gaines M. Foster, *Ghosts of the Confederacy: Defeat, the Lost Cause, and the Emergence of the New South, 1865-1913* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 145; O'Leary, *To Die For: The Paradox of American Patriotism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 146.

⁴ Blight, *Race and Reunion*, 400.

⁵ Barbara A. Gannon, "They Call Themselves Veterans': Civil War and Spanish War Veterans and the Complexities of Veteranhood," *Journal of the Civil War Era* 5, no. 4 (December 2015): 532, JSTOR.

SEEPING SENTIMENT

and rituals indicates that veteranhood—veterans’ shared identity—did not cross generations and wartime experiences.”⁶ The current scholarship lacks a focus on the generational gap beyond veterans’ groups and the Lost Cause’s span beyond regional borders, and this helps to set the stage for a more extensive analysis of Civil War memory across generations and renders sentiment during the Spanish-American War as a valuable point of comparison. Additionally, Gannon’s work in *The Won Cause* provides insight for the intellectual battle for Civil War memory among veterans and civilians; while her work does assert a generational gap in Civil War memory in the North, it does not provide an in-depth analysis of sentiment among those analyzed in this paper.⁷ This essay extends the research of Civil War memorialization and sectional reconciliation by exploring a new bank of primary sources and the specific outlooks of college-aged students during the Spanish-American War—whose ideas, influenced by Lost Cause ideology, represent the demographic of those who would hold the power to shape the policies of the United States for decades to follow.

This article employs the student-run university newspapers from Harvard University, Sewanee: The University of the South, The University of Alabama, and Yale University to illuminate the generational gap between Union veterans and service-aged university students in the North, which did not exist between Confederate veterans and service-aged Southerners. As these newspapers were written and edited by students themselves, they reflect firsthand the beliefs and ideals of the young men who fought in the Spanish-American War, America’s first major conflict since the Civil War. Insight into the difference between North and South provides greater context for sectional reconciliation and the phenomenon of difference in Civil War memory and commemoration between the North and South, as well as Spanish-American War rhetoric. These universities were chosen due to their Civil War involvement, support for the Spanish-American War, and prominence in their perspective regions. Additionally, primary sources concerning Union veterans and the GAR as well as Confederate veterans provide context for sentiment among Civil War veterans. This context is significant because it helps to shed light on which groups played a significant role in sectional reconciliation, how the Lost Cause played a part in this reconciliation and memorialization, and how the South managed to win the intellectual battle of Civil War memory for nearly a century following the Civil War. Utilizing the content of the four student-run university newspapers from the North and South throughout the Spanish-American War over the year of 1898, this article compares the difference in mentions of the two wars, analyzes the use of Lost Cause ideology, and evaluates the attitudes surrounding sectional reconciliation to provide a generational and geographic analysis.

The main tenets of the Lost Cause ideology surround the idea that the Civil War and secession were never about slavery. Rather, they were concerned with preserving states’ rights and upholding the Constitution. As defenders of the Constitution, Confederates were patriotic and noble Americans according to this framework. Secondly, the Lost Cause describes slavery as a benevolent institution for loyal and contented enslaved people, not as an atrocity. Thirdly, it illustrates Confederate soldiers as “among the greatest soldiers in history, and they were only defeated due to the Union’s superior manpower and resources.”⁸ The conclusion

⁶ Gannon, ““They Call Themselves Veterans,”” 529.

⁷ Barbara Gannon, *The Won Cause: The Black and White Comradeship in the Grand Army of the Republic* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 2011), 8.

⁸ Adam Dombay, *The False Cause: Fraud, Fabrication, and White Supremacy in Confederate Memory* (Charlottesville: University of Charlottesville Press, 2020), 6.

meant to be drawn from these tenets is that “instead of being remembered as traitors, Confederates should be recalled as heroic defenders of American principles.”⁹ Edward A. Pollard introduced this pseudohistorical narrative within a year of the Civil War’s end in *The Lost Cause: A New Southern History of the War of the Confederates*, and it was “embraced by many, if not most, White Southerners in the century after the Civil War.”¹⁰ While the Union won the Civil War, the “Lost Cause ... won the battle for Civil War memory much of the twentieth century.”¹¹

Spanning from April to December of 1898, the Spanish-American War seemingly brought the country together hardly thirty years following the end of the Civil War, and nearly twenty since the bitterness of Reconstruction. United States intervention in the Cuban War of Independence resulted in a war with Spain following the explosion of the *U.S.S. Maine*, as ‘Remember the Maine’ became a rallying cry among Americans in both the North and South to enter the war. The Spanish-American War is considered one of the possible historical markers of sectional reconciliation following the Civil War. Through the examination of student-run university newspapers in the North and South during the Spanish-American War, it is possible to provide a framework for questions surrounding Civil War memorialization and the effectiveness of the Lost Cause and its part in the moment of sectional reconciliation.

The comparison of memorialization and remembrance of the Civil War by each of these universities necessitates a synopsis of their involvement and experiences during the war. Arguably, the Southern universities had a much more intimate experience, as the war, along with its destruction and fighting, came to each of their campuses. The University of Alabama, home to the *Crimson White*, is its state’s oldest public university. The institution served as a military base for the Confederacy and suffered tremendous destruction by Union troops. Though the destruction was limited to the annihilation of buildings and materials with potential for use in the war, 1,500 men were sent into Tuscaloosa. “Their mission was to ‘destroy the bridge, factories, mills, university (military school), and whatever else may benefit the Rebel cause,’” and in the end, “only four buildings survived the destruction.”¹² President of the University, Landon C. Garland, noted in a letter to his father, “the University buildings are all burned. Nothing was saved but the private residence of the officers. The most valuable part of my library ... was consumed.”¹³ Several monuments were erected, grounds were honored, and traditions were put in place at The University of Alabama to commemorate both the destruction during the war as well as Confederate veterans. Similarly, Sewanee: The University of the South witnessed a skirmish during the war, which one Confederate soldier labeled a “rite sharp little fight.”¹⁴ While the destruction at the Sewanee campus seems to be generally exaggerated, the Union troops supposedly attempted, and succeeded, to destroy the cornerstone. On September 17, 1898, the paper mentioned that “after the Civil War ... the cornerstone

⁹ Adam Dombey, *The False Cause*, 6.

¹⁰ Dombey, *The False Cause*, 6.

¹¹ Barbara Gannon, *The Won Cause*, 187.

¹² J.B. Sellers, *History of University of Alabama, Vol. 1: 1818-1902* (University of Alabama, 1953), 281-92; John S. Sledge, *These Rugged Days: Alabama in the Civil War* (Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 2017), 153.

¹³ Letter, L.C. Garland to his father, May 30, 1865. Joint University Library, Vanderbilt University.

¹⁴ Richard Tillinghast, “Sewanee and the Civil War,” *Southwest Review*, Vol. 99, No. 3 (Southern Methodist University: 2014): 342, JSTOR.

SEEPING SENTIMENT

which had been laid with such ceremony, in 1860, was shattered, and its fragments carried far away.”¹⁵

Northern universities gave much to the Civil War effort, as well. Many Yale University and Harvard University students volunteered for the Union Army, as George Anson Bruce mentioned in *The Twentieth Regiment of Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry* that “the unit was officered largely by young men fresh from Harvard University ... for this reason it was popularly known as the Harvard regiment.”¹⁶ The participation of these universities, though, seems to be more complex than that of the Southern universities in the war, which was almost entirely on the behalf of the Confederacy. The students of Yale, for example, fought for both the North and South, and approximately twenty-two percent served in the war.¹⁷ While it is difficult to say that there were no Southern university students who served in the Union army, no notable number of students have been noted as doing so. This difference between the participation of Northern and Southern universities can be attributed to Southern youth having been regularly sent North to prestigious schools such as Yale University or Harvard University, while Northern students were not as often sent south for university. The poem later inscribed on the Yale Civil War memorial, “The Blue and the Gray” written by 1849 alumnus Francis Miles Finch, illustrates the prevalence of Confederate soldiers in the Northern university, in addition to reconciliatory sentiment following the war:

No more shall the war-cry sever,
Or the winding rivers be red:
 They banish our anger forever
 When they laurel the graves of our dead!
Under the sod and the dew,
Waiting the Judgment Day: -
 Love and tears for the Blue;
 Tears and love for the Gray.¹⁸

While these universities did not suffer the physical damage as the universities did below the Mason-Dixon line, they dedicated their efforts to the Union cause, and suffered tremendous loss among student body.

Veterans of the Civil War felt strongly about the memorialization and remembrance of their sacrifices, and as the veterans of the Union were aware of the spread of Lost Cause mythology, they attempted to combat it. Union veterans held a “strong commitment to a sectional narrative of the Civil War that was fundamentally at odds with most, if not all, of the central tenets of the Lost Cause.”¹⁹ Additionally, Union veterans refused “to accept any notion that Confederate efforts to destroy the nation were as laudable as their efforts to save it.”²⁰ Much to their dismay, Theodore Roosevelt, in an article from January of 1900, a month after the Spanish-American War’s end, noted, “we are all glad that the Union was restored, and are one in our loyalty to it; and hand in hand with this general recognition ... that the man from the

¹⁵ *Sewanee Purple*, September 17, 1898.

¹⁶ George A. Bruce, *The Twentieth Regiment of Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry, 1861-1865* (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company: 1906), 7, Hathitrust.

¹⁷ Amy Athey McDonald, “Yale Collections Capture the Memories, Music, and Mayhem of the Civil War,” *Yale News*, (April 8, 2015).

¹⁸ *Yale Memorials*, (New Haven, Connecticut: 1963), 45-47, EliScholar.; Francis Miles Finch “The Blue and the Gray,” *The Atlantic Monthly* (September 1867).

¹⁹ Cook, “A Quarrel Forgotten?,” 422.

²⁰ Gannon, ““They Call Themselves Veterans,”” 532.

North and the man from the South each was loyal to his highest ideal of duty when he drew sword or shouldered rifle to fight to the death for what he believed to be right.”²¹ The aims of Southerners and Confederate veterans were effective in pushing sectional reconciliation within their own terms, as in December of 1898, President McKinley asserted that “sectional feeling no longer holds back the love we bear each other ... found in the gallant loyalty to the Union and flag so conspicuously shown in the year just passed.”²² This speech in Atlanta confirmed the efforts toward and popular support for sectional reconciliation among both Northerners and Southerners. While this sentiment saw heightened popularity across the nation during the Spanish-American War and in light of the United States’ victory, this was not shared among many Union veterans who “rejected any sense of equality in the importance of the causes or of the sacrifices that they had demanded.”²³ To these men, “the idea of reconciliation implied mutual sacrifice, to be made by both aggrieved parties, who admit their sins and agree to attempt to put the past behind them,” and it was an unimaginable compromise.²⁴ As members of a separate generation, lacking personal memories of the Civil War and the phenomenon of Lost Cause mythology in the South, students were “able to view the Confederate military as an honored part of the American military experience. They did not share the GAR members’ understanding that Confederate courage served a cause intent on destroying the American Union.”²⁵

Following the Civil War’s end, universities worked toward regaining normalcy, and for the schools in the South, this time was marked by Reconstruction and reintegration back into the Union. Over the few decades following the Civil War up until the turn of the century, Sewanee: The University of the South and The University of Alabama worked toward reconciliation. As stated in the *Sewanee Purple* on April 9, 1898,

When the history comes to be truly written, it will be found that ... before the echoes of the war had ceased, and when the bitterness of strife was still fresh in the minds and hearts of the people, this institution alone, by the voice and actions of its first vice-chancellor, called men from their animosities and resentments and bade them to seek and foster together, the arts of peace. Certainly, Sewanee has done its work, and that a great one, in bringing men of the two sections into the right relations with each other.²⁶

The reminiscence of Sewanee’s first vice-chancellor conveys a push in reconciliatory sentiment during April of 1898, just before the declaration of war, although the university was founded upon the principle of providing a Southern university free from Northern influence, as one of its founders asserted it would “materially aid the South to resist and repel a fanatical domination which seeks to rule over us,” illustrating a stark contrast in sectional rhetoric from around the time of the

²¹ Theodore Roosevelt, *The Strenuous Life; Essays and Addresses*. New York, Century Co., 1900, Bartleby.

²² Grace E. Hale, *Making Whiteness: The Culture of Segregation in the South, 1890-1940*, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1998), 67-68.; United Confederate Veterans: Charles Broadway Rouss Camp, No. 1191, *Report on the Re-burial of the Confederate Dead in Arlington Cemetery*, (Washington, DC: Judd & Detweiler, 1901), 10-11, Internet Archive.

²³ Gannon, “They Call Themselves Veterans,” 532.

²⁴ Benjamin G. Cloyd, *Haunted by Atrocity: Civil War Prisons in American Memory* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2010), 110.

²⁵ Gannon, *The Won Cause*, 182.

²⁶ *Sewanee Purple*, April 9, 1898, <https://dspace.sewanee.edu/handle/11005/16453>.

SEEPING SENTIMENT


Civil War to the Spanish-American War.²⁷

The remembrance of the Civil War and its inclusion in these university newspapers varies greatly by region. While there is a nearly constant mention of the Confederacy, its soldiers, and the Civil War in the *Sewanee Purple* and *Crimson White*, the *Harvard Crimson* and *Daily Yale* seldom reference the war, and even less its veterans and their sacrifices. Within the *Harvard Crimson*, the only mentions of the Civil War over the year of 1898 were during the month of May, in which the university hosted a “course of eight lectures on Soldier’s and Sailor’s Life.”²⁸ Among these lecturers, three were Union veterans, and they spoke on the topics of Army life, Navy life, and the medical care for soldiers during the Civil War. Outside of the explanation of these lectures, there was no other mention throughout the year. Union veterans regularly implored United States citizens to teach of their sacrifices, to preserve their memory, and solidify the meaning of their cause.²⁹ The lack of acknowledgement, especially in comparison to the volume of memorialization by Southern universities while Union veterans plead for recognition, points to a disconnect among these generations in the North that did not exist in the South as the battle for Lost Cause memory of the Civil War transcended generations.

The explanation of this phenomenon could be the constant position of Southerners on the offensive of the battle over Civil War memory. Groups such as the United Daughters of the Confederacy (UDC) worked tirelessly to instill the values of the Lost Cause into the younger generations of the South through after-school programs, public school textbook requirements, and publications of Civil War history along the lines of Lost Cause tenets. In an 1897 edition of the *Confederate Veteran*, there was discussion of discontinuing the use of the song ‘Dixie,’ to which one Southern woman replied:

We as Southern people, glory in this ‘tendency to keep alive the sentiment of the lost cause.’ Why not: Have we anything of which to be ashamed? True, defeat was ours, but it was brought about not through any lack of bravery, gallantry, or patriotism for what we believe to be right because of its being guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States. The record of Confederate soldiers is without a parallel in history, and, as time goes on, instead of being classed as traitors, their many gallant deeds and loyal hearts will be appreciated for their true worth, and their names go down in history as heroes true to every trust.

She continued to elaborate that “it is not that we love the ‘Star-Spangled



Huestis Pratt Cook, *Human Confederate Flag*, ca. 1907, Richmond, Virginia. VCU Commons.

²⁷ Steven Dayle, *Carry Me Back: The Domestic Slave Trade in American Life*, (Oxford University Press: 2013), 205-207.

²⁸ “Soldier’s and Sailor’s Life: Eight Lectures to be Delivered Before the University,” *Harvard Crimson*, May 10, 1898.

²⁹ Benjamin C. Cloyd, *Haunted by Atrocity: Civil War Prisons in American Memory* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2010), 92-93.

THE CRIMSON HISTORICAL REVIEW

Banner' less, but 'Dixie' will always be absolutely sacred to Southern hearts ... around 'Dixie' twine our fondest memories and dearest associations."³⁰ Her admiration and ardent vindication for the Confederate cause and tenets of the Lost Cause mirror the efforts by various other organizations for Confederate memorialization.

While the *Harvard Crimson* made very few mentions of the war, the *Daily Yale* made only three mentions of the Civil War or its veterans. The first, on January 18, 1898, the paper included an announcement for the Freshman Union debate, whose topic was, "Resolved, that the Civil War was necessary for the abolition of slavery."³¹ Of the three mentions of the war, one concerns the meaning of the war and its necessity for the war's most significant outcome. To many Union veterans, though, this would not shy from their own interpretation, as they saw the meaning of the war as the fortification of the Union of the United States; "Northern veterans accepted reunion with former Confederates because it validated their efforts to preserve the Union," but in contrast to the views of university students, "they rejected any sense of equality in the importance of the causes or of the sacrifices that they had demanded."³²

The next mention was not until December 3, 1898, included in a short history of the Yale Chapter of Phi Beta Kappa for its 122nd anniversary. Its mention of the Civil War, though, was only in reference to how it disrupted the meetings of the society: "at the time of the Civil War, although the annual orations and poems were continued, the private meetings had wholly disappeared, so that in 1871 the last thread of tradition seemed to be broken."³³ Again, there is not a recollection of the war's veterans, their sacrifice, or valor, but rather a note concerning the society's attendance. The third and final mention of the Civil War did not concern the Union, but instead the Confederacy. In an announcement on December 15, 1898, for the eleventh annual meeting of the American Economic Association, it mentioned that "among the important papers to be read," there would be "one by Professor J. C. Schwab on 'Prices in the Confederate States during the War.'"³⁴ Of these three examples from the *Daily Yale* over the year of 1898, they neglect to include acknowledgement and appreciation for the sacrifices of Union veterans. In his war memoir written in 1896, Ezra Ripple pleaded with his fellow Americans, "if you appreciate the sacrifice, teach your boys and girls their duty in preserving to posterity this Union for which their lives were so freely given."³⁵ Rather than practice any sort of responsibility in the preservation of their memory, the *Daily Yale*, along with the *Harvard Crimson*, took no initiative in doing so. The intensity surrounding Civil War memorialization was weaker in the North, especially during the height of the UDC organization from 1894 to 1914. While Union veterans did plead for recognition and acknowledgement of their sacrifices, groups outside of these veterans do not seem to have been nearly as active in the North as in the South. This, possibly in part because the South arguably had much more to prove, could provide an explanation as to why Northern university students were not concerned with the preservation of the memory of Union veterans.

One of the most interesting announcements within the *Daily Yale* over the year of 1898 was the announcement of a lecture by an infamous Lost Cause proponent

³⁰ "Time to Call Off 'Dixie,'" *Confederate Veteran*, 1897, 113-14.

³¹ *Daily Yale*, January 18, 1898, Yale Daily News Historical Archive.

³² Gannon, "They Call Themselves Veterans," 532.

³³ *Daily Yale* December 3, 1898, Yale Daily News Historical Archive.

³⁴ *Daily Yale*, December 15, 1898, Yale Daily News Historical Archive.

³⁵ Ezra Ripple, *Dancing Along the Deadline: The Andersonville Memoir of a Prisoner of the Confederacy* (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1996), 1-6.

SEEPING SENTIMENT

and Southern writer. While this example is not explicitly a mention of the Civil War, the *Daily Yale* announced, “one of the best lectures of the season is to be given at College St. Hall this evening at 8 o’clock. The lecturer, Thomas Nelson Page ... is best known through his negro dialect stories and essays on the South, which have been published at intervals during the past ten years.”³⁶ Thomas Nelson Page received an invitation as a renowned author, yet he was a proponent of the Lost Cause narrative and a Southern writer endorsed by the UDC. Blight provides a valuable contextualization for this lecture, as he noted the opinion of Mildred Rutherford, the historian general for the UDC, that “no library should be without ... all of Thomas Nelson Page’s books.” This aligns with the UDC’s “constant appeals for ‘truthful history,’ Lost Cause ideology, especially the notions that slavery really did not cause the war and that Reconstruction was ... vicious oppression.”³⁷ In welcoming Page to campus, the Yale students not only neglected to signify appreciation for Union veterans and their cause, but cheerfully invited a strong proponent of the Lost Cause to speak before the student body. Soon after this invitation, Yale University offered Page an honorary degree in 1901—a man who was the “foremost champion of the Lost Cause” to his generation.³⁸ In the battle for Civil War memory, this provides an example of how the South remained victorious for nearly a century following the war.

Throughout the year of 1898, the *Sewanee Purple* and *Crimson White* made numerous mentions of the Civil War, Confederate veterans, and the sacrifices they made in accordance with Lost Cause ideology. On April 9, 1898, the *Sewanee Purple* included the following addition after the announcement of a lively debate concerning current events:

Better a thousand times give vent to genuine though mistaken conviction and expression to righteous though misdirected sympathy and enthusiasm than to let the deadening influence of nonchalance or the sordid sentiment of self-interest stifle the ennobling impulses of the soul, the unselfish love of humanity, honor and patriotism.³⁹

While this excerpt might initially seem appropriate within the context of political advocacy and the discussion of foreign relations, the idea of “righteous misdirected sympathy” as a better alternative to “deadenning influence of nonchalance” illustrates the lingering stubbornness over the cause of the Civil War and nobility of Confederate veterans throughout the South. Additionally, included on the same day, the paper announced the death of a Bishop who was a “Chaplain in the Confederate army ... and the second founder of the University.” The paper noted, “there are two classes of people who must deplore his loss and reverence his memory with special and profound tenderness and affection, and they are the Confederate veterans and the alumni of The University of the South.”⁴⁰ The paper later throughout the year mentions the sons of Confederate veterans and the specific attribute of many as Confederate veterans or previous Confederate commanders. The *Sewanee Purple* attributed the success of the university to Confederate veterans and demonstrated a strong pride in the South and its cause in the Civil War.

Even more so, the *Crimson White* demonstrated its appreciation for the Confederate cause. On February 16, 1898, a lecture was announced to be given by “a

³⁶ *Daily Yale*, May 18, 1898, Yale Daily News Historical Archive.

³⁷ Blight, *Race and Reunion*, 282.

³⁸ Michael Flusche, “Thomas Nelson Page: The Quandary of a Literary Gentleman.” *The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography* 84, no. 4 (1976): 464-85, JSTOR.

³⁹ *Sewanee Purple*, April 9, 1898.

⁴⁰ *Sewanee Purple*, April 9, 1898.

brilliant son of Alabama,” in which he spoke of the causes of the Civil War; he claimed that “this great struggle should not be considered so much as the outcropping of the antagonism between the Puritan and the Cavalier as it is customary to consider it.”⁴¹ This mention conveys the Lost Cause imagery of the Cavalier Confederate soldier and Southern gentlemen, and in comparison, imagery of the Puritan Union soldier. Soon after on March 4, there was a meeting of the state association of the UDC. On May 5, there was an announcement for the Freshman Exhibition of public speakers, and the topics consisted of Perpetuity of the Union, The Death of Stonewall Jackson, The New South, and The Confederate Dead. Additionally, on this day, there was an announcement of a Confederate Memorial, and it stated, “as usual the corps of cadets formed in battalion and marched to the cemetery last Tuesday afternoon to do honor to the Confederate dead.”⁴² Later that month, it proudly mentioned that a student had been appointed to the staff of the famous Confederate veteran, General Joseph Wheeler, in the Spanish-American War.⁴³ Throughout the year, there were several similar mentions of Confederate veterans in the Spanish-American War. One extraordinary inclusion in June of 1898 concerned the Massachusetts 6th Regiment:

The Sixth Massachusetts Regiment was given a cordial public welcome through Baltimore May 21st on its way South. It was reviewed by the mayor and passed under mottoes and decorations which commenced the change that has taken place since the same regiment, on its way South April 19, 1861, was attacked by a mob. A basket of flowers, which was presented to the regiment by the city, bore the inscription ‘Baltimore welcomes the Sixth Regiment. Flowers not bullets.’ A basket of lunch was given each soldier, within was a card inscribed, ‘Maryland’s greeting to Massachusetts. May the memory of 1861 be effaced by the welcome of 1898’ Confederate veterans formed an escort and among them was a group of rock throwers who took part in the attack on the regiment in 1861. The regiment had one colored company which was cheered with special cordiality.⁴⁴

This short history of the Sixth Massachusetts Regiment provides an illustration of the animosities during the Civil War, and how far removed they felt from that situation during the Spanish-American War. The inclusion of heightened Civil War memorialization in the *Crimson White* conveys the connection to Confederate veterans among the younger generation of Southerners, but also demonstrates the effectiveness and persistence of Lost Cause ideology. These ideas not only reverberated through the South but seeped into the North through connections such as the Southern figure Thomas Nelson Page’s visit to speak at Yale. Additionally, this instance provides context for the pattern of sectional reconciliation during the Spanish-American War as well as the patriotism shown by ex-Confederates throughout 1898. In July of 1899, General James Longstreet, a famous Confederate and Spanish-American War veteran, asserted that “barring a little family misunderstanding of a generation back, the South has never been anything but loyal.”⁴⁵ This further conveys reconciliatory sentiment following the Spanish-American War and that the South’s loyalty to the Union was proven by its participation in the war of 1898.

These inconsistencies of Civil War memory across regions of the United States convey not only the South’s commitment to the battle over Civil War memory

⁴¹ *Crimson White*, February 16, 1898.

⁴² *Crimson White*, May 5, 1898.

⁴³ *Crimson White*, May 21, 1898.

⁴⁴ *Crimson White*, June 1898.

⁴⁵ James Longstreet, “Loyal South of To-Day,” *The Independent ... Devoted to the Consideration of Politics, Social and Economic Tendencies, History, Literature, and the Arts (1848-1921)* (July 6, 1899), ProQuest.

SEEPING SENTIMENT

and meaning, but also general passivity among the demographic of students in the North concerning its Civil War veterans as demonstrated by the students of Yale and Harvard. The Grand Army of the Republic consistently pushed for their narrative of Civil War history, as did the United Confederate Veterans, but only the latter proved effective in pushing their narrative through to span across generations and regions in the early years following the Civil War. As the Union veterans in the North worked to ensure their memorialization and to combat the Lost Cause mythology, the university-aged students did little to assist them. In contrast, students at Southern universities readily and frequently assisted Confederate veterans and proponents of the Lost Cause in their goals. Beyond these differences in Civil War memorialization and rhetoric during the year of 1898, these sources provide a context for sentiment concerning the Spanish-American War, which serves as a significant moment as a marker of sectional reconciliation. These student-run newspapers provide numerous examples of concern over the war and students' intrigue concerning tense foreign relations. Each began to memorialize the veterans of the Spanish-American War prior to the war's end influenced by Lost Cause mythology. Ideas infused with the Lost Cause were perpetuated by the demographic who would hold the power to cultivate the harmful political and social status quo in the United States for the greater part of the twentieth century.

The Spanish-American War as a significant moment in sectional reconciliation following the American Civil War renders the year of 1898 as a valuable point of analysis. This is especially poignant in the North, whose students neglected the Union veterans' pleas to reject ideas of the Lost Cause. This comparison of Civil War memorialization and the merging of ideas among the younger generations in the North and South presents a foreshadowing of the ongoing process of sectional reconciliation that would continue for decades, especially in the areas of compromise by the North in light of Southern stubbornness. As mentioned at the beginning of the article, Harvard's students conveyed an understanding of the responsibility for memory concerning war veterans with their proclamation that "the fate of the dead hero is in the hands of those who survive him."⁴⁶ These students realized the importance of preserving the honor of fallen veterans, yet they did not actively apply their understanding to the memory of Union veterans from the Civil War. The power of the Lost Cause spread beyond the South and into the North, impacting the view and sympathies of Harvard and Yale's students. This is significant as it provides a greater context for the moment of sectional reconciliation and the generational gap among not only Spanish-American War and Civil War veterans, but also the younger civilians across the North and South who would lead the United States in the decades following through the Gilded Age and into the Progressive Era—whose legislative decisions would be influenced by the Lost Cause for years to come.

⁴⁶ "Memorial Day Services," *The Harvard Crimson*.

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Crimson Historical Review